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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
As perhaps the most comprehensive piece of farm legislation since the 
1930s, the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 marked the beginning of a new 
approach toward grains policy. With the creation of the Farmer-Owned 
Reserve program, emphasis was shifted toward grain reserves as the primary 
policy instrument and away from price supports and supply control, where 
publically controlled stocks were only a residual of the grains policy. 
The innovations provided under the 1977 act were primarily outgrowths 
of responses to the upheavals in commodity markets during the early 1970s. 
Events during this period significantly changed the nature of world grain 
markets. The major developments included a sharp increase in petroleum 
prices, a movement among larger trading nations from fixed to flexible 
exchange rates, a change in Soviet import policy, production variability 
around the world, and the increased reliance of the U.S. on agricultural 
exports in the wake of a rising use of insulating trade policies by other 
countries. These events fostered a sharp increase in price variability, 
which together with changes in the economic and political situation in rural 
America, were instrumental forces in motivating the introduction and passage 
of the Farmer-Owned Reserve (FOR) program. 
Although the goals of the FOR program have never been explicitly 
stated, the program is assumed to have the dual objectives of price 
stabilization and price support. The primary emphasis is presumably on 
"partially" stabilizing prices. That is, the program operates with the 
intention of increasing the probability that market prices will fall within 
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a pre-established price range, rather than stabilizing prices around a 
target. 
Although the pursuit of these objectives takes place through a complex 
set of program features, the economics of FOR operation are relatively 
simple. Through the program's offering of low interest loans and storage 
subsidies at low prices, producers are encouraged to reduce marketings and 
hold more grain in storage than they would otherwise. The removal of these 
benefits at high prices, and the possible imposition of certain penalties 
for continued grain storage, induces producers to release these quantities 
to the market. The accumulation and release of "reserve" stocks in this 
fashion, buffers the impact of demand and supply side instabilities, thereby 
reducing price variation. 
Since its inception, the Farmer-Owned Reserve has become a massive and 
quite variable component of the commodity market structure. FOR stocks of 
corn, for example, have fluctuated from 185 million bushels in 1981, to over 
2.7 billion bushels in 1983, constituting 3 percent and 33 percent of total 
production, respectively. A program of such magnitude and variability has 
obvious and important implications, not only for the eligible crops, but for 
related crops and the livestock industry as well. 
Purpose of the Study 
This study entails an econometric investigation of the market impacts 
of the FOR program for corn. The approach focuses on assessing some of the 
price-quantity impacts of the program on the markets of the corn-livestock 
sector. While the strongest focus is on corn markets, the livestock 
subsector is included in the study because of the strong interdependencies 
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that exist between the two, and because as Breimyer and Rhodes (1975) point 
out, policy measures designed for one part of the subsector may have 
substantial and unintended effects upon other, closely interrelated parts. 
Because the primary goal of the FOR program is the stabilization of 
prices for the eligible crops, the main objective in the study is to examine 
the success of the program in achieving a reduction in corn price variation 
over time. The issue is taken up in a seasonal framework, so that the 
stabilizing characteristics of the program can be evaluated in both 
intrayear and interyear terms. Secondary objectives of the study include 
examining the program's effects on corn price levels, disappearance and 
carryover stocks, and livestock prices and variability. 
A quarterly econometric modeling approach is employed as the means of 
identifying the specific market impacts of the program. The equations of 
the model embody the supply and demand sides of the corn, fed beef, pork, 
and broiler markets. Simulation of the model over the period 1971IV-1982IV 
under both the FOR policy and an alternative storage strategy, are conducted 
for the purpose of contrasting the behavior of the relevant markets when 
conditioned by the two strategies. 
Organization of the Study 
The study is organized into nine chapters which are intended to provide 
a systematic approach to investigating the problems outlined above. 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a brief review of previous 
studies which are directly concerned with operational or performance issues 
of the Farmer-Owned Reserve program. Presented in the first section is an 
overview of the more important evaluative studies of the market impacts and 
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performance of the program. Following this is à summary of other research 
works focusing on partial aspects of the program which are considered 
relevant to the study. 
Chapter II takes up the issue of market instability as a policy 
problem, and the role of publically operated buffer stocks in U.S. 
agricultural policy. The mechanics of buffer stock operation, as well as 
operational considerations in buffer stock management are highlighted. 
The major provisions of the Farmer-Owned Reserve program for corn are 
summarized in Chapter III, followed by a brief review of reserve operations 
for the years, 1977-1983. 
A theoretical discussion of the influence of the program on price 
variability is taken up in Chapter IV. In a comparative statics framework, 
the price moderating ability of the program is examined. A section of the 
chapter is also devoted to a discussion of the interaction of reserve stocks 
with privately held free stocks of grain. As is widely recognized, the 
extent of this interaction has noteworthy implications for the performance 
of the program. 
Chapter V contains a descriptive summary of the structure of the U.S. 
corn-livestock subsector. As Johnson and Rausser (1977) point out, study of 
the underlying system of interest should precede consideration of model 
construction. As such, attention is focused on the structure of the 
subsector and identifying the interrelations between its components, as a 
basis for the specification of an econometric model of the subsector. 
A comprehensive econometric model of the corn-livestock subsector is 
presented in Chapter VI. Conceptualization of the model is based on 
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standard microeconomic theory with recognition of the specific biological 
and market characteristics of the respective commodities. Discussion of the 
specification of the model and the estimation results for the stochastic 
equations are presented in detail. 
Validation tests of the model are conducted in Chapter VII. The 
simulation performance, as well as stabilizing characteristics of the model 
are checked by historical and ex post model forecasts, and by multiplier 
analysis. 
Chapter VIII presents the empirical analysis of the Farmer-Owned 
Reserve program. Two models are formulated — one describing the structure 
of the relevant markets under the FOR program, and one describing the 
markets under an alternative storage policy designed to replicate the stock 
management strategies prior to implementation of the FOR in 1977. Solutions 
generated for the two models over the period corresponding to the first five 
years of the FOR program provide the basis for examining the market 
implications of the program relative to continuation of the pre-1977 
policies. 
The analysis concludes with a brief summary of the study in Chapter IX. 
Review of Selected Studies 
Several studies have sought to determine the market implications of the 
FOR program. In a variety of contexts, the program has been judged with 
respect to its effects on such factors as grain and livestock price levels 
and variability, total carryover stocks, producer income variability, and 
government expenditures. A brief overview of the major empirical studies 
is presented, with discussion confined primarily to the methods of 
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analysis, and the results reached significant to this study. For 
comparative purposes, the methodologies of these studies are summarized in 
Table 1.1. 
Sharpies 
An initial evaluation of the program was conducted by Sharpies (1980). 
Policies affecting wheat markets prior to, and since 1977 were compared in 
their abilities to meet a set of six conflicting policy objectives 
including improved price stability, higher and more stable producer 
incomes, reduced government expenditures and intervention, adequate 
reserves for foreign trade committments, and more consumer protection from 
very high prices. In the analysis, the pre-1977 wheat policy included 
deficiency payments, accumulation of wheat stocks when the market price 
fell below the loan, and release of those stocks when the price exceeded 
115 percent of the loan. The post-1977 wheat policy differed by adding the 
FOR, and raising the release price of wheat stocks owned by the Commodity 
Credit Corporation (CCC) to 180 percent of the loan. 
Using a computer simulation model of the U.S. wheat industry, the 
policy options were stochastically simulated over the seven crop years, 
1977/78 to 1983/84, using a randomly selected series of shocks to U.S. 
wheat yield and exports. The results of interest indicated that relative 
to the pre-1977 policy, the post-1977 policy decreased wheat price 
variability, increased both the mean wheat price and privately-owned 
carryover stocks, and decreased government-held stocks. However, the 
analysis indicated that the post-1977 policy failed to significantly 
enhance producer incomes. 
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Table 1.1. Overview of major empirical studies of the Farmer-Owned Reserve Program 
Author 
Program 
commodity Purpose of study Model 
Trea 
FOR 
Sharpies (1980) wheat contrast ability of 
alternative storage 
policies in meeting 
certain objectives 
WHEATS 
(nonestimated, 
annual) 
endo 
Meyers and 
Ryan (1981) 
corn and 
wheat 
estimate effects of 
FOR on prices, stocks, 
and production 
five equation 
dynamic models 
(nonestimated, 
annual) 
exog 
Meyers, Womack wheat 
and Bredahl (1981) 
estimate effects of 
FOR on prices, stocks, 
utilization, and 
production 
variation of 
Gallagher et al. 
(1981) model 
(annual) 
Gardner (1981a) corn and estimate effects of 
wheat FOR on prices and 
stocks 
series of single 
equations (annual, 
quarterly) 
Just (1981) corn and 
wheat 
estimate effects of FOR 
on grain prices and 
stocks, and livestock 
prices and production 
34 equation model 
of corn, wheat, 
livestock markets 
(quarterly) 
exog 
Morton (1982) corn and estimate effects of FOR 35 equation model 
wheat and alternative policies of feedgrain. endc 
on grain and livestock wheat, livestock 
prices markets (annual) 
Salathe, Price all program 
and Banker (1984) commodities 
but rice 
estimate effects of FOR 
on grain and livestock 
markets, farm income, 
and government costs 
FAPSIM 
(annual) 
^Bushel for bushel substitution of reserve stocks for free stocks used in the comi 
WHEATSIM is a simulation model of the U.S. wheat market, described in detail in I 
^FAPSIM is a comprehensive model of the U.S. agricultural sector, discussed in Sai 

! Program 
Treatment of 
FOR stocks 
Substitution 
coefficient Method of analysis 
) endogenous -0.4 
(assumed) 
stochastic simulation of alternative 
policies over period 1977/78-1983/84, 
using randomly selected shocks to U.S. 
wheat yield and exports 
s exogenous -0.2, -0.4 
(assumed) 
deterministic simulation of FOR and 
alternative policy for period 1977-1981, 
under both scenarios for substitution 
coefficients 
al. endogenous -0.2 
(estimated) 
reduced form impact analysis of 
production and export shocks in 
1978/79 and 1980/81 
igle 
inual, exogenous 
-0.74 wheat 
-0.61 corn 
(estimated) 
graphical analysis and simple 
regressions for storage rules, 
and price dependent equations 
lodel 
It, 
:kets 
exogenous 
-0.81 wheat 
-0.52 corn 
(estimated) 
deterministic simulation of estimated 
model, and estimated model with all 
FOR variables removed for period, 
1977III-1979II 
model 
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:ock 
jal) 
endogenous 
-0.24 wheat 
-0.26 corn 
(estimated) 
•stochastic simulation of alternative 
policies over period 1981-1990, using 
randomly selected shocks to U.S. crop 
yields and exports 
-0.55 wheat deterministic simulation of estimated 
exogenous -0.38 corn model with all FOR variables removed, 
) (estimated) compared with actual market outcomes 
for 1977-1981 
ed in the commercial Inventory demand equations, 
in detail in Holland and Sharpies (1978). 
scussed in Salathe, Price, and Gadson (1982). 
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Meyers and Ryan 
Another preliminary assessment of the FOR program was performed by 
Meyers and Ryan (1981). Employing an annual model of the U.S. corn and 
wheat markets, the market influence of the FOR was examined relative to an 
alternative policy utilizing only a nonrecourse loan program. To 
investigate the hypothesis that the FOR moderates price movements, a five 
equation dynamic model was constructed using assumed values for the price 
elasticities and the FOR and CCC substitution coefficients for free stocks. 
The results for the period 1978/79 to 1980/81 suggested that elimination of 
the FOR would result in a larger price variance, lower total stocks, and 
higher free stocks for both corn and wheat. Moreover, the FOR may have 
slightly increased the average price for wheat, although the authors could 
detect no significant effect of the program on average corn prices over the 
three year period. 
Meyers, Womack and Bredahl 
Employing an annual model of the U.S. wheat market, Meyers et al. 
(1981) were the first to endogenize reserve quantities of grain. In a 
simple theoretical model, the authors show that the presence of reserve 
stocks as both a demand shifter (via free stocks), and a price responsive 
demand component, would increase the price elasticity of total demand if 
the substitution coefficient of reserves for free stocks was in the range 
(-1,0]. To investigate the hypothesis that the price impact of supply or 
demand shocks was muted in the presence of the FOR, reduced form 
multipliers were obtained from the structural model for both a production 
shock and export shock induced in the 1977/78 and 1979/80 crop years. The 
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change in market behavior as a result of the FOR was evaluated by comparing 
the impacts when reserves were endogenously determined, to when they were 
fixed (corresponding to a no reserve situation, or a reserve filled to 
capacity). The findings revealed that the FOR in the two periods acted as 
a shock absorber, moderating price fluctuations. The shocks were absorbed 
by changes in reserve stocks, increasing the variability of total stocks 
while decreasing the variability of quantities flowing to the other 
consumption channels. 
Gardner 
A relatively lengthy, but rather ad hoc evaluation of the program was 
provided by Gardner (1981a). The methodologies used centered primarily on 
graphical analysis in conjunction with single equation regressions in 
examining the program's influence on annual, and quarterly grain stocks, 
and annual, quarterly, and daily grain prices. The conclusions reached 
contrasted sharply with those of previous studies. Gardner found that the 
FOR had no significant direct effects on grain prices in the 1977 and 1978 
marketing years, and had only a very small impact on total stocks. 
Furthermore, FOR activities directed at short term price stabilization were 
found to be largely unsuccessful. 
Just 
The first comprehensive econometric treatment of the subject was 
conducted by Just (1981). The analysis was based on the deterministic 
simulation of a 34 equation quarterly model of the wheat/feedgrain/ 
livestock economy. With exogenous reserve quantities, the model was 
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estimated for the two year period, 1977III to 1979II. Adding back the 
calculated residuals, the model was then simulated over the same period 
with all FOR variables removed. The generated data points were used to 
represent the market's response to actual conditions in the absence of the 
FOR program or any other price supporting policy. Using this approach, 
Just concluded that corn prices were supported by the FOR during the first 
year of the program, but quickly depressed in the second year. The finding 
was attributed to a maladjustment of the livestock industry to the 
reserve-influenced grain prices of the program's first year. 
Reserve-supported corn prices of 1977/78 allegedly led to a reduction in 
cattle placed on feed and in the number of hogs kept for market, thereby 
lowering the demand for feed and hence depressing corn prices in 1978/79. 
To evaluate the ability of the FOR in moderating unexpected price 
shocks, the one quarter response of the markets (with and without the FOR) 
to the Soviet grain embargo of 1980 was also examined. The outcome 
indicated that the FOR did moderate the market shocks of the embargo. 
However, the author reminds that the result must be viewed in light of the 
fact that several changes in the program's provisions were deemed necessary 
immediately following the embargo to sufficiently cushion its impact. 
Hence, he concluded that "if the reserve policy were viewed as capable of 
handling large shocks in the grain market, then such major revisions in 
reserve parameters would not be required with such developments as the 
Russian grain embargo" (p. 82). 
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Morton 
A stochastic simulation approach to examining the effect of alternative 
policies (with and without the FOR) on wheat, corn, and livestock price 
variability was undertaken by Morton (1982). Four alternative policies 
were imposed on a thirty-five equation, annual model of the 
wheat/feedgrain/livestock sector and stochastically simulated, using export 
and yield shocks, over the period 1981-1990. The policies included (1) a 
continuation of the 1977 policy, (2) a replacement of the FOR by a simple 
storage subsidy, (3) discontinuation of the set-aside authority, and (4) a 
free market case with no public intervention. To reflect expected 
management strategies, specific rules for set-aside decisions were imposed 
on the model at the beginning of each year's solution. Due to the limited 
number of annual observations, FOR behavior was not directly estimated, but 
approximated by linear response functions derived from actual data points. 
Using this approach, corn and wheat price variability (as measured by the 
respective means of the standard deviations from each of the simulated 
years) was found to be smallest under the 1977 (i.e., FOR) policy, and 
largest for the free market case. Morton found that variability in wheat 
prices increased over 300 percent in moving from the 1977 policy to the 
free market situation. Corn price variability, on the other hand, 
increased only 38 percent between the same two policies. With respect to 
the livestock markets, prices were also the most stable under the 1977 
policy, although the 1977 policy was found to exert no significant effect 
on mean price levels over time. 
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Salathe, Price and Banker 
Salathe et al. (1984) employed a large scale annual model of the U.S. 
agricultural sector (FAPSIM) to evaluate the reserve program for all 
program crops but rice. Removing all FOR variables, the authors simulated 
the model over the crop years 1977-1981, with the CGC release price 
maintained at its pre-program setting of 115 percent of the loan rate per 
commodity. Comparing the simulated no-reserve option with actual market 
outcomes, their results showed that the program significantly increased 
total stocks, in general had a positive impact on grain prices and mixed 
effects on price variability, depending on the commodity. The program also 
enhanced farm income while adding to total government outlays. With 
respect to corn markets, prices were increased up to 5 percent by the 
program and price variability was reduced by a very small amount. The 
minor influence of the program on price variability was attributed to the 
larger price band during the FOR period than before. 
Other Studies 
Several studies have addressed additional questions and issues raised 
by the FOR program. Although less comprehensive in nature these studies 
nonetheless focus on aspects of the program which are significant to this 
work. 
An issue which receives lip service in virtually any study of the FOR 
is the interaction of the demand for free (or speculative) stocks with that 
of FOR stocks. The operations of the FOR program are not mutually 
exclusive of the storage activities of private speculators (Peck and Gray, 
1980, p. 39), and the extent of this relationship has important 
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implications for the effectiveness of the FOR program. Meyers (1981) 
argued that the different substitution effects of reserve stocks for free 
stocks used in different studies of the FOR, may be one of the key reasons 
the results vary so considerably. 
Sharpies and Holland (1981) were among the few to empirically measure 
the substitution effect. Using a curvilinear functional form, the authors 
estimated a value for the substitution coefficient which they point out is 
likely not constant but positively related to price and FOR size. Nelson 
and Burnstein (1983), comparing the expected returns from alternative 
storage options, derive a demand for free stocks relation with and without 
the FOR. The authors show that as reserve stocks increase, the demand for 
free stocks shifts leftward. This shift has been attributed to an on-farm 
substitution effect (Meyers and Ryan, 1981), and an expectations effect 
(Sharpies, 1982). However, in examining the interaction of reserves with 
free stocks, Gardner (1982) warns that it may be insufficient to discuss 
the relationship solely in terms of a tradeoff between the quantity of 
grain in the reserve program and the quantity of grain demanded for 
speculative purposes. He points out two other basic effects that should 
not be overlooked are the effect of the reserve program's rule for stock 
accumulation on the private trade's rule, and the effect of reserve stock 
levels under that rule on privately-held free stocks. 
Using firm-level decision models, Meyers and Jolly (1980) developed 
some of the theoretical underpinnings of farmer demand for reserves. 
Viewed as an investment generating a temporal flow of storage costs and 
returns, the firm-level FOR marketing option is evaluated in their work 
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relative to a current cash sale option by means of stochastic efficiency 
criteria. The demand for farmer held reserves in the aggregate can then be 
derived from the firm-level decision, given current market conditions and 
FOR program provisions. Chambers and Foster (1983) note that farmers 
placing grain in the program are likely to be younger in age, operating 
farms producing primarily grain, with large on-farm storage facilities. 
Results of a farm survey conducted by Meyers, Jolly and Ryan (1981) reached 
essentially the same conclusions. Farmer participation in the program by 
region, has been summarized by Burnstein (1980) and Sharpies (1982). 
An evaluation of the FOR program cannot take place without 
consideration of the role of the FOR in the total policy package. As 
Womack et al. (1984) mention, the Farmer-Owned Reserve is part of the 
buffer stock-supply management program which forms the cornerstone of the 
1977 and 1981 farm bills. The "balanced" use of the FOR and acreage 
adjustment programs is emphasized as an important prerequisite in the 
successful achievement of price and income objectives. 
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CHAPTER II. PRICE STABILITY AND THE FARMER-OWNED RESERVE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
As background for an informed evaluation of the FOR program and its 
merit as an instrument of agricultural policy, it is useful to be acquainted 
with some of the issues and objectives of U.S. agricultural policy, as well 
as the role of a managed buffer stock program, such as the FOR, in 
stabilizing commodity markets. This chapter begins by briefly examining 
some of the reasons for public intervention into agricultural markets, and a 
few of the issues confronting agricultural policymakers. Following this is 
a short recount of the changing farm problems of the last few decades, with 
emphasis on the emergence of market instability as a chief concern in 
commodity markets in recent times. The desirability of stable grain prices 
is then probed, followed by a discussion of some of the operational 
considerations that surface in the management of a nationally-implemented 
grain reserve program. 
Overview of U.S. Agricultural Policy 
Throughout the years the government has maintained an active presence 
in agricultural markets. From the depression days on, the basic philosophy 
has remained that the government must intervene to adjust supply to maintain 
prices that are politically acceptable, or failing to achieve an increase in 
prices, to make payments to producers of certain farm crops to bring returns 
to an acceptable level (Johnson, 1973). While agricultural policy 
objectives have changed over time, the major farm programs today are much 
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the same as those devised and implemented over fifty years ago, as part,of 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. 
Rationale of government intervention 
The extent of government involvement in agricultural markets has and 
will continue to be a major item of controversy. The specific reasons for 
government intervention have changed as the nature of the farm problem and 
the overall political, social, and economic environment within which 
agriculture operates, has changed. Summarized below are several arguments 
put forth by Paarlberg (1980) for the existence of and continued 
intervention of the government into agricultural markets . 
Of foremost importance is the argument that government involvement is a 
necessary step in partially alleviating the ongoing economic disadvantage of 
farming operations relative to other forms of business. Proponents of 
government action in commodity markets frequently quote historical trends in 
such statistics as net farm income, parity ratios, and the ratio of per 
capita income of farmers to the per capita income of nonfarmers, as evidence 
of the distressed situation in agriculture. The relative disadvantage of 
agriculture as a viable business, attested by these statistical series, is 
often cited as the prime reason for the existence of farm programs designed 
to raise farm prices and incomes. 
Related somewhat to the first argument, a second justification for 
government involvement centers on the tendency of farmers to 
overproduce — with a subsequent depression of agricultural prices. Such 
proneness has been attributed to several factors, including the market 
structure within which farmers operate, the high value placed on 
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technological development, the extreme inelasticity of the demand for food, 
and the relative immobility of most agricultural resources. 
Third, government involvement can be justified on the grounds of 
improving agricultural stability. The biological nature of production, 
together with the gyrations of the market, make farming one of the most 
unstable enterprises in existence. Lacking an effective means to avoid the 
production and price risks inherent in farming, farmers are subject to 
unexpected and sometimes substantial income fluctuations. 
Government intervention is further proposed as a means of increasing 
the market power of farmers. Agriculture is the only remaining large sector 
of the economy that is for the most part, competitive in the classical 
sense. Yet the firms farmers buy from and sell to, frequently possess some 
degree of market power or influence over prices. Frustrated, farmers as a 
whole desire a degree of power sufficient to countervail the actions of 
those encountered in the marketplace. 
Lastly, Paarlberg notes that government farm programs thrived for some 
time on the popularity received by the early programs of the 1930s. 
Forestalling what might otherwise have been a political upheaval, the 
commodity programs implemented in the depression days were highly 
successful, and served as an argument for continued federal assistance for 
decades. 
Two additional arguments advanced by Gardner (1981b) include the 
premise that government intervention is necessary to countervail the actions 
taken by other governments, and as a response to the threat posed by large 
scale, mechanized farming. To the above list might also be added the 
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assurance of an adequate food supply as major justification for government 
involvement. 
Issues in agricultural policymaking 
Pressures for public action arise when groups within the private 
sector dissatisfied with current conditions, are unable or perhaps unwilling 
to bring about the necessary changes through private means. Because 
agriculture affects us all, a broad array of interests is involved in the 
making of food and agricultural policy. The major groups affected are 
farmers, consumers, agribusinesses, and taxpayers. Society as a whole is 
also affected, to the extent that agricultural policy influences overall 
societal welfare. 
A major obstacle in the policy formation process involves the 
establishment of a list of current priorities for the policy. Each of the 
above groups has its own interests and objectives for an agricultural policy 
not all of which can be met. The objectives which carry the most weight 
depend heavily on current economic conditions in addition to political 
philosophy. 
The policy objectives held by members of the constituencies are largely 
static with respect to time, primarily because members of the same group 
share economic, social, and political goals. Farmers, among other things, 
are obviously concerned with earning reasonable rates of return on their 
resources, while consumers are primarily interested in the assurance of 
adequate supplies of low-priced food. 
While not exhaustive, some of the specific farmer-held objectives for 
agricultural policy include: 
20 
1. A reasonable or fair economic outcome to farming 
operations. 
2. A reasonable or fair stability in economic outcomes. 
3. Open access to foreign markets with a minimum of 
impediments to trade imposed by other nations or the U.S. 
government. 
4. Freedom in making production and marketing decisions. 
5. Environmental protection, including conservation of land 
and water. 
6. Compensation for burdens imposed on farmers by society that 
are unrewarded by the market (e.g., export embargoes, 
environmental regulations, food price controls). 
7. Preservation of the family farm. 
Considered together, the farm policy objectives of consumers, taxpayers, and 
society as a whole, include: 
1. Adequate quantity, quality, and variety of food at 
reasonable or fair prices. 
2. Reasonable stability in food prices consistent with 
sufficient price movement to efficiently allocate 
resources as dictated by shifting consumer demands. 
3. Farm commodity export sales to earn foreign exchange and 
create favorable exchange rates. 
4. Transfer payments to provide minimum adequate diets for 
those who lack resources to purchase such diets from 
earnings. 
5. Low treasury cost. 
6. Minimum administrative and bureaucratic requirements. 
7. Equitable distribution of tax dollars. 
8. Efficient resource use and product allocation in 
agriculture as well as the economy as a whole. 
9. Equitable sharing of the benefits of economic progress. 
10. Environmental protection. 
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Obvious conflicts exist in the above sets of objectives. These exist 
not only between the objectives of different groups, but also between the 
objectives held by the same group. For example, the farmer-held goal of 
price supports that bring returns on resources for large, efficient farms 
comparable to what those resources would earn in the nonfarm sector leaves 
small, inefficient farms with low average returns. On the other hand, 
establishing a support price that brings parity resource returns for small 
farmers creates windfall gains for large, efficient farms. The objective of 
freedom in making production and marketing decisions is additionally, 
inconsistent with farmers' desires to have the government intervene in 
agriculture. 
The most prominent conflicts, however, exist between the goals of the 
different constituencies. As Tweeten (1979, p. 57) emphasizes, "the most 
sobering overall reality is that no food and agricultural policy 
simultaneously provides high farm income, low food cost, and low taxpayer 
cost." Which of these interests receives preferential treatment in the 
making of policy depends closely on current and expected economic 
conditions. As Hathaway (1981) points out, policymakers cannot always 
concern themselves with longer run objectives, since they are forced to deal 
with today's problems, and with groups which expect certain policy responses 
to be forthcoming. If farm and food prices are low, and expected to remain 
low, farm interests will be prominent in policy formulation, whereas if farm 
and food prices are expected to be high, nonfarms interests will likely be 
represented in legislation. While special interest groups provide the 
motivating force for the policy process and can be extremely effective in 
eliciting desired policy actions, final policy decisions are politically 
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based. Public policy according to Tweeten (1979, p. 42), thus tends to be 
"a compromise of the economically desirable, socially acceptable, and 
politically feasible". 
Aside from formulating-current objectives for agricultural policy, 
several additional problems are introduced into policy decisions. As 
Hathaway (1981) points out, the ability to adopt and maintain a policy 
depends not only on whether the objective itself appears reasonable, and 
with the desired outcome, but also on whether the proposed route to the 
policy objective is tenable. He argues that situations have occurred in the 
past where a particular policy objective was desirable, but the "means" by 
which the objective was to be attained, were not. In some circumstances, 
objections over the proposed means were so extreme that officials were 
forced to abandon the entire policy. Moreover, Hathaway adds that 
policymakers must recognize the fact that variables in the economic system 
beyond their control, may easily "swamp" the effect of the few economic 
varibles that they do control. The occurrence of this overpowering effect 
can lead to allegations that available policies were used ineffectively when 
in fact they weren't. Together with the short time allowed policymakers to 
reach decisions, Hathaway maintains that the above problems tend to result 
in a series of short run policies that appear to be unrelated to the 
administration's stated long run objectives. 
Changing Farm Problems and Policy Concerns 
From the 1930s through the 1960s, the most pervasive farm problem was 
low prices and income stemming from a chronic excess capacity to produce. 
During this period, farm income averaged only 51 percent of nonfarm Income 
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and did not exceed 70 percent until 1965. The nature of the problem led to 
extensive government involvement in agriculture. Policy efforts were 
directed primarily towards price support, with production control via 
voluntary acreage reductions and some paid land diversion. Other programs 
such as PL480 were subsequently implemented to dispose of the massive 
government stocks accumulated under these programs in the fifties and 
sixties. Acreage reductions were in affect every year from 1961 to 1972. 
However, commodity markets underwent a dramatic transformation in 1973. 
At a time in which the world was experiencing grain production shortfalls, 
factors such as a movement from fixed to flexible exchange rates, an 
increase in income levels in food deficient countries and a change in Soviet 
import policies combined to sharply increase the demand for U.S. grain 
exports. No longer was the U.S. characterized by surplus production. U.S. 
exports of feedgrains and wheat, for example, increased 88 percent from 1971 
to 1973 as domestic grain stocks dropped to record lows. The increase in 
export demand drove up commodity prices, and net farm income which on a per 
capita basis, surpassed that of nonfarmers for the first time ever in 1973. 
Subsequent gains in U.S. grain production, however, outpaced the growth 
in exports, and the high prices of the 1973-74 period, plummeted in the 1975 
and 1976 crop years. Net farm income followed the price turnaround, as 
carryover stocks of grain increased to levels characteristic of the early 
sixties. 
The sharp reversal in commodity markets sparked new concern as to the 
future directions of U.S. agriculture. The problem of chronic surpluses, so 
characteristic of earlier periods, had been replaced by a problem of 
periodic surpluses and deficits. Variability in prices, as measured by the 
24 
coefficient of variation, doubled for wheat, and more than tripled for corn 
and soybeans from the sixties to the seventies. Price and supply 
variability rather than low prices and income, thus emerged as the primary 
farm problems of the mid-1970s. As such, pressure from both consumers and 
producers came to bear on policymakers to refocus policy efforts towards the 
stabilization of commodity markets, and the assurance of adequate food 
supplies. 
Instability and Buffer Stocks 
The issue of market instability in the context of policy problems, 
raises two questions. The first question is whether or not stable markets 
are desirable from the societal point of view, and secondly, what role, if 
any, should the government pursue in stabilizing markets. These issues are 
each taken up in this section. 
The desirability of stable commodity prices 
The relative benefits of stable commodity prices can be evaluated by 
considering either the overall welfare gains of stabilization, in terras of 
producer and consumer surplus, or the implications of stable prices from the 
perspective of economic efficiency. 
The issue of welfare gains and losses to price stabilization is largely 
a theoretical problem and research in this area has proliferated since the 
early works of Waugh (1944) and Oi (1961). These types of studies primarily 
rely on the economic surplus approach in measuring the welfare implications 
of stable prices. Some (including Waugh and Oi) have postulated that 
producers and consumers in certain circumstances benefit from unstable 
prices. Others, such as Samuelson (1972), who was extremely critical of the 
25 
Waugh-Oi approaches, and Massell (1969), were among those to demonstrate net 
gains from stable prices in any situation. Where a specific type of 
government intervention was investigated, Konandreas and Schmitz (1978), 
assuming the existence of a costless buffer stock, found in their work that 
producers and consumers as a whole benefit from stable commodity prices. 
Helmberger and Weaver (1977), on the other hand, concluded that competitive 
storage with no government intervention maximizes welfare gains for 
producers and consumers. 
Although the welfare literature is mixed, the weight of the evidence 
supports overall gains to price stabilization and stabilization schemes. 
However, the issue of who gains and who loses to such schemes is crucially 
dependent on the assumptions used, such as the form of the disturbance terra, 
the type of risk response, and assumed demand and supply specifications. As 
Just et al. (1977) point out, even a switch from linearity of the functions 
to log linearity can be sufficient to reverse who gains and loses from price 
stabilization. 
Perhaps a less controversial case for stability can be made by 
considering the implications of stable prices from the perspective of 
economic efficiency. Economic efficiency is hindered by unforeseen random 
events which create loss of value of goods and services produced and 
consumed. Trends, cycles, and other variation in the economic system which 
can be anticipated and adjusted to with a high degree of precision, are not 
uncertainties, and hence, not a source of economic inefficiency. 
Gains in economic efficiency accrue primarily in the areas of 
allocative and operational efficiency. Allocative efficiency is enhanced 
when changes in prices induce resources to move to higher value uses. Some 
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variability in prices is therefore, necessary to efficiently allocate 
resources and products in response to changes in the economic system, but as 
Tweeten (1979) notes, far more variability exists in the economy than is 
necessary. Operational (or productive) efficiency, on the other hand, is 
improved when resources are more effectively utilized in the production 
process. 
From the standpoint of allocative efficiency, unstable prices compound 
the resource allocation problems already present in agriculture, and 
attributed to the relative immobility of most agricultural resources, as 
well as the biological lags present in agricultural production. Such an 
inefficiency arises, for example, when a favorable cost-price relationship 
for a particular crop at planting time completely reverses by harvest. 
Resources transferred away from other enterprises and committed to 
production of the crop were misallocated to the extent that they were routed 
to lower, rather than higher value uses. In such a situation, stable prices 
would be expected to alleviate potential cash flow problems which would 
occur when prices declined following a period of net investment. 
A more important inefficiency growing out of economic uncertainty, 
however, is inefficiency in farm production, or operational inefficiency 
(Heady, 1952, p. 740). To reduce the business and financial risks of 
farming, strategies including diversification of enterprises, flexibility in 
changing operations, and liquidity are frequently adopted by farmers. 
However, the application of these strategies results in a reduction of 
output per unit of input. For example, while diversification of farm 
enterprises can be shown to substantially reduce overall production risk, 
especially if there exists a negative correlation between returns to 
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diversified enterprises, it also sacrifices some net farm income for the 
reduction in risk, and results in forfeited gains to specialized production. 
By the same reasoning, flexibility in changing enterprises from year to year 
often requires a farmer to forego large investments in specialized, 
efficient machinery which similarly results in a loss of operational 
efficiency. Moreover, liquidity, as a financial risk-reduction tool, 
decreases operational efficiency in that to maintain a degree of liquidity 
sufficient to meet financial obligations, farmers may hold excessive cash 
reserves which could be invested in productive and profitable inputs. 
A final source of inefficiency at the farm level centers on the 
distributional impacts of market variabilities on farms with different 
financial structures. Farmers most susceptible to unexpected price 
fluctuations include beginning operators, full-time farmers who are heavily 
indebted, and owner-operators of expanding, full-time medium-sized farms. 
Individuals in these situations are often efficient producers, but because 
of their precarious financial situations, are the least capable of coping 
with the business and financial risks inherent in farming operations. 
Ordinarily, unfavorable economic conditions in an unstable economy are 
expected to weed out inefficient producers, but to the extent that these 
uncertainties causes a preponderance of farm liquidations among the 
efficient, but overleveraged farmers, rather than the less efficient, 
established farmers, it represents a source of inefficiency. 
Reutlinger (1976) points out that there may also be macroeconomic 
attributes of stable food prices in that stable prices help to stabilize the 
effective incomes of low income individuals. Moreover, Burnstein (1980) 
notes that while high commodity prices drive up retail food prices, a 
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falling off of commodity prices fails to lower food prices. Hence, stable 
farm level prices could help to alleviate what he terms, a "ratchet" effect 
on food prices. A decrease in the variability of food prices is also 
credited with increasing the demand for food relative to other nonfood 
commodities (Tweeten, 1979). 
The role of a buffer stock 
Variations in prices can be diminished by increasing the elasticity of 
demand and/or supply. As Johnson (1975, p. 824) indicates, these 
relationships can be made very elastic for a given geographical area by 
either managing the flow of trade, or managing storage. Historically, for 
food and feed grains, the approach which has received the most attention in 
the United States is the management of storage via buffer stocks. 
The question of buffer stocks of grain for the U.S. is not new, but was 
considered by economists along with other stabilization instruments over 
thirty years ago. However, the issue took on new meaning in light of the 
commodity market events of the mid-seventies. As Brandow (1976, p. 92) 
pointed out at the time, "a reserve stock policy for grains in the U.S., as 
a means of stabilizing markets and of facilitating food aid, has emerged as 
a national issue, free for the time being, of domination by price and income 
support objectives." Maintaining that grain stocks carried by the 
commercial trade are too small and inadequate to meet the nation's 
objectives, Brandow advanced several arguments for the establishment of a 
nationally implemented grain reserve. These include the arguments that a 
national grain reserve would: 
29 
1. Help curb the instability arising from export demand 
variability which conventional market mechanisms are 
incapable of controlling. 
2. Encourage the long range development of commercial grain 
exports through dependable U.S. supplies and stable prices. 
3. Allow the U.S. to become a more stable source of foreign food aid. 
4. Increase the stability of output and prices in the 
livestock industries. 
5. Enhance food price stability for macroeconomic reasons. 
6. Decrease the uncertainty and hence, increase the efficiency 
of grain production. 
7. Increase the utility of risk-averse producers. 
Specifically, government intervention into the speculative grain 
stockholding activity of the private sector is aimed at maximizing social 
benefits rather than private benefits to grainholders. Since the free 
market is assumed to fail in maximizing social benefits, the primary 
argument for a public storage program lies in the premise that it is more 
effective than the free market in attaining the desired level of stocks and 
price variation. 
Basic mechanics of buffer stock operation 
Operationally, a buffer stock program is designed to partially 
stabilize prices. The major emphasis of such a program is on increasing the 
probability that market prices will fall within a pre-established price 
band. Since fluctuating prices are necessary to allocate production and 
guide the product through the channels of trade, from a social standpoint 
then, as well as operationally, a complete stabilization of prices is 
infeasible. 
The price band is defended through accumulation of stocks at prices 
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below the band, and release of stocks to the market at prices above the 
band. The acquisition price, which specifies the price at which stocks are 
acquired, defines the lower end of the price band. The release price, or 
trigger level, specifies the price at which stocks are returned to the 
market and defines the upper end of the band. If successful, the program 
should cut-off or at least moderate peaks above the release price and 
troughs below the acquisition price in the price pattern over time. 
The operations of a buffer stock program can be illustrated quite 
simply (Figure 2.1). The price band is normally set so that it encompasses 
price in a "normal" year. In "short" crop years, the free market price 
would lie above the band, whereas a bumper crop would likely depress prices 
to levels below the band. 
Market price 
release level 
acquisition 
level 
Quantity 
Figure 2.1. Buffer stock operations under alternative 
supply situations 
In normal crop years with no stock program, the equilibrium quantity 
traded in the market would equal and price would be maintained within the 
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price band. To push market price into the price band in periods of large 
supply S^, incentives to place grain in the program must be large enough to 
remove the quantity Q^-Q^ from total supply. This amount would enter the 
program and the quantity marketed in normal outlets would equal . In a 
short crop period with supply at SQ, stocks of grain in the program would be 
triggered. The quantity Q^-Qg would need to come out of the program in 
order to enforce the top of the band and drive market prices down to the 
release level. Under this situation, the market would clear the quantity Qj^ 
at the release price. 
In this manner, a buffer stock defends the pre-established price band. 
Low prices trigger incentives to place grain in the program while high-side 
prices stimulate action to bring these stocks back on the market. However, 
the successfulness of the program in attaining its objectives depends on a 
couple of key factors. To defend the top of the band requires a sufficient 
quantity of grain in the buffer stock at the start of the period. If total 
program stocks were less than the quantity Q^-Q^, prices could not be driven 
down to the release level. On the other hand, the ability to defend a price 
floor at or around the acquisition price depends on adequate producer 
participation, and nonconstraining or no ceiling levels on total program 
stocks. 
Operational Considerations in Grain Reserve Management 
A grain reserve may be operated as either a buffer stock, a price 
support mechanism, or some combination of the two. In this section, 
attention is focused on a few of the operational issues that surface in the 
management of a grain reserve solely as a buffer stock. 
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Many complexities are involved in the management of a national grain 
reserve program. Operationally, when establishing the price settings and 
rules for reserve accumulation and release, the managers of the program must 
attempt to address the diverse interests of each of the major groups 
involved. Excessive concessions to one group at the expense of another will 
obviously bring about dissatisfaction with the program as well as move the 
price to the boundaries of the price band. Consumers, processors and 
livestock producers have an understandable desire to see that grain prices 
remain relatively low and stable. Grain producers on the other hand, profit 
from high grain prices and in spite of the benefits of price stability there 
is some evidence that grain producers may to a degree, benefit from price 
instability (Johnson, 1976, p.169). Moreover, as the federal budget grows 
tighter, due consideration must be given to the program's costs. 
Of primary importance to program managers is the specification of the 
loan rate (i.e., acquisition price) and release price which comprise the 
price band. Since the desired degree of price stabilization is implicit in 
the price band setting, consideration must be given to several factors. The 
position, as well as the width of the price band have noteworthy 
implications. 
A major item of importance is the position or bounds of the price band 
relative to the expected price in a "normal" crop year, as well as to 
producers' average cost of production. A price band established so as to 
encompass both of these variables encourages efficient production and tends 
not to exert an undue influence on price trends through time. In addition, 
all else equal, it will maintain the relative profitability of competing 
crops so as not to impede the market's role in the allocation of resources. 
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A price band too high may have several adverse outcomes. For one, it 
tends to promote excessive profits in the production of program crops. As 
Knutson et al. (1983, p. 256) emphasize, profits in agriculture are quickly 
translated into inflated land prices and expanded debt service costs. Large 
profits also tend to shelter inefficient producers and decrease incentives 
to cut production costs. By the same reasoning, it encourages 
overproduction and develops a tendency among farmers to produce for the 
artificially high prices of the program. This action ties up stocks in the 
program and "shorts" the market. 
Prices supported too high also imply trade market consequences. Since 
loan rates in the U.S. exert a heavy influence on world prices, high loan 
rates tend to protect our foreign competitors and encourage stepped up 
production efforts on their part, increasing the competition for 
agricultural exports. Foreign countries operating under a price umbrella 
created by high U.S. loan rates are able to undercut U.S. prices, capturing 
larger shares of the export market. The U.S. position in this situation is 
relegated to that of a residual supplier in the export market, providing 
only the portion of overseas sales that our competitors cannot. 
On the other hand, a price band established too low relative to the 
expected price and the average cost of production would depress profits and 
encourage the transfer of farm resources to other commodities. Large 
reserve stocks would be necessary to defend such a price band since a 
continual release of these stocks would be required to moderate upward price 
pressure. The effect of low support prices is also to subsidize grain use 
instead of reducing marginal consumption. 
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A further consideration arises with respect to the positions of price 
bands among related program crops. As Womack et al. (1984) point out, the 
price bands must reflect, and permit, intermarket linkages for both supply 
and demand. Their relative positions should also be such that they maintain 
the proper relationship in terms of feeding importance. 
The width of the price band, and subsequent degree of price protection 
involved are particularly important, but often slippery issues. Price 
changes should signal needed adjustments in production and consumption. In 
order to do so, however, prices must be permitted to move over a sufficient 
range to attract resources and discourage consumption in years of tight 
supplies while discouraging production and encouraging grain use in years of 
plenty. 
A narrow price band constrains the market and is difficult to enforce 
especially if supply and/or demand is relatively inelastic. The narrow 
price band necessitates a large buffer stock due to the increased 
probability that market prices will violate the price band. This translates 
into increased program costs in the form of expanded outlays to acquire 
these stocks and carry them forward from year to year. A narrow price band 
also reduces the freedom of market forces in guiding consumption and 
production decisions. 
Too wide a price band, on the other hand, does little to stabilize 
prices. While the program costs, and the size of the stocks needed to meet 
most supply imbalances are smaller, price uncertainty is increased. As 
argued earlier, the effect of economic uncertainty is to induce the farmer 
to adopt a more diversified, or more flexible farm plan than he would 
otherwise. This may imply a high price to pay in that the farming system is 
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less efficient, and less profitable, than a more specialized inflexible 
system. A wide price band, however, would exert greater pressure on other 
countries to assume a larger share of the burdens of maintaining grain 
stocks while simultaneously encouraging larger privately held speculative 
stocks at home. 
For the major feedgrains, the price corridors cannot be specified 
without regard for their impacts on livestock markets. Given the importance 
of corn in livestock feeding, its price band must be such that it imparts an 
acceptable amount of instability on the livestock industry. Livestock and 
poultry enterprises are essentially margin operations. Economic efficiency 
is promoted by margin stability, in that instability tends to break the 
overexpanded and financially vulnerable producers who are frequently not 
inefficient producers (Breimyer and Rhodes, 1975). 
While there are many considerations and compromises involved in 
establishing the rules of the program, one of the most important 
requirements is that the rules be effectively communicated so that market 
participants have clear signals for production and consumption decisions. 
The government by implementing such a program is substituting its own 
decision-making for the uncertainty of the market. Yet, as Paarlberg (1980) 
reminds, government decision-making itself is an uncertainty, and more 
importantly, may be wrong. The primary justification for a buffer stock or 
reserve program is that it is more effective than the free market in 
maximizing societal welfare. As such, the program managers must be careful 
in avoiding erratic provision changes that may force more uncertainty and 
instability on the market than would prevail in the absence of such 
programs. 
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CHAPTER III. DESCRIPTION AND OPERATIONS OF THE FARMER-OWNED 
CORN RESERVE PROGRAM 
Presented in this chapter is an overview of the provisions and 
operations of the Farmer-Owned Reserve program for corn. The first section 
entails a description of the program as enacted by Congress in 1977 . It 
includes a summary of the program provisions which govern FOR stock activity 
and the extension of FOR loans. The second section highlights market 
developments and FOR operations for the years 1977-1983. 
Description of the Farmer-Owned Reserve Program as Mandated 
by the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 
The Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 mandated a farmer-held wheat 
reserve, and authorized a farmer-held feed grain reserve. Both are 
voluntary commodity programs and have been in operation since 1977. 
The eligible farm producer may participate in the FOR program by 
entering into a contract with the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). Under 
the terms of the agreement, the farmer may place any amount of his current 
crop in the reserve program with the stipulation that it remain there for a 
period of three years. Ownership of reserve grain, as implied by the title 
of the program, is not transferred to the CCC but remains with the farmer, 
who is subsequently responsible for the maintainence of its quality. 
With the grain as collateral, the farmer is eligible to receive a loan 
from the CCC for the term the grain is held in the reserve. The loan amount 
is equal to the program loan rate per bushel times the number of bushels 
placed in the program. The interest charged on the loan is a subsidized 
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rate set by the CGC. Currently interest accrues for the first year of the 
loan only. The interest period in the past has varied from three years, 
when the program was initiated, to a period in 1981 when the interest charge 
was waived entirely. 
As an added incentive for participation, the program offers advance 
annual storage payments, currently equal to 26.5<i/bushel/year. This payment 
may be used by the farmer to compensate for the on or off farm cash storage 
costs of holding reserve grain. The first payment is received at the time 
the contract is signed. Additional payments follow on the first two 
anniversaries of the contract. 
Participants are only required to keep their grain in the program for 
the three year duration if prices do not rise above a prespecified release 
price. If the average mid-month farm price equals or exceeds the release 
price (currently 112% of the loan rate for corn), the reserve moves into 
"release status" and reserve stocks are triggered. Release status has a 
minimum duration of the month in which the release price is exceeded plus 
the next month. During this period, the farmer is allowed to repay the loan 
prior to its maturity and market the grain taking advantage of the higher 
price. As a redemption incentive, storage payments may be suspended after 
the second consecutive month in release and the interest charge on the loan 
reimposed at current CCC rates. 
Loan redemption becomes mandatory if the market price advances from the 
release price to the call price. In this event, participating farmers must 
redeem all FOR loans within a ninety day period. Failure to repay the loan 
within that period results in forfeiture of reserve grain to the CCC. No 
grain placements are allowed when the reserve is in call status. 
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If by the end of the three year term, the market price never reached 
the release level, or the farmer did not choose to exercise the redemption 
option in release status, two alternatives exist in fulfilling the terms of 
the contract. The farmer may repay the loan plus accrued interest and keep 
the grain regardless of the price or he may utilize the nonrecourse feature 
of the loan. The nonrecourse option allows the farmer to default on the 
loan in which case the reserve grain is forfeited to the CCC as full loan 
payment. 
Participation in the FOR is limited to only those farmers in compliance 
with the current year's set-aside program, if one was in existence. For 
crop years in which no set-aside program was in effect, all producers of the 
eligible crops are allowed to participate provided they certify their 
planted acreages with the government. When the program was first initiated, 
there was the added participation restriction that required producers to 
first obtain a CCC price support loan and sit out the nine month term before 
placing in the FOR program. That restriction, however, was later waived by 
the Secretary of Agriculture and direct entry into the program has been 
allowed ever since. 
While there are many additional features of the program, only a few are 
noteworthy in this study. The Secretary of Agriculture is first authorized 
to impose ceilings on reserve quantities. The minimum ceilings currently 
allowable are 700 million bushels for wheat and 1000 million bushels for 
feed grains. Furthermore, when the FOR program is in existence, the CCC may 
not sell any of its stocks of grain at less than 105 percent of the call 
price for each commodity, thereby permitting a maximum reliance on the FOR 
before invoking the release of government held stocks. And finally, a new 
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reserve contract is written up whenever there is a major change in program 
provisions. Thus, at any point in time, there may be multiple contracts 
outstanding, each with different loan and release prices, etc. These 
contracts have been labeled Reserve I, II, III, etc and are listed below 
with the effective grain placement dates under each: 
Reserve I program inception - January 7, 1980 
Reserve II January 8, 1980 - August 24, 1980 
Reserve III July 28, 1980 - October 5, 1981 
Reserve IV October 6, 1981 - June 30, 1982 
Reserve V July 1, 1982 - present. 
Several revisions to the program were enacted under the Agriculture and 
Food Act of 1981. Operationally, the most significant of these was the 
termination of the call price and mandatory redemption. Correspondingly, 
the minimum resale price of CCC-owned stocks was adjusted from 105 percent 
of the call price to 110 percent of the release price per commodity. 
The 1977 and 1981 Acts grant the Secretary of Agriculture a large 
amount of flexibility in determining the program's provisions. Once the 
national loan rate is established, the Secretary has considerable latitude 
in setting the release and call prices. For corn, there are no bounds on 
the position of the release price relative to the loan rate. For wheat, the 
release must be no less than 140 percent and no more than 160 percent of the 
loan rate. The Secretary can in addition, manipulate the other provisions 
of the program if market conditions warrant. For example, he can change the 
participation rules, interest rate and period, and storage subsidy to 
influence placements. To influence redemptions, he has the authority to 
change the interest charge on loans in release status, call loans before 
maturity, and extend the loan term to five years. As a result, the 
provisions of the program have become quite sensitive to current and 
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expected market developments, with the frequency of such revisions being 
thought to introduce unnecessary uncertainty into commodity markets (Just, 
1981, p. iii). A chronological review of the provisions for the corn 
reserve is contained in Appendix A. 
Operations of the Farmer-Owned Corn Reserve, 1977-1983 
The FOR program does not limit the amount of grain an individual farmer 
may market, but it does affect the timing of grain marketings. The program 
offers farmers a temporary alternative to direct sale or speculative 
storage. As such, the quantity of grain that enters the reserve is expected 
to be quite responsive to current market prices and outlooks. 
Presented in this section is a brief recount of FOR operations and 
market developments for the first six crop years of the program. Little 
effort is made in disentangling the price influences of the program from 
that of other market events. Rather, the objective is to provide a 
descriptive summary of events during this period for the purpose of 
examining the response of the program's provisions, and farmer participation 
to current market conditions. 
1977/1978 
The 1977/78 crop year for corn was characterized by record production 
and exports. The increase in production over the previous year resulted 
primarily from improved yields while most of the increase in the demand for 
exports was attributed to renewed purchasing by the USSR which was itself 
experiencing severe crop shortages. Despite strong exports prices remained 
low, averaging around $2.05/bushel. Hog/corn and steer/corn price ratios, 
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on the other hand, surged to their highest levels since 1972, resulting in 
record numbers of livestock on feed. 
In spite of relatively low prices, farmers appeared to be exercising 
restraint in placing corn in the FOR. For much of the year, market prices 
remained close to the loan level (Figure 3.1), and did not fall to more than 
five cents below it. The placements that did occur took place in the latter 
months (Figure 3.2), reflecting the restriction that 1977 crop grain placed 
in the FOR must first pass through the nine month regular CCC loan program. 
Largest monthly placements were 72 million bushels, and ending FOR stocks 
stood at 235 million bushels. 
1978/1979 
Another record corn crop followed in 1978. In spite of strong set 
aside incentives, production shot up 12 percent from the previous year, 
pushing prices below the loan level. Concerned that reserve target 
quantities would not be met, program managers dropped the nine month 
restriction and allowed "direct entry" of the 1978 crop into the FOR. 
Although less than half of all farmers participated in the set-aside, and 
were thus eligible to place grain in the FOR (Table 3.1), reserve stocks 
rose dramatically from October to December and direct entry was 
discontinued. In the first four months of the crop year, FOR stocks more 
than tripled to 714 million bushels. 
Continued strength in the demand for feed and a surge in exports 
brought about a mid-year price turnaround. Expanding livestock numbers and 
a hard winter combined to lift total feed disappearance to over 4.3 billion 
bushels for the year — the third largest on record. The sub-two dollar 
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Table 3.1 Proportion of corn producers eligible for participation in the 
Farmer-Owned Reserve program, 1977/78 - 1982/83. 
Crop year 
Percent of corn producers 
eligible for participation 
1977/78 100 
1978/79 41 
1979/80 21^ 
1980/81 100 
1981/82 100 
1982/83 23 
^In response to the Soviet grain embargo, the participation restriction 
on the 1979 crop was waived from April 15, 1980 to June 13, 1980. 
harvest prices recovered through the year to over $2.60, prompting release 
of reserve stocks in June. The reserve remained in release for almost three 
months, moving about one-third of total reserve stocks back on the market. 
1979/1980 
The 1979/80 year was characterized not only by another record in corn 
production, but also by uncertainty in grain markets rising out of the 
Soviet grain embargo. Low participation in the acreage program, and average 
yields near 110 bushels/acre combined to stimulate production to almost 
eight billion bushels. Prices in the first three months of the crop year, 
however, remained strong at around $2.40/bushel supported mostly by 
continued strength in the demand for livestock feeds. Pork and broiler 
productions for example, were up 21 percent and 6 percent from the previous 
year, respectively, despite slipping feed margins. Placements of corn into 
the FOR program were small in the first three months even though direct 
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entry into the program was again allowed for the new crop and old crop under 
loan. 
In January of 1980, grain markets were disrupted by the 
administration's suspension of grain sales to the USSR. To counteract the 
market impact of the embargo the managers of the FOR programs made several 
provision changes designed to increase participation in the reserve 
programs. For corn, the loan level was raised to $2.10/bushel, with the 
reserve and call levels revised upward accordingly. Storage payments were 
similarly increased, and the interest charge on FOR loans (which had applied 
to only the first year) for a short period was waived entirely. 
Disappointed with farmer response to the enhanced benefits, the authorities 
in April allowed nonparticipants as well to place corn in the program. In 
total, however, the more attractive program features, and relaxation of the 
eligibility restriction contributed only modestly to corn placements. FOR 
stocks increased from 645 million bushels in January to a maximum of 872 
million bushels in June. Strong export demand from other trading partners 
was to a larger extent responsible for offsetting the price depressing 
effects of the embargo. 
Drought-influenced new crop prospects caused a tightening of late 
season markets with prices reaching the trigger level for the second time in 
July. That same month, the program parameters were again revised upward, 
implying little interest on the part of program managers in moderating the 
advancing prices. Loan levels were increased to $2.25/bushel, and the 
release and call levels to $2.81/bushel and $3.26/bushel, respectively. 
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1980/1981 
Owing to a short production of 6.6 billion bushels, total corn supply 
for the 1980/81 year was down, despite large carryin stocks. Although 
exports were trending downward, feed demand remained particularly strong in 
the first half of the year, aiding in the support of prices above the 
release level for the period. 
In December, the loan level was raised to $2.40/bushel, and the 
interest charge on FOR loans was waived. The release and call levels 
remained unchanged. With such revisions, the returns to program 
participation were so attractive that farmers were putting more corn into 
the program than they were taking out. Despite an already tight market and 
prices in the $3.15 range, an additional 470 million bushels entered the 
reserve. The increased demand for FOR stocks aided in driving prices to the 
call level in January for the first and only time throughout the FOR program. 
Corn prices peaked at around $3.25/bushel early in 1981. Feed demand 
which had been strong in the early months was beginning to taper off in 
response to poor livestock/feed price ratios. Corn exports were also 
slipping as a result of several factors including a strong U.S. dollar, a 
world economic slow down, and increased production in major exporting 
countries. Argentina for example, was significantly expanding corn exports 
as a result of a two-fold production increase over the previous year. 
Although prices were falling, they remained above the release level through 
the summer. In July, the interest waiver on FOR loans was repealed. Total 
reserve quantities ended the year at 188 million bushels after peaking at 
900 million bushels in February. 
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1981/1982 
Because of the short 1980 crop, and forecasted decline in beginning 
stocks for 1981, no set-aside was imposed on the 1981 crop. Good growing 
conditions and large planted acreage contributed to a record corn production 
of 8.2 billion bushels. In a two month period (August, 1981 to October, 
1981), the market price dropped from above the release level to below the 
loan level. To ease the transition from the short year to the new harvest, 
loan rates were raised to $2.55/bushel. Similarly, the release level was 
revised to $3.15/bushel, as the call level was terminated in accordance with 
the provisions of the Agricultural and Food Act of 1981. The higher loan 
and low market prices combined to induce the placement of over 1 billion 
bushels of corn in the program from October to February. Yet with even 1.3 
billion bushels locked up in reserve stocks, and a harsh winter increase in 
feed demand, prices remained well below the loan level. The depressed 
prices were largely attributable to the demand for corn exports which 
started the year briefly strong then fell off sharply as the dollar 
strengthened further, the European community increased its import levies on 
feedgrains, and foreign exchange problems reduced the imports of many middle 
and low income countries. The U.S. share of the world coarse grain trade 
during this period fell to 59 percent from around 70 percent the previous 
two years. 
Following a momentary spurt in spring prices, prospects for an even 
larger crop in 1982 dropped the bottom out of late summer prices. 
Compounding this was the heavy pre-harvest marketing of FOR grain under the 
"rotation" provision, whereby farmers were allowed to market old FOR grain 
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if replaced by new-crop grain. In July, the rotation period was extended 
Erom 30 to 60 days before harvest. 
1982/1983 
Markets entered the 1982 crop year under very weak conditions, which 
tightened substantially as a result of several second half developments. 
Record corn yields of 115 bushels/acre more than offset the three percent 
reduction in planted area resulting from the acreage program, and boosted 
total production to 8.4 billion bushels. Although feed disappearance was 
taking place at a rapid rate, fall prices fell to below $2.00/bushel. To 
encourage participation in the 1982/83 acreage programs, loan levels for the 
new crop were raised to $2.90/bushel. The more than ninety cent difference 
between the loan rate and current cash prices spurred another quantum jump 
in FOR placements. Although only 23 percent of all farmers were eligible, 
FOR stocks of corn climbed from 1.4 million bushels at harvest to 2.6 
billion bushels in January. With massive stocks looming overhead and 
uncertain market outlooks, the administration on January 11 announced an 
experimental payment-in-kind (PIK) program, designed to substantially reduce 
planted acreage for the 1983 crop by substituting existing stocks for new 
crop production. 
At the time of the PIK announcement, markets were already beginning to 
tighten. Rapid disappearance in the first half of the year at low prices 
had significantly drawn down free stocks, and prices were rising steadily to 
ration remaining stocks. Corn prices were also supported in the second half 
by strong demand for food, seed and industrial uses, which for the first 
time was advancing toward the annual mark of one billion bushels. 
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Late season prices responding to reduced plantings and 
drought-influenced production outlooks reached the release level in July, 
triggering reserve stocks. In September, to encourage farmers to liquidate 
their FOR contracts and market reserve grain, storage payments were 
suspended, and interest recharged on outstanding loans. 
Reserve operations in summary 
Several general observations stand out from the preceding discussion. 
An examination of corn prices over the period relative to the price rules of 
the program, indicates that the FOR was of limited effectiveness in 
maintaining the market price of corn above the loan level. Although for 
most of the program's first four years, prices remained above the loan 
level, price patterns in 1981 and 1982 cast serious doubt on the ability of 
the program to consistently enforce a price floor at or around the loan 
level. With the exception of May 1982, corn prices remained below the loan 
rate for eighteen consecutive months, despite the isolation of such large 
reserve quantities of corn from the market. The enhanced program 
provisions, which encouraged participation in the program and to some extent 
reduced the downward price pressure during this period, also caused the 
program to become extremely imbalanced. Substantial disparities were 
created between returns to program participation and returns in the 
marketplace during the 1981/82 and 1982/83 years. As a result, reserve 
stocks swelled to enormous levels, greatly increasing the costs of the 
program and necessitating drastic steps as were taken with the adoption of 
the PIK program. 
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The fact, that corn prices remained below the call level for virtually 
the entire period appears to be more the result of depressed markets and 
high call levels than FOR operations. Judging from the chronology of FOR 
provisional changes, program authorities apparently placed little emphasis 
on suppressing upward price movements and enforcing the topside of the price 
range. Especially since the 1981 legislation, when the call level and 
mandatory redemption was terminated, the objective of the FOR has seemingly 
shifted towards protection only against low prices. This is also evidenced 
by the increase in loan rates that occurred during a release period in July 
1980, and the interest waiver later that year when prices were already 
approaching the call level at $3.25/bushel. 
The market impacts of the program, however, must be evaluated in light 
of the quite erratic market developments during the 1977-1983 period. By 
the very nature of removing grain from the market at low prices and 
providing grain to the market at high prices, the FOR promoted stable 
markets, but it appears this stability was overshadowed by instability in 
other market factors. The program's isolation of over 1 billion bushels of 
corn in 1982 and over 2.7 billion bushels in 1983, while not supporting 
prices above the loan level, undoubtedly exerted more influence on markets 
than would have taken place in the absence of such a program. 
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CHAPTER IV. THEORETICAL IMPACT OF THE FARMER-OWNED 
RESERVE PROGRAM ON COMMODITY PRICE VARIABILITY 
A simple market model is developed in this chapter for the purpose of 
examining from a theoretical standpoint, the ability of the FOR in 
moderating unexpected price shocks. In a comparative statics framework, 
reduced form multipliers are derived which are used to investigate the 
equilibrium price impacts of systematic demand and supply side shocks. The 
reduced form equations are further used to reveal those factors which 
directly affect the price stabilizing performance of the program. 
Simple Model of an FOR Influenced Commodity Market 
Conceptualized in this section is a simple model depicting the market 
structure for a single commodity in the presence of an operational reserve 
program. The model contains no intermarket linkages and is assumed linear 
in form with the stochastic terms suppressed. Although the emphasis in this 
study in on seasonal variation, for simplicity the model below is specified 
in annual terms. This approach essentially leaves the argument unchanged 
and greatly simplifies the specification. 
For the purposes here, the model is composed of six equations which 
include four behavioral relationships, an expectations equation, and a 
market clearing identity. The model contains only endogenous variables, 
lagged endogenous variables, a demand shock variable (Z^), and a supply 
shock variable (X^). It abstracts from all other exogenous shifters. 
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The model is conceptualized as follows: 
where: 
D 
I • fz'Pl+l - "f 
e 
t+1 • 
R 
• Vl * 
t+1 
X = D + + R^ - I 
D = demand for current consumption 
P = price of the commodity 
I = ending free stocks 
= expected price next year 
R = ending reserve stocks 
X = production of the commodity 
Z = demand shifter 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
Equation (4.1) represents the demand for current consumption. The 
specification is kept simple since inclusion of this equation is not 
critical to the model's purpose, other than as a price responsive component 
of total demand. Demand for current consumption is postulated as a downward 
sloping function of current price, and an upward sloping function of the 
shift variable. 
Equations (4.2) and (4.3) of the model were specified with the 
objective of incorporating into the model the crucial interactions that 
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exist between farmer-held reserve stocks of grain and privately held free 
stocks of grain. Aside from the FOR's importance as a temporary marketing 
substitute, the primary market impact of the program is on the demand for 
privately held free stocks. The extent of this interaction carries with it 
important implications for the price stabilizing potential of the FOR 
program. 
Sharpies and Holland (1981), for example, have demonstrated that a 
strong, inverse relationship exists between reserve stocks and free stocks. 
Meyers and Ryan (1981) attribute this relationship to two factors. The 
first factor, termed the substitution effect, represents the farm-level 
substitution of reserve stocks of grain for privately held free stocks. In 
other words, a farmer placing grain in the program would probably do so by 
drawing down his current uncommitted or free inventories, thereby 
substituting reserves for free stocks. This is essentially a one-way 
substitution effect since released reserves are normally marketed in order 
to satisfy the loan repayment obligation. The second factor, the 
expectations effect, hinges on the presumption that large reserve stocks 
once released, will be quite effective in suppressing continued upward price 
movements. When reserve stocks build, therefore, the expected gains from 
speculative storage, and hence, the demand for speculative stocks, decreases. 
An objective in the model specification was to separate the above two 
types of interaction so as to permit a separate examination of each. The 
specifications of equations (4.2) and (4.3) were motivated with this in 
mind. Equation (4.2) represents a supply of storage relation and 
incorporates the substitution effect of reserves on free stocks. Equation 
(4.3) allows for the expectations effect of reserve stocks, and can be 
54 
interpreted loosely as a demand for storage as derived by Brennan 
(1958, p. 52)1. 
Ending free stocks of grain in equation (4.2) are assumed to be a 
positive function of the price of storage - P^, a negative function of 
reserve quantities, and a positive function of beginning free supply which 
is the sum of current production and carryin stocks. The first term 
represents the holding of stocks for speculative purposes, whereas the 
second term reflects the substitution effect of reserves for free stocks. 
The last terra represents the storage rule, the slope of which determines the 
marginal rate of stockpiling. 
Equation (4.3) expresses a relationship for the market's expectation of 
next year's price. The specification in part stems from the market clearing 
identity for year t+1. The expected price is assumed to be negatively 
related to the "observables" influencing next year's price. These include 
ending free and reserve stocks, and next year's production, which together 
constitute the supply of grain for the ensuing year. 
Equation (4.4) describes the demand for farmer-owned reserves. The 
equation is derived from the following identity: 
^ = Vi Q^t " Q^t (4.7) 
The major difference between equation (4.3) and the Brennan derivation 
is that Brennan assumed free stocks (and reserve stocks implicitly) to be 
exogenous. 
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where : 
QP = quantity of grain placed in the reserve 
QR = quantity of grain redeemed from the reserve. 
To the eligible farm producer, the FOR represents another marketing option 
for his grain. As such, the demand for grain for placement into the program 
is likely to be quite responsive to the returns to the other marketing 
alternatives that exist. In the simplest case in which the producer is 
confronted with only a cash sale decision versus a placement decision, the 
current market price defines the opportunity cost of the placement decision. 
All else equal, as the market price rises, the demand for grain placements 
falls. In this context, and given that the amount of grain that may enter 
the program is constrained by current production, the demand for placements 
may be characterized as: 
=  X J  ( 4 . 8 )  
where: 
h^^ < 0 ,  0 < h^2 < 1 
As prices rise to the release level, reserve stocks are triggered and 
may come back on the market. The higher price rises, the larger is the 
quantity of grain redeemed, as producers liquidate their contracts and take 
advantage of the high prices. The total amount of grain coming out of the 
program is constrained by the level of beginning reserve stocks. The demand 
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for redemptions, thus appears as: 
where: 
Q\ = hzCP;, (4.9) 
^21' ^ 22 ^  ® 
0 < ' 
The identity in (4.7) can be restated in a behavioral form by 
substituting in the functional relationships for the quantity placed, and 
quantity redeemed in equations (4.8) and (4.9), respectively: 
\ • Vl + "t-l' 
or 
\ - Vi + «((Pc- Vi' 
where: 
^41 < 0' ^42 > 0' ^43 < 0 
0 < < 1 
- 1  <  <  0 .  
Equation (4.11) is the form used in the model. It postulates ending 
reserve stocks as a negative function of market price, a positive function 
of production (when the reserve is not in release), and a positive function 
of beginning reserve stocks. Although for simplicity the model treats the 
slope with respect to price as fixed, there may indeed be a kink in the 
function at the price where the change in reserve quantities is zero. 
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Furthermore, the effect of beginning reserve stocks on ending stocks will 
vary depending on whether the reserve is in or out of release. 
The last behavioral relationship in the model (Equation 4.5) expresses 
next year's production as simply a function of the expected price. The 
specification of the equation assumes away any difference between actual and 
planned production. 
Totally differentiating each equation of the model then yields: 
dP 
dX 
dD 
dl 
e 
t+ 
dR 
t+ 
dX 
= + :t-l) 
= - f32^^t 
= dRfl - + ^42'^t " ^43^\-l 
= 
= dD^ + dl^ + dRj. - dl^_i - dR;_i 
(4.12) 
(4.13) 
(4.14) 
(4.15) 
(4.16) 
(4.17) 
where: 
° ^22' ^23' ^ 42' ^43 ^ 
0 < f23 + f^2 ^ ^  
^32 ^ ^ 31 
f^2 = 0 if QP^ = 0 
f^3 = 0 if QR^ = 0. 
Most of the coefficient restrictions above originate from the market 
clearing identity (4.17). The identity itself allows one to constrain the 
coefficients fg^, f^^, f^^, and f^^ + f^2 Che zero-one range. 
The coefficient f^^, which reflects the substitution effect, lies in the 
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range for reasons noted earlier. The coefficient f22 is hypothesized less 
in magnitude than f^^, since it is assumed that market participants perceive 
farmer-owned reserves as partially insulated from the market. Because the 
price must rise above the release level to trigger reserves, their presence 
has less of an impact on expected price than current production plus carryin 
stocks which are readily available to the market. 
Reduced Form Price Impacts 
The static price response of the FOR model and a free market model to 
the previously mentioned demand and supply shocks can now be investigated. 
Impact multipliers derived from the reduced form are used to examine the 
price adjustments as the markets equilibrate following each shock. The 
multipliers for the demand and supply side shocks in the FOR model, 
respectively, are (assuming dl^_^ = dR^_^ =0): 
where: 
r - l :  
^0 " (^'19) 
^1 " ^ ^''"^A2^22~^^23'''^42^^^^'^^31^51^"^^^~^42^^21^3l''"^42^21^32 (*^^0) 
^11^21^31 (^•21) 
Using the a priori coefficient restrictions, it can be easily demonstrated 
that FQ, F^, and F^ are all greater than zero. 
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The corresponding set of multipliers depicting the free market 
response, can be derived from those of the FOR model by constraining all 
FOR-associated parameters in the above equations to zero. To utilize this 
approach is to necessarily assume that the underlying parameters describing 
a free market structure are identical to those describing the structure of 
the FOR-influenced market. This assumption is tantamount to the assumption 
of no "parametric drift" in the Lucas (1976) sense. While potentially 
unjustifiable in empirical exercises, the assumption is employed here as 
more a matter of necessity than convenience, and is not felt to invalidate 
the results. 
The free market multipliers are then: 
t 
^Free ^  ^ ^ 
where: 
(4.22) 
F„ - (4-23) 
F; . Cl-f23)(lM3if5i)+£2if3i (4.24) 
^2 ^  (4.25) 
Similarly FQ, F^ and are all greater than zero. 
Collecting terms, we find that: 
where: 
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^0 =^0 
F; = + hi 
F2 = F2 - h2 
^2 ~ ^41^^^"^22^^^^^31^51^^^21^^31~^32^^ ^ ^ 
(4.26) 
(4.27) 
Therefore, 
dZ 
FOR 
• 4 < Fj-hj dZ 
Free 
(4.28) 
and 
dP 
dX 
FOR 
"1 , 
^2~^2 dX 
Free 
(4.29) 
Equations (4.28) and (4.29) indicate that the externally generated 
market shocks assumed here, exert less of an impact on the equilibrium price 
in the simple FOR model, than in the model representing the free market. 
These equations also imply, as might be expected, that the effectiveness of 
the program in stabilizing prices is directly related to the price 
responsiveness of the demand for reserve stocks (f^^), and to the response 
of program placements to current production (f^2). The more price 
responsive are reserve quantities, the more demand and/or supply side 
instabilities are absorbed by changes in reserve quantities, thus lessening 
the equilibrium price adjustments. By similar reasoning, the larger is f^2' 
the more an exogenous increase in production is absorbed in reserve stocks, 
thereby diminishing the potential for a drastic fall in prices. The 
magnitude of the coefficient f^2 varies mainly with changes in the number of 
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eligible producers. The effectiveness of the program is clearly impaired if 
few producers are eligible, or for that matter, if those that are eligible 
are hesitant to make the potential three year committment of placing grain 
in the program. 
The above equations further imply that the performance of the program 
is quite sensitive to the values taken by the reserve-free stock interaction 
parameters, fand ^^2' values for these parameters imply that 
reserve stocks heavily displace free, or speculative stocks, through the 
substitution and expectation effects mentioned earlier, translating into a 
diminished ability of the program to stabilize markets. If there exists a 
perfect farm-level substitution of reserves for free stocks (i.e., 
the stabilizing potential of the program is reduced, but not nullified as 
long as reserve quantities are perceived by market participants as somewhat 
insulated from the market (i.e., ^ 32^^31^' likely that as the market 
price approaches the release level, triggering reserve stocks, will 
approach f^i* 
FOR Effect on the Elasticity of Total Demand 
The ability of the FOR to moderate price variation can be linked 
directly to its ability to increase the price responsiveness of total stocks 
(free and reserve), and hence, the elasticity of total demand. All else 
equal, as total demand becomes more elastic, the equilibruim price response 
to market instabilities is diminished. 
To contrast the price responsiveness of total demand in the FOR model 
to that in the free market model is a simple exercise in the analysis. In 
the FOR model developed here, the total market demand (TD^^^) is the sum of 
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Che demands for current consumption, free inventories, and farmer-ovmed 
reserves. As such, its slope with respect to the market price can be shown 
to equal: 
dTD 
dP 
FOR 
(4.30) 
where : 
F2 = as defined in (4.21) 
^3 " ^ ^21^31 ^31^51 
Correspondingly, the slope of total demand with respect to price for the 
free market is: 
dTD 
dP 
Free 
^2-^2 (4.31) 
where; 
h^ = as defined in (4.27). 
Given the a priori restrictions outlined earlier which guarantee that the 
values for F2, h2, and F^ are unambiguously positive, then clearly: 
dTD 
dP 
FOR 
^2 , ^2 ^2 
p; > 
dTD 
dP 
Free 
(4.32) 
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As expected, the demand function in the FOR model is more price sensitive 
than that in the free market model, thus suggesting that the presence of the 
program alters the market's behavior and structure. 
The implications of equation (4.32) on potential price variability are 
illustrated in Figure 4.1. Depicted in this diagram are the FOR and free 
market price responses to an exogenous production shock. Prior to the 
production shock in the example, both markets are equilibrated at the price 
PQ. As production increases, shifting total supply from SQ to , the shock 
in the FOR model is more rapidly absorbed in total stocks, with the result 
that the price falls only to Pj^ before a new equilibrium is established and 
supply and demand are once again equated. In the free market case, however, 
the market price is much more sensitive to the shock, falling to P^, before 
the market clears. The reserve program, by increasing the price response of 
the demand for stocks, lessened the price impact of the production 
variability. Similar results could be shown to exist in the event of a 
demand side shift. 
While the stabilizing potential of the FOR program can be couched 
solely in terms of its ability to increase the elasticity of total demand, 
the degree to which the program is able to achieve this increase is 
crucially dependent on the tradeoffs that exist between the demand for 
reserve stocks of grain and the demand for speculative stocks. The more 
reserve stocks displace speculative stocks, the more a price-induced 
increase in speculative stocks (as above) would be curtailed by the 
simultaneous expansion of reserves, reducing the effectiveness of the 
program. 
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In the framework here, a change in reserve quantities imparts shift 
effects on both the supply of storage and the demand for storage. The 
overall impact of reserve quantities on privately held free stocks, can thus 
be derived by simultaneously solving equations (4.2), (4.3), and (4.5) for 
I^, and differentiating the resulting partial reduced form equation with 
respect to yielding: 
2It ^ ^31^51^ , ^21^32 , ,  ... 
8Rj. 1 + + ^ 31^51 ^ "*• ^21^31 ^31^51 
The first term in the right hand side of the equation embodies the 
substitution effect, while the second term represents the price expectation 
effect. 
Rearranging the terms of the h^ expression in equation (4.27), and 
making use of equation (4.33) gives: 
^2 = ^41 (4.34) 
It is generally assumed that a bushel of grain placed in the FOR 
reduces privately-held free stocks of grain by an amount less than one 
bushel. That is: 
•' < If < » (4.35) 
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As Sharpies (1982) mentions, this could in part be due to the fact that 
farmers are now getting paid to store grain — most of which they would have 
stored anyway. In addition, only part of the grain placed in the program is 
acquired from free stocks, the remainder of which originates from reduced 
farmer marketings during the period. Under this assumption, the value for 
h^ is positive, and it follows from equation (4.32) that prices will 
fluctuate less in the presence of the FOR than in its absence. However, if 
an increase in reserves displaces an equal amount of free inventories, then: 
| i . - l  ( 4 . 3 6 )  
and the terra h^ vanishes, resulting in a complete nullification of any 
price stabilizing characteristics of the program. In this event, the 
FOR-influenced market would react to a price shock in much the same manner 
as would a free market, the only difference being the composition of total 
grain stocks. 
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CHAPTER V. STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE U.S. 
CORN-LIVESTOCK SECTOR 
The development of econometric models is greatly facilitated by the 
maintenance of a sound perspective on the structural characteristics of the 
system under investigation. An examination of the economic interactions 
that characterize the U.S. corn-livestock subsector, as well as technical 
and production constraints unique to the subsector, is undertaken in this 
chapter as a preliminary step to model formulation. The purpose is to give 
a balanced overview of those aspects of the subsector that may be 
significant to an econometric effort. 
Overview of the U.S. Corn Market 
Corn is one of the most important cash crops grown in the United 
States being the leader in terms of overall production, and the second 
leading crop in terms of farm receipts. Corn markets also provide the 
primary linkage between the crop and livestock sectors of U.S. agriculture. 
The structural features and characteristics of the U.S. corn market 
have been discussed in detail in a report by Leath et al. (1982). Those 
characteristics important to this study are summarized below. 
Corn supply 
The United States is the world's leader in the production of corn, with 
the annual crop generally exceeding 25 percent of the world total. Due to a 
steady upward trend in corn yields per acre, production is further 
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increasing at an acreage rate of 200 million bushels per year (Liu 1983, 
p . 2 2 ) .  
The annual U.S. supply of corn consists of production and carryover 
stocks. Imports are very small and do not significantly effect total supply. 
Corn acreage Dent or field corn is the predominant type of corn 
grown in the United States. White corn is of much lesser importance and has 
become a specialty crop grown for food uses. The production of white corn 
has not exceeded 40 million bushels since 1975. 
Most corn in the U.S. is planted between late April and early May. The 
corn acreage planted for all purposes has exhibited sizable variations over 
time (Figure 5.1). During the fifties, the planted area trended downward 
until acreage controls were relaxed in 1959 and 1960. In the sixties and 
early seventies, the acreage planted stabilized at around 67 million acres. 
However, with no acreage controls from 1973 to 1977, the planted area 
increased 26 percent, and has exceeded 81 million acres eight of the last 
nine years. In 1983, the area planted to corn was drastically reduced by 
acreage cutbacks under the payment-in-kind (PIK) program. 
Corn acreage planted is largely a function of participation in 
government programs, and expected market prices for corn and soybeans. 
Soybean prices are a factor because on most land both crops can easily be 
substituted for each other, depending on which will yield a higher expected 
profit. 
The harvest of corn begins in September and generally carries through 
October. The proportion of planted acreage actually harvested varies 
closely with weather conditions. High temperatures and lack of 
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Figure 5.1. U.S. corn planted acreage 
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precipitation during the growing season result in more corn acreage 
harvested early for silage. The acreage harvested as silage has almost 
doubled since 1950, and averages around 11 percent of total corn acreage 
planted. 
Yield per bushel Corn yields per harvested acre increased 200 
percent from 1950 to 1982. The most significant increases took place in the 
fifties and sixties. Yields increased at a much slower rate in the 
seventies when marginal, less productive land was placed in production. 
The general increase in yields over time (Figure 5.2) is primarily the 
result of changes in technology and production practices, including 
development of improved high yielding hybrids, increased rates of 
fertilization, higher seeding rates, and improved control methods for weeds, 
insects, and diseases. The greater variability in yields which occurred 
during the seventies evolved primarily from the weather. 
Total production While acreage has varied significantly from year 
to year, total production of corn has trended upward. In spite of the fact 
that the acreage harvested in 1982 was about the same as that harvested in 
1950, yield increases in that time tripled production from 2.8 billion 
bushels to 8.4 billion bushels. 
The Corn Belt is the primary corn producing area, accounting for over 
45 percent of total acreage planted and over 55 percent of total U.S. 
production. The region's share of both the total production and harvested 
acreage for the U.S. increased slightly from 1960 to 1970, but decreased 
somewhat in the early eighties. Although the Corn Belt has led all regions 
in production, the Lake States region has shown the greatest increase in 
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Figure 5.2. Average U.S. corn yield per harvested acre 
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acreage and production. The Lake States region surpassed the Northern 
Plains during the seventies and currently ranks second among all regions in 
corn production. The Southeast and Delta States during the same period saw 
their regional shares of production and harvested acres decrease — largely 
the result of a substitution of more profitable crops such as soybeans. 
Carryover Carryover stocks are inventories of corn remaining in 
storage at the end of the marketing year on September 30. With the 
exception of government-related stocks, carryovers represent working 
inventories and excess supplies required by processors, exporters, and 
livestock feeders in the transition from one marketing year to the next. 
Table 5.1 shows the breakdown of total U.S. carryover stocks of corn 
together with the other sources of corn supply for the period since 1966. 
As may be seen in the table, variations in carryover stocks have been 
quite pronounced, with ending stocks of corn ranging from 361 million 
bushels in 1975 to over 3.1 billion bushels in 1983. The variation in total 
stocks largely reflects changes in government-related inventories, which 
include stocks owned by the CCC, as well as farmer-owned quantitites under 
the CGC and FOR loan programs. 
Government-related stocks as a percent of total stocks tend to be 
inversely related to crop prices. Responding to the high prices of the mid 
seventies, government-owned and program stocks fell to one percent of total 
stocks in 1975, However, low prices in the eighties made quite attractive 
the respective government loan programs, tying up 94 percent of total stocks 
in government-related inventories by the end of the 1982/83 year. Privately 
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Table 5.1. U.S. corn supply, 1966/67-1983/84 
Beginning of year stocks 
Free stocks 
Not Under Farmer CCC 
Marketing under CCC owned owned Total 
year loan loan reserve stocks Total Production Imports Supply 
million bushels 
1966/67 245 348 0 249 842 4168 1 5011 
1967/68 454 235 0 138 826 4860 1 5687 
1968/69 453 533 0 182 1169 4450 1 5620 
1969/70 381 442 0 295 1118 4687 1 5806 
1970/71 404 346 0 255 1005 4152 4 5161 
1971/72 324 238 0 105 667 5646 1 6314 
1972/73 403 564 0 160 1126 5580 1 6708 
1973/74 539 90 0 79 709 5671 1 6380 
1974/75 471 5 0 7 484 4701 2 5187 
1975/76 358 3 0 0 361 5841 2 6204 
1976/77 376 23 0 0 400 6289 2 6691 
1977/78 738 148 0 0 886 6505 3 7394 
1978/79 368 415 316 13 1111 7268 1 8380 
1979/80 539 116 550 100 1304 7939 1 9244 
1980/81 642 83 636 256 1618 6645 1 8264 
1981/82 424 187 185 238 1034 8201 1 9237 
1982/83 265 309 1310 302 2186 8397 1 10684 
1983/84 197 100 1656 1166 3119 4121 1 7241 
held stocks not under loan tend to be much more stable than government 
inventories, and primarily reflect working inventories required by the users 
of corn. 
No major trends are observable in the position of corn stocks over time 
(Table 5.2). Stocks held on the farm are relatively stable and constitute 
around 60 percent of total ending stocks, the balance of which is maintained 
in commercial storage facilities. As indicated in the table, the CCC held a 
sizable portion of its stocks at CCC binsites until 1973 when the binsite 
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Table 5.2. Ending stocks of corn, by position, 1965/66-1983/84 
larketing CCC 
year Farm Off-farm^ binsites Total 
- - - - - -  m i l l i o n  bushels - - -
1965/66 532 176 134 842 
1966/67 572 156 98 826 
1967/68 788 277 104 1169 
1968/69 732 243 143 1118 
1969/70 576 318 111 1005 
1970/71 427 215 25 667 
1971/72 751 349 26 1126 
1972/73 405 284 20 709 
1973/74 288 196 0 484 
1974/75 192 169 0 361 
1975/76 234 166 0 400 
1976/77 448 438 0 886 
1977/78 666 445 0 1111 
1978/79 795 509 0 1304 
1979/80 921 697 0 1618 
1980/81 490 544 0 1034 
1981/82 1356 830 0 2186 
1982/83 1510 1609 0 3119 
1983/84 347 375 0 722 
^Includes corn stored in interior mills. elevators, and warehouses. 
storage program was discontinued. These stocks are now entirely held at 
commercial facilities. 
Corn demand 
Domestic corn use currently accounts for about three-fourths of total 
annual disappearance (Table 5.3). Livestock and poultry feed is the largest 
source of disappearance accounting for between 83 to 91 percent of total 
domestic use. Although much smaller, industrial uses of corn (food, 
industry, and alcoholic beverages) has grown at a faster rate, increasing 
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Table 5.3. U.S. corn disappearance, 1966/67-1983/84 
Domestic use 
Marketing Food and Alcoholic Total 
year industry beverages Seed Feed Total Exports disappearance 
million bushels 
1966/67 282 73 14 3323 3697 487 4184 
1967/68 291 74 13 3524 3886 633 4519 
1968/69 272 75 12 3607 3966 536 4501 
1969/70 278 74 13 3825 4190 612 4801 
1970/71 299 69 17 3593 3978 517 4495 
1971/72 324 70 15 3982 4391 796 5187 
1972/73 359 75 16 4292 4742 1258 6000 
1973/74 374 80 18 4181 4653 1243 5896 
1974/75 412 66 19 3180 3677 1149 4826 
1975/76 432 71 20 3570 4093 1711 5804 
1976/77 456 74 20 3571 4121 1684 5805 
1977/78 500 70 20 3744 4334 1948 6282 
1978/79 531 69 20 4324 4944 2133 7077 
1979/80 583 72 20 4518 5193 2433 7626 
1980/81 642 73 20 4133 4868 2355 7223 
1981/82 709 83 19 4202 5013 1967 6980 
1982/83 774 109 15 4522 5420 1870 7290 
1983/84 864 92 19 3875 4850 1850 6700 
almost 50 percent from 1979 to 1983. Corn exports since the early seventies 
have become an important market channel averaging over 28 percent of total 
disappearance in the last decade. 
Livestock and poultry feed Corn accounts for about 80 percent of 
the total quantity of grain fed to livestock in the United States. As a 
feed, corn use in the last thirty years has ranged from a low of 2.2 billion 
bushels in 1954/55 to a record high of 4.8 billion bushels in 1982/83. The 
variation in feed use reflects changes in the number of animals on feed, as 
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well as ration adjustments by livestock and poultry producers in response to 
relative prices of corn and competing feed ingredients. 
A sizable proportion of the number of cattle and hogs in the U.S. are 
located on grain producing farms. As a result, about 60 percent of the corn 
used as animal feed is fed on the farms where produced. The balance is 
purchased from nonfarm sources as whole corn or in prepared animal feeds. 
Prepared animal feed manufacturers use corn byproducts produced by dry-corn 
millers (hominy feeds), wet-corn processors (corn gluten meal and corn 
gluten feed), and distillers (distiller's dried grain). 
Demand for corn by livestock and poultry producers is quite seasonal, 
peaking in the fall and winter. Feed use is usually the lightest during the 
summer reflecting in part, a greater use of wheat when prices are at a 
seasonal low. The most important determinants of the quantity of corn used 
for feed are: the price of corn, the price of soybean meal, the value of 
beef, pork, and broiler production, the quantity of wheat fed, and the price 
received by farmers for livestock and livestock products. 
The hog industry is the largest user of corn, with an average 
consumption of 37 percent of total corn fed over the last eight years. 
Cattle on feed and other beef cattle over the same period accounted for 
about 26 percent of the quantity of corn consumed by livestock. The poultry 
and dairy industries accounted for 20 percent and 17 percent of consumption, 
respectively. 
While the consumption shares have been fairly stable on a year to year 
basis, several trends have surfaced in the last decade. The poultry 
industry for example, has increased its share of corn consumption from 18 
percent of total corn fed in 1975/76 to 22 percent in 1982/83. The 
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expansion in feeding corn to poultry has occurred at the expense of the 
cattle on feed industry which over the same period decreased its consumption 
share from 24 to 19 percent. The demand for corn as an ingredient in hog 
rations has similarly diminished the last five years, from 39 percent to 34 
percent of total usage. Use by the dairy industry has exhibited a slow but 
upward trend, reflecting a more stable price structure for dairy products 
compared with other livestock products. 
Food, seed, and industry Domestic use of corn for food, seed, and 
industrial (FSI) purposes has been relatively small compared with the annual 
volume used for livestock and poultry feed, but has increased at a much more 
rapid rate. Most of the corn moving into FSI uses is processed by either 
the wet-corn processing industry or the dry-corn milling industry. A large 
proportion of the primary products of these industries (meal, grits, flour, 
and starch) is further processed into breakfast foods, corn sweetener 
products, ethanol alcohol, pet foods, and other products. 
The fifties and sixties were periods of slow but rather steady growth 
in the quantity of corn used for FSI purposes, with annual growth rates 
averaging about 2.5 percent. In the seventies, however, as a result of 
expanding markets for sweetener products, FSI use jumped from 7.5 percent to 
13 percent of total domestic corn use. From 1979 on, FSI use rose at a rate 
of 10 percent per year, reflecting the increased use of corn and corn 
products in the production of subsidized alcohol fuels, in addition to corn 
sweeteners. 
Most of the corn used for FSI purposes is channeled to the wet 
processing industry. In 1950, wet processed products accounted for 50 
78 
percent of total FSI use rising to 70 percent in 1980. A large part of the 
gain was attributed to the production of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS). 
Since the early seventies when the industry first produced it, per capita 
consumption of HFCS has doubled as large commercial users substitute more 
fructose for sugar in satisfying their sweetener needs. The major users are 
soft drink manufacturers who now use fructose for over half of their 
sweetener requirements. 
The other major FSI user of corn is the dry-milling industry. Dry 
millers use corn in the production of breakfast foods, brewer's grits, and 
other food products such as cornmeal, hominy grits, and corn flour. 
Production of dry-milling products has increased more slowly than 
wet-processed products reflecting the rather stable per capita consumption 
of meal and cereal in recent years. 
Exports Exports of corn are the second largest component of total 
U.S. corn disappearance. Exports have had a significant impact on U.S. corn 
markets in recent years. The price instability of the last decade reflects 
the variability in exports as well as variability in domestic production. 
During the fifties and sixties, corn exports accounted for an average 5 
percent and 12 percent of total disappearance, respectively. However, 
exports began to expand rapidly in the early seventies. In 1973/74, more 
than 1.2 billion bushels of corn was exported, representing a 143 percent 
increase in only two years. Corn exports continued to trend upward through 
the seventies to a record 2.4 billion bushels in 1979/80, representing 32 
percent of total disappearance. The growth in U.S. corn exports during the 
seventies translated into an increase of from 42 percent of the world corn 
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trade in 1970 to 70 percent of the world corn trade by 1980. Since 1980, 
U.S. corn exports as well as trade share have fallen off moderately. 
The U.S. ships corn to more than ninety countries, primarily for use in 
livestock feeds. Western Europe and Japan have traditionally been the major 
importers followed by the Soviet Union and Mexico. However, several recent 
trends in U.S. corn exports by destination have emerged, shifting the 
importance of the major importers. 
In the past. Western Europe has been the leading destination for U.S. 
exports of corn, accounting for more than 50 percent of U.S. shipments as 
recently as 1976/77 (Figure 5.3)'". However, in the past five years, Western 
European countries have sharply reduced their purchases of U.S. corn. The 
trend in exports to this region largely reflected increased domestic grain 
supplies in the countries, as well as the substantial use of grain 
substitutes such as corn gluten feeds and soybean meal. The European 
Community does not apply its variable levy system to imports of these 
products resulting in their availability to feed manufacturers at more 
attractive prices than imported corn. 
The void created by smaller corn exports to Western and additionally. 
Eastern European countries has partially been filled by rapidly expanding 
shipments to Asian and Latin American destinations. Japan is by far the 
leading destination among Asian countries accounting for over 50 percent of 
shipments to the region. Other significant importers in the area include 
^EC-10 in the figure denotes the ten member countries of the European 
Community, while LDC denotes "less developed countries." OTHER is the 
residual of U.S. corn exports. 
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the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and the People's Republic of China. Mexico 
has shown the sharpest rate of increase among Latin American countries. 
U.S. exports of corn at 60-70 percent of world trade, far overshadow 
those of any other major grain trading nation — even at their recently 
reduced level. Argentina, the second largest exporter, accounts for around 
12 percent of the world trade, followed by Canada and South Africa at 7 
percent each, and Thailand, Western Europe, and Australia at 3 percent each. 
Although not a monopoly, the United States, by virtue of its large share of 
the world corn trade, is a major influence on world prices. 
The value of the dollar relative to foreign currencies, production by 
other exporters, importer livestock numbers and trade policies are the major 
factors to be considered in modeling the annual volume of U.S. corn exported. 
Overview of the U.S. Beef, Pork and Broiler Markets 
Beef production 
Beef production in the United States can be divided into two 
specialized stages: (1) feeder calf production and (2) cattle feeding. 
Feeder calf production Beef cow herds are maintained on farms as an 
investment in the production of feeder calves. After weaning, feeder calves 
may either be marketed as a source of immediate output, or retained through 
the feeding stages and marketed for slaughter. Seventy percent of U.S. 
farms and ranches engaged in beef production are considered cow-calf 
operations, marketing most of their calves at weaning or shortly thereafter 
(Boykin et al., 1980). 
The most popular time for calving in cow-calf operations is the late 
winter to early spring months, although there is a growing trend towards 
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fall calving. Under normal circumstances, calves born in the early spring 
months are weaned in the fall at about 7 to 8 months of age, and a weight 
approaching 500 pounds. Although lightweight calves may be marketed at this 
time, if roughages are available they may be carried longer into what is 
sometimes referred to as a stocker phase. Many operators sell stocker 
calves to feedlot operators who graze them briefly on pastures or crop 
residues before placing them on concentrate feeds. The period calves stay 
on grass prior to placement in feedlots depends on feed grain availability, 
and feed grain and fed cattle price relationships. If feeding margins are 
very poor, cattle may remain on grass or roughage-based feeds until they 
reach slaughter weight. Under such conditions, the period from weaning to 
slaughter is substantially longer. 
Since beef cows are typically only an indirect source of output, it is 
most economical to maintain them on low-quality roughages such as rangeland, 
pasture, or harvested forages used to supplement grazing. While existing in 
all fifty states, the majority of beef cows are located in the Western 
Rangelands, the Corn Belt and the Southeastern States. Herds in the Western 
States are relatively large and comprise almost one half of the total cow 
herd. By comparison, cow herds in the Corn Belt States are very small at 
about one fifth the average size of those in the West. Cow-calf operations 
in the Corn Belt are frequently part of a diversified farm enterprise, 
combined with other operations such as corn and soybean crops, and cattle 
feeding or hog raising. 
The number of beef cows on farms for the last two decades is 
illustrated in Figure 5.4. Beef cow numbers are quite cyclical, having 
reached a peak for the period of 45.7 million head in 1975. The number of 
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cows held in inventory is relatively inflexible in the current period and 
exhibits very little price response given the technical constraints of 
building herds through the retention of heifers. 
Over the last twenty years, there appears to have been little 
structural change in calf production. The overall calving ratio, a key 
structural parameter, has not risen greatly above its 1965 level of 90 
percent, and actually fell a little below this level during the 1975-1979 
period. From 1960 to 1980, however, the slaughter of calves has fallen from 
33 percent of total adult cattle slaughter to only 7.7 percent. 
Cattle feeding Feeder steers and heifers are placed on concentrate 
feeds to promote fattening and shorten the period to market weight. Once 
placed in feedlots calves are very seldom returned to roughages, however, 
there may be some early turnoff, and thus lighter weight marketings in times 
of poor feeding margins. Most calves are placed in feedlots within a few 
months after weaning at an average weight of 650 pounds. This 
characteristic results in a marked seasonal peak in placements in the fourth 
quarter of each year (Figure 5.5). However, much flexibility exists on the 
part of the cattle feeder in making the commitment to place calves on 
feed — the timing of which varies with relative prices, seasonal 
conditions, and pasture availability. By varying the age at placement, the 
length of the feeding period, and the number of calves fed, producers are 
able to adjust the quantity of grain fed and the output of beef in response 
to current market signals. 
The rations fed to cattle usually consist of feed grains (especially 
corn), a protein supplement, and some roughage in the form of hay or silage. 
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The most important cost components in cattle feeding are the cost of the 
feeder calf and the feed grain component of the ration. Based on prices in 
1981, the cost of the feeder calf was estimated to be 53 percent of the 
total cost of feeding a 600 pound calf to 1,100 pounds in the Corn Belt 
(USDA, 1982). Feed grains contributed an additional 20 percent, while the 
protein supplement comprised 5 percent of the total costs. These 
proportions appear to have been fairly stable through time and suggest that 
the key price variables in modeling cattle feeding are likely to be feeder 
steer and feed grain prices. 
The efficiency with which feed is converted to gain for a calf in a 
lot depends upon the ration composition, the weight and sex of the calf, 
length of the feeding period, and weather. A higher level of roughages in a 
ration reduces the feed cost, but also reduces daily gains and feeding 
efficiency. Typically cattle on feed require around 11 pounds of feed per 
pound of gain, compared with over 16 for cattle on roughage feeds 
(Allen, 1976). These conversion ratios have remained very stable over time. 
One prominent characteristic of U.S. beef production is the substantial 
westward shift in cattle feeding operations over the last two decades. This 
shift has been accompanied also by a movement towards larger, commercialized 
feedlots, and fewer farmer-operated feedlots. In 1977, only two percent of 
all feedlots had a capacity of greater than 1000 head, yet these lots 
produced 65 percent of all the fed beef slaughtered (Gee et al., 1979). 
Large commercial operations tend to market cattle continuously throughout 
the year, while farm feedlots generally market live cattle in only the late 
spring through summer months (Van Arsdall and Nelson, 1983). Commercial 
lots also feed higher concentrate rations, resulting in a shorter time on 
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feed and quicker turnaround. The average time on feed in large feedlots is 
around 150 days, compared with 225 days in farm feedlots. 
Pork production 
The structural characteristics of U.S. hog production have been 
discussed in detail by Van Arsdall and Nelson (1984), and only a few key 
aspects are summarized below. 
Hogs and pigs are raised for the most part in three types of 
specialized operations: feeder pig operations, feeder pig finishing 
operations, and farrow-to-finish operations. While there is some 
overlapping, most hog producers use only one production system. 
About one-fourth of all slaughter hogs are produced through the split 
phase production system, where they are farrowed and raised to 40-60 pounds 
by feeder pig producers, and then sold to feeder pig finishers for 
additional fattening to slaughter weight. In the feeder pig production 
phase, pigs are typically weaned 5-6 weeks after farrowing, and marketed to 
finishers at around nine weeks of age. The age at weaning bears a strong 
inverse relationship to the size of the operation, with larger farrowing 
operations weaning at less than four weeks of age so as to shorten the 
production turnaround and permit a more intensive use of facilities. In 
finishing operations, feeder pigs are fed to slaughter weight on high energy 
rations designed to promote weight gain. The period from market as feeder 
pigs to market as slaughter hogs averages around 130 days. 
Three-fourths of the hogs produced are raised directly from birth to 
slaughter through farrow-to-finish operations. By combining the functions 
of the above two activities, these operations are able to raise hogs to 
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market weight on less fed and in about 2-3 weeks less time. In 
farrow-to-finish operations, producers control the number, quality, and 
timing of the pigs they will finish, and also avoid the costs of buying and 
transporting pigs, and the losses and stresses incurred in the process. 
Additionally, there is some evidence that the inherent performance 
capabilities of hogs raised in farrow-to-finish operations is greater than 
those produced under split operations. 
Hog slaughter weights average in the 225-230 pound range, but do 
exhibit some price responsiveness. For example, when the hog/corn price 
ratio is low, as it was in 1980, slaughter weights tend to be lighter, 
whereas when it is high, the returns to hog feeding are larger, and hence, 
the weights at slaughter. Hog production is relatively evenly distributed 
throughout the year with little apparent seasonality. 
Based on USDA estimates, "the two largest expenses in hog feeding are 
the cost of the feeder pig, and the cost of the feed grain used in the 
ration (USDA, 1982). Each of these expenses accounted for 30 percent of the 
total feeding cost in 1981. Protein supplements account for around 18 
percent of total costs. 
Traditionally, hog and corn production have been companion enterprises, 
with farmers using hogs as an alternative means to market corn. As such, 
hog production is strongly concentrated in the North Central Region of the 
United States where corn is the major crop. Sixty-seven percent of the 1981 
hog inventory was located in eight states in this region: Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin 
(USDA, 1981). Roughly two-thirds of the farms producing hogs in 1975, had 
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other livestock or poultry activities, with 90 percent of these farms having 
beef cows or cattle feeding as that activity. 
Despite sharply fewer producers, U.S. hog production remained about the 
same for the period 1950-1980. However, per capita consumption of pork for 
the period trended downward, largely the result of a sharp decrease in lard 
consumption from 14 pounds per capita in the early fifties to only 2 pounds 
per capita in the late seventies. U.S. pork producers responded to the 
shift in consumer preferences by producing more "meat-type" hogs, such that 
in 1980, 96 percent of all barrows and gilts graded U.S. No. 2 or better, 
compared with only 50 percent twelve years earlier (Parham and Agnew, 1982). 
The result was that while overall per capita pork consumption was trending 
down, per capita consumption of pork meat held steady for the period. In 
1980, pork represented about one-third of total U.S. red meat consumption. 
Broiler production 
Broilers are young chickens seven to ten weeks of age, that are raised 
specifically for their meat. Prior to 1940, the production of broilers was 
virtually nonexistent in the U.S. Since that time, however, in response to 
consumer desires for young, tender, meat-type chickens, the broiler industry 
has expanded rapidly. In 1950, the total number of broilers produced in the 
U.S. was 632 million, whereas by 1980 it had risen to 3.9 billion 
(Lasley, 1983, p. 13). In terms of annual per capita consumption, this 
represented an increase of from 8.7 pounds to 48.6 pounds. 
A large degree of vertical integration and rapid technology change have 
been two key characteristics in the broiler industry the last few decades, 
and have vastly improved both production and efficiency. Vertical 
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coordination of successive production and marketing stages through ownership 
or contracting has spread rapidly such that by 1977, ninety-nine percent of 
all broilers produced were grown under contract or by integrated firms. 
With the increase in integration has come about a concomitant increase in 
the concentration of production. For example, in 1978 the largest one-third 
of all farms producing broilers were each marketing more than 100,000 
broilers annually. These farms accounted for 82 percent of total 
production. 
Rapid technological change in the industry has significantly enhanced 
feeding efficiency. Advances in production technologies, improvements in 
poultry nutrition, and improved management practices have enabled the 
broiler industry to produce a 3.5 pound broiler, ready for processing, in 
seven to eight weeks, instead of the twelve to fourteen weeks that was 
typical in 1960 (Benson and Witzig, 1977). In 1980, 208 pounds of feed were 
required to produce 100 pounds of broiler meat, compared with 285 pounds of 
feed required in 1960. 
The cost of feed is by far the largest cost component in broiler 
production, accounting for 73 percent of total production costs in 1977. A 
typical broiler ration is composed of 70 percent corn and 30 percent soybean 
meal (Chavas, 1978, p. 65). In this proportion, the costs of the two feed 
ingredients is roughly equal. 
Broiler production requires the shortest planning horizon of the 
livestock markets considered here. According to Rausser and Cargill (1970), 
there is a lag of around 26 days between shipment of eggs to the hatchery 
and the placement of the resulting chicks in the flock. A broiler-type 
chick is then typically marketed in around 55 days (Kenyon, 1981). Although 
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hatchery egg supply levels place a maximum constraint on the egg set 
potential, there is relatively little cost to excess capacity, and thus, a 
large degree of production flexibility exists on the down side (Paulsen 
et al., 1977). The minimum time span between a decision to expand or 
decrease production, and the actual realization of that change should 
therefore be approximately equal to the three months needed to convert eggs 
to finished broilers. 
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CHAPTER VI. SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF 
AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
An integrated econometric model of the U.S. corn-livestock subsector is 
conceptualized and estimated in this chapter. The model will serve as the 
basis for the empirical analysis of the Farmer-Owned Reserve Program for 
corn that is undertaken in Chapter VIII. 
Specification Issues 
An econometric model is inherently a simplified approximation of 
reality. The specification of such a model involves the problem of 
translating hypotheses about the functioning of the system under 
investigation into estimable relationships. In general, a variety of 
alternative model specifications are admissible, with standard statistical 
tests incapable of discriminating among them. Determinations required prior 
to the specification process itself are those involving the bounds of the 
model, the particular functional forms used, and for time series models, the 
frequency of data observations. These issues are first taken up as 
preparatory steps to imposing a parameteric structure on the model. 
Degree of exogeneity 
An initial specification problem to be dealt with involves 
determination of those components of the system that should be included in 
the model. While there are always gains to be realized by expanding the 
size of the model, the limitations imposed on this activity by the costs of 
information, computation, and structural understanding, favor small, less 
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extensive models. An objective in determining the appropriate scope of the 
model was to make the model as simple as possible without eroding its value 
as a decision aid. 
For this study, the size of the model was determined by the minimum 
number of equations necessary to represent the system at the level of 
disaggregation consistent with the study's objectives. The model was 
delineated to include only the corn, fed beef, pork, and broiler markets in 
an endogenous fashion. Although the main emphasis is on corn markets, the 
fed beef, pork, and broiler markets were retained in the specification 
because of the importance of these commodities as a source of demand for 
corn, and because of the strong interdependencies that exist among these 
groups at the retail level, and to a lesser extent, the farm level. 
Variables representing competing agricultural commodity markets, such 
as that for the other feedgrains, wheat, soybeans, lower quality processed 
beef, and dairy animals were regarded as predetermined to the model. The 
other feedgrains and wheat were excluded from consideration because they do 
not compete strongly with corn for production resources, and because these 
commodities are relatively minor feed ingredients. Consumption and 
production of soybeans, processed beef, and dairy products were regarded as 
predetermined primarily in the interests of model manageability. Unlike the 
other feedgrains and wheat, soybeans do compete closely with corn for 
production resources (land in particular), with soybean prices in part, 
jointly determined with corn prices. However, inclusion of the soybean 
market would involve modeling a complex subsystem, given the importance of 
the soyoil and soymeal markets in the price determination process. While 
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dairy animals compete with the remainder of the livestock sector for 
feedgrains and grazing land, this subsector was also dropped from 
consideration because of the anticipated modeling difficulties, given the 
array of federal policy measures specific to the subsector. Although some 
lower quality processed beef is derived from the slaughter of corn-fed 
cattle, most of it comes from the slaughter of cull cows, range-fed beef, 
and imported beef, and hence, is only indirectly affected by events in the 
feedgrain markets. 
Functional form 
In general, standard economic theory offers very little guidance in the 
choosing of functional forms, so that in practice the modeler has much 
flexibility in choosing the exact set of structures to represent the system. 
In many circumstances, the reported functional form was the end product of 
an exploratory analysis, where several alternative forms were empirically 
tested. Since linear models of the corn-livestock subsector have performed 
well in previous studies (e.g., Arzac and Wilkinson, 1979; Martin, 1983), 
the basic intent here was to retain this assumption as far as possible. 
While not ruling out the possibility of nonlinear relationships, the 
assumption of linearity is much more convenient from an estimation 
standpoint, and is not theoretically implausible. 
Periodicity 
Because the FOR program is to be examined from a seasonal standpoint, a 
quarterly data period was considered appropriate. Relative to annual data, 
quarterly data provide additional information on the response of 
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decisionmaking units in the system to economic factors, but also impose 
additional structural complexities on the model as attention is focused on 
the specific characteristics of quarterly economic behavior which may be 
different from yearly averages or totals. On the crops side for example, 
where production enters the year in only the first quarter, the level of 
beginning stocks in subsequent quarters represents the only source of 
supply. The model must necessarily allow for an explicit treatment of the 
quarter to quarter allocation of grain stocks to the various disappearances. 
Moreover, the possibility exists that the price responsiveness of demand 
relations and other structural equations may differ within a year. Hence, 
the specification must have the functional flexibility to capture any 
seasonal shifting of the price parameters. 
On the livestock side, quarterly production relationships are highly 
dynamic, and difficult to specify mathematically, given the technical 
constraints of production response in addition to producer flexibility with 
respect to feeding strategies for certain livestock groups. The highly 
seasonal nature of calf crops, calf placements on concentrate feeds, and sow 
farrowings require special consideration, not necessary in annual models. 
Decisionmaking in the livestock subsector can be much more accurately 
represented in an intrayear framework, to the extent that the model is 
structured with an explicit recognition of the seasonal production, and 
economic decisions that take place. 
Model Structure and Estimation Procedure 
The specification employed in the model was motivated by several 
factors. As with any econometric effort, the primary objective was to 
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derive a form which would accurately represent the physical flows, component 
interactions, and pricing relationships that characterize and guide the 
underlying system through time. To this end, the specification is based on 
the neoclassical theory of consumer and producer behavior, with 
consideration given to the physical attributes of the relevant commodities, 
in order to set up appropriate lag lengths relative to the biological 
production periods. As part of this process, the specification necessarily 
assumes economic rationality on the part of the system's participants. 
In view of the model's role as a tool for policy analysis, the 
specific policies questions at hand were also a factor in the model's 
design. Because the objective of the study is to evaluate the impacts of 
the FOR program in a market setting, a heavy emphasis was placed on modeling 
the FOR, with explicit treatment of the interactions between FOR stocks of 
corn and privately-held free stocks. The major livestock markets are 
represented in the model not only because of the interrelationships of these 
markets with corn markets, as noted earlier, but also as a means to evaluate 
the economic ramifications of reserve policies on the livestock industry. 
Structure of the model 
The model is comprised of forty-nine equations of which twenty-two are 
stochastic, and the remaining twenty-seven are market clearing or 
definitional equations. Relationships among the endogenous variables of the 
corn sector of the model are illustrated in Figure 6.1. In each quarter, 
the corn market subsystem allocates beginning stocks and production to the 
five endogenous sources of disappearance: (1) feed, (2) food, seed, and 
industrial, (3) exports, (4) privately-held free stocks, and (5) 
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Figure 6.1. Schematic i l lustrat ion of the structure of the corn market of the model 
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farmer-owned reserves. The allocating mechanism, the current equilibrium 
price, is determined by the intersection of the sum of these demand 
components with the predetermined supply. Ending reserve stocks in the 
specification are not directly regarded as a stochastic quantity, but rather 
by identity equal to beginning stocks plus the price-responsive difference 
between placements into the program and redemptions from the program. 
Primary demand side interactions in the subsystem are also present between 
ending reserve stocks of corn and commercial stocks of corn. The only 
behavioral component of the supply side of the corn market is the planted 
acreage response by corn producers in the spring quarter. The production of 
corn entering in the fall quarter is thus predetermined, based on planting 
decisions two quarters earlier. The primary linkage between the corn sector 
of the model and the livestock sector is the number of livestock units on 
grain-based feeds. 
The livestock component of the model, illustrated in Figure 6.2, 
encompasses the consumption and production, and farm and retail prices of 
the three meat products (fed beef, pork and broilers), and inventory levels 
of livestock used in the production of these products. The fed beef 
subsystem of the model is structurally the most complicated of the three 
livestock markets represented. The behavior of the beef subsystem is 
crucially dependent on two producer decisions: the number of cows held in 
the breeding herd, and the number of cattle placed on concentrate feeds. 
The number of beef cows on hand largely determines the subsequent calf crop, 
and hence, directly affects feeder calf prices, a key intermediate input in 
fed beef production. The availability of steers and heifers for placement 
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Figure 6.2. Schematic i l lustrat ion of the l ivestock sector component of the model and i ts 
l inkages to t f ie corn market 
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on feed depends closely on prior calf crops, with an allowance for the 
number of calves previously slaughtered. However, since these cattle and 
calves may alternatively be raised on pasture, the number of cattle on feed 
is also quite responsive to such economic factors as the price of slaughter 
steers, and the cost of concentrate feeds. The meat from steers and heifers 
on feed comprises around 70 percent of total beef production, and provides 
the great majority of beef used for table cuts at the retail level. A 
margin equation is present for each of the commodities, and allows for the 
transmission of price signals between consumers and producers by linking 
prices at the retail and farm level. 
The pork sector of the model is somewhat simpler in structure than the 
fed beef sector. However, it encompasses two sources of production — that 
from the slaughter of barrows and gilts, and that from the slaughter of sows 
from the breeding herd. The production of pork from barrows and gilts is 
largely unresponsive to current economic variables, rather governed by 
previous pig crops. Thus, the number of sows farrowing in previous periods, 
which determine pig crops, define within a narrow range the production or 
pork from market hogs. The number of sows to farrow tends to respond 
closely to the expected profitability of feeding hogs to market weight. As 
feeding margins worsen, sows are culled from the breeding herd, and sold for 
slaughter. 
The broiler industry is represented by a very simple specification in 
the model. Broiler production involves relatively short, but still 
significant lags in production. It is related to the production of the 
other meat groups through the market for feed, but because of its very 
101 
specialized nature, does not compete directly for other production 
resources. 
The respective livestock markets are linked together at both the farm 
and retail level. At the farm level, the sectors compete directly for feed 
ingredients, and as mentioned in the case of hog and cattle operations, for 
other production resources, including labor and capital resources. A strong 
source of interaction similarly exists between the meat groups at the retail 
demand level. Previous studies have found significant demand 
substitutability between meats, and usually a strong relationship between 
meat demand and consumer incomes. These interdependencies ensure that the 
prices of the commodities remain closely related. 
Estimation procedure 
The annual equations of the model and the structural equations not 
characterized by simultaneous determination, were estimated by ordinary 
least squares. In this context, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates 
of the structural parameters retain the desirable properties of unbiasedness 
and efficiency. The remaining equations of the model were estimated by 
applying two stage least squares to the historical data. Because the number 
of predetermined variables in these equations was less than the total number 
of observations, the entire set of predetermined variables was used as first 
stage regressors in the procedure. Estimates generated by two stage least 
squares are not asymptotically efficient, as would be a system estimator, 
but they are preferable to OLS estimates from the standpoint of consistency. 
No adjustments were made during estimation of the model for serially 
correlated errors among the equations, in spite of the fact the some 
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Durbin-Watson statistics were rather low. When viewing the model as a 
linear approximation to a complex nonlinear structure, the choice between 
the reported coefficients and those resulting from the ad hoc assumption of 
simple serial correlation appeared a somewhat arbitrary matter. Moreover, 
adjusting for serially correlated errors in a simultaneous equations model 
in the presence of lagged dependent variables significantly compounds 
estimation difficulties. 
For the most part, the parameters of the model were estimated from 
quarterly data for the period 1971IV-1982IV. The beef cow inventory 
equation was estimated on an annual basis because of data limitations, 
whereas the structural equation for acreage planted depicts an economic 
decision occurring only annually. The historical period for estimating 
these two equations was somewhat longer than the period used for the 
remainder of the model. 
Empirical Estimates of the Structural Equations 
In the study, numerous specifications and testing of relationships were 
conducted before a final structure was formulated. The reported 
coefficients for the structural equations are the preferred estimates from 
this analysis. Variables were retained in the specification if the 
coefficients were of the correct a priori sign, and reasonable magnitude, in 
spite of the fact that some had standard errors quite large relative to the 
point estimates. For each equation, summary statistics including absolute 
t-ratios, R-square, Durbin-Watson (DW) or Durbin-h (DH) statistics (see 
Durbin, 1970), and the ratio of the standard error of regression to the 
dependent variable mean (S/M) are presented. Elasticities of the dependent 
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variable with respect to certain explanatory variables are also presented, 
together with the estimation procedure and period used for the equation. 
The absolute t-ratios are given in parentheses under each estimated 
coefficient. The S/M statistic, and more importantly, the R-square 
statistic are presented because the two are widely recognized as measures of 
statistical fit, although as has been pointed out (e.g., Basmann 1962), the 
R-square statistic may be biased in certain applications. Elasticity 
measures are similarly recognized and serve as important indicators of the 
structure implicit in econometric model. Absolute values of the point 
elasticities evaluated at the sample period means, are presented in brackets 
under the estimated coefficients of continuous-valued exogenous variables. 
Corn Demand 
Feed demand Although declining somewhat in relative importance, the 
demand for corn as a livestock feed remains the largest component of total 
corn demand. Because corn serves as an input in the production of 
livestock, its demand as a feed ingredient is derived from the final demand 
for livestock products. As such, the quantity of corn consumed by livestock 
is assumed to be closely linked to total grain consuming animal units, and 
the expected profitability of livestock feeding. 
In general, the current period price responsiveness of feed demand is 
relatively minor, given the limited flexibility with which livestock numbers 
on feed can be quickly adjusted. Livestock prices and the price of corn 
thus, tend to exert the strongest influences on corn demand through lagged 
impacts on livestock numbers. However, there is some current period price 
response through variations in feeding rates/animal and feed periods. When 
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feeding margins are favorable, producers frequently respond by increasing 
feeding rates and the period on feed, choosing to market slaughter animals 
at heavier weights. In this manner, current period prices account for some 
of the variation in feeding patterns when the number of livestock on feed is 
relatively fixed. 
Historically, the strongest feed demand has occurred during the fall 
quarter. Over one-third of total corn fed for the year is consumed in the 
fall. A marked peak in cattle placements on feed occurs at this time 
creating a surge in feed requirements, which declines steadily through the 
rest of the marketing year. Because the feed demand for corn tends to be 
the most price responsive in the fall, slope dummies were attached to corn 
prices to allow for seasonal shifts in the parameters. 
Domestic feed consumption of corn is estimated by the following 
equation: 
QCRNFEED = 244.03 - 188.12*RPCRN - 47.80*Q4*RPCRN - 54.23*Q1*RPCRN 
(0.53) (2.64) (1.39) ( 1 . 1 6 )  
[0.42] [0.37] [0.49] 
- 29.34*Q2*RPCRN + 0.0194*GCAU + 96.55*RPWHT + 450.82*Q4 
(0.64) (2.40) (2.96) ( 5 . 6 1 )  
[0.53] [0.86] [0.30] 
+ 272.36*Q1 + 19.18AQ2 (6.1) 
(2.54) . (0.18) 
(S/M = 0.08, R-SQUARE = 0.96, DW = 2.05, quarterly-2SLS, 1971IV - 1982IV) 
where: 
QCRNFEED = domestic corn feed use, mil. bu. 
RPCRN = average corn price received by farmers, deflated by 
FPI, $/bu. 
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GCAU = grain consuming animal units, thou. 
RPWHT = average wheat price received by farmers, deflated by 
FPI, $/bu. 
Qi = 1 in calendar quarter i, -1 in calendar quarter 3, 
0 otherwise (i = 1, 2, 4) 
FPI = index of prices paid by farmers, all production items, 
1977 = 100 
Feed demand for corn was found to be more responsive to the current 
period price than expected. As hypothesized, this response also varies 
seasonally. Because of the dummy variable scheme utilized in the model, the 
coefficient on the own-price variable is the average price response for the 
four quarters. The coefficient on each of the seasonally varying price 
variables can then be interpreted as the deviation of that quarter's price 
response from the average.^ Thus, through the crop year, the quarterly 
price coefficients are -235.92, -242.35, -217.46, and -56.75. While prior 
reasoning suggested that the feed demand for corn would be the most price 
responsive in the fall quarter, the estimation results indicate that feed 
demand is more sensitive to price movements in the winter and spring 
quarters. However, as expected the own-price elasticity is relatively small 
in the summer, when livestock feeding is lightest. A comparison of the feed 
price elasticities computed here those from other studies is contained in 
Table 6.1. 
the t-statistics for the coefficients on the seasonal price parameters 
thus test the hypothesis that the slope for that particular quarter is 
significantly different from the average for the crop year. 
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Table 6.1 Corn feed demand elasticity comparisions 
Calendar quarter 
Author 1 
2 3 4 
This study -0.49 -0.53 -0.23 -0.37 
Subotnik and 
Houck (1979) 
-0.22 -0.15 -0.18 -0.24 
Butell and 
Womack (1975) 
-0.26 -0.31 -0.25^ 
Womack (1976)'' -0.42 
Baumes and 
Meyers (1980)^ 
-0.32 
^No current period price variable appeared in the equation. 
Equation specification for the quarter was later changed. 
Annual models. 
The number of animals consuming grain based feeds (GCAU) is an 
important determinant of the amount of corn fed to livestock each quarter. 
The grain-consuming animal units variable serves the same function as a 
population variable would in a consumer demand relation, except for the fact 
that it is a decision variable to the livestock producer and hence, is 
determined within the model. Feeding decisions made in the current and 
previous two quarters determine the number of livestock on feed, which is 
carried into the demand for corn relation through this variable. The 
elasticity of feed demand with respect to GCAU is not significantly 
different from 1.0, as would be anticipated. 
The price of wheat was originally inserted in the specification in only 
the summer quarter, to reflect feed substitution possibilities, but was 
found to exert a significant effect in all quarters. Prior specifications 
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of this equation also included current and lagged values for soybean meal 
prices, an index of livestock prices, and the ratio of livestock to corn 
prices. However, these variables consistently yielded signs contrary to a 
priori expectations and were subsequently dropped from the specification. 
In the case of soybean meal prices, the negative estimated coefficient, 
although incorrect theoretically, has been found in previous studies, and 
was retained in a feed demand equation estimated by Hull and Westcott 
(1984). 
Food, seed and industrial demand An increasingly important source 
of domestic corn disappearance is accounted for by food, seed, and 
industrial (FSI) uses. FSI demand increased steadily from 9 percent of 
domestic corn disappearance in 1970, to over 17 percent in 1982. Upwards of 
70 percent of the corn going into FSI channels is used in the manufacture of 
wet products — primarily corn starch, and high fructose and glucose corn 
syrup. 
Similar to feed demand, corn demand for food and industrial uses is 
derived from the retail demand for the end products. The demand for corn 
for FSI utilization is estimated on a per capita basis as: 
QCRNFSIC = 1.387 - 0.177*RCPCRN - 0.00029*RDPIC + 0.064*RCPWHT + 0.0094*T 
(4.36) (4.02) (3.27) (2,96) (14.11) 
[0.34] [1.44] [0.17] 
- 0.036*Q4 - 0.036*Q1 + 0.093*Q2 - 0.071*D79*Q4 
(2.97) (3.03) (7.77) (3.39) 
- 0.131*D79*Q1 - 0.045*D79*Q2 (6.2) 
(5.86) (2.08) 
(S/M = 0.05, R-SQUARE = 0.96, DW = 1.20, quarterly-2SLS, 1971IV - 1982IV) 
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where: 
QCRNFSIC = domestic corn food, seed, and industrial use, 
per capita, lbs. 
RCPCRN =.average corn price received by farmers, deflated 
by CBPI, $/bu. 
RDPIC = disposable personal income per capita, deflated by 
CPI, thou. $ 
RCPWHT = average wheat price received by farmers, deflated by 
CBPI, $/bu. 
T = time trend 
D79 = 1 after 1979IV, 0 otherwise 
CBPI = producer price index, cereal and bakery products, 
1967 = 100 
CPI = consumer price index, all items, 1967 = 100 
Initial attempts to estimate the equation yielded quite poor 
statistical fits. With the exception of the time trend, none of the 
exogenous variables were significant. An analysis of the residuals revealed 
a substantial change in the seasonality of FSI demand on and after 1979, and 
attributable in part to the growth of the corn sweetener industry. In view 
of the structural break, subsequent specifications of the equation allowed 
the seasonal intercept shifters to vary after 1979. This change in the 
specification greatly improved the fit and the significance of the remaining 
explanatory variables. 
As can be seen from the estimation results, FSI demand peaks sharply in 
the summer months as the demand for soft drinks, a primary user of high 
fructose corn syrup, peaks. FSI demand also tends to be quite income 
elastic, with a very strong upward trend. While some studies have used a 
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business cycle proxy as an explanatory variable, such a specification 
resulted in strong intercorrelation of variables, and did not significantly 
enhance the performance of the equation. 
Export demand Exports of corn are the most volatile component of 
total corn demand. Because of difficulty in statistically explaining the 
variation in commercial corn exports over time, many studies have opted in 
structural models to treat them as predetermined. However, to the extent 
that exports are price responsive, such an approach cannot be justified in 
this study where FOR policies directly influence the allocation of corn 
stocks to the various market channels. 
The volume of corn exported by the U.S. is influenced by several 
factors. To a large degree, corn exports reflect livestock industry 
conditions and feed grain production in importing countries, as well as 
shipments by other exporters. However, given that the ability of importing 
countries to buy corn from the U.S. is directly affected by foreign exchange 
constraints, and the value of their currency relative to the U.S. dollar, 
these factors also play critical roles in determining export levels. 
Since exported corn is primarily used as a feed ingredient, the major 
importer of corn are countries with developed livestock sectors. 
Historically, the nations of the European Community (EC) have been the 
largest purchaser of U.S. corn, followed by Japan, the USSR, and Mexico. By 
and large, the trade policies of the major importers insulate their internal 
consumption prices from the U.S. price (Bredahl, Meyers, and Collins, 1979). 
The EC countries utilize a variable levy mechanism to insulate their markets 
from the world market. Theoretically, variations in exchange rates affect 
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internal EC corn prices only indirectly through the substitution of corn 
with soybeans, or other livestock feed ingredients not subject to the levy 
system. Other European countries, and the USSR break the linkage of 
domestic prices with the world market through state trading. Japan and 
Taiwan are the only major exceptions to the rule, employing essentially free 
trade policies such that their prices directly reflect U.S. prices and 
exchange rate changes. 
The major competitors in the export market for corn include Argentina, 
South Africa, Canada, and Thailand. The exports of these countries vary 
substantially from year to year, ranging in total from around 16 percent of 
the world corn trade to over 30 percent over the last ten years. About 65 
percent of annual competitor exports are shipped in the July-December period 
(USDA, 1972). This occurs because the bulk of foreign corn that competes 
with the U.S. corn for exports is produced in the Southern Hemisphere, where 
the growing seasons are reversed. Research work by Bredahl, Womack, and 
Matthews (1978) indicates that the policies of the major exporters, and 
historical U.S. export patterns, support the hypothesis that the U.S. is 
primarily a residual supplier in the world corn trade. 
Because exports to the Soviet Union are primarily governed by long term 
agreements are not overly responsive to market conditions, the dependent 
variable used in the export demand relation is computed as U.S. total corn 
exports net of shipments to the Soviet Union. The final estimated equation 
is: 
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QCEXNURS = -1580.93 - 108.19*RXPCRN3 - 0.654*EXPCOMP + 18.74*AUEC9J 
(1.76) (3.11) (1.27) (2.14) 
[0.56] [0.17] [5.48] 
+ 0.609*QCEXNURS - 136.37*0781 + 132.66*08034 
(3.74) ^ (2.81) (2.62) 
+ 1.38*Q4 - 21.12*Q1 + 39.64*Q2 (6.3) 
(0.08) (0.79) (1.48) 
(S/M = 0.16, R-SQUARE = 0.76, DW = 1.59, quarterly-2SLS, 1971IV - 1982IV) 
where : 
QCEXNURS = U.S. corn exports, all destinations except USSR, 
mil. bu. 
RXPCRN3 = three quarter moving average of RXPCRN, $/bu. 
RXPCRN = average corn price received by farmers deflated by 
U.S. dollars/SDR, $/bu. 
EXPCOMP = total corn exports of major competitors, mil. bu. 
(interpolated to quarterly series) 
AUEC9J = three quarter moving average of animal units in 
EC-9 countries and Japan, thou. 
0781 = 1 in 19781, 0 otherwise 
08034 = 1 in 1980III and 1980IV, 0 otherwise 
Not surprisingly, the export equation fits the poorest of the corn 
demand relations. The deliberate and simplifying omission of variables 
reflecting supply-demand relationships for importers and other exporters, 
lies behind the relatively weak explanatory power of the equation. Initial 
estimations employed the current price of corn deflated by dollars per SOR, 
as the price variable in the quation. After some testing, however, it was 
felt that exports were also responding to previous quarters' prices and 
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exchange rates, reflecting the fact that many export bookings take place 
well in advance of shipment. Consequently, a three quarter moving average 
of deflated prices was inserted into the equation producing better 
statistical results. 
Competitor exports were employed in the equation as a separate 
regressor, rather than subtracted from the importer demands in formulating 
the dependent variable. The latter approach is tantamount to the assumption 
that the U.S. is the residual supplier in the world market, and effectively 
imposes a coefficient of -1 on total competitor exports in the relation. 
The approach used here allows for an empirical estimation of the coefficient 
for competitor exports, and implies a tradeoff of somewhat less than one. 
Every bushel increase in corn exported by competiting countries was found to 
displace about two-thirds of a bushel of U.S. corn exports. 
To reflect foreign corn demand for livestock feeds, the number of 
animal units in the nine EC countries and Japan appears as a shift variable 
in the equation. The elasticity of corn exports with respect to this 
variable is quite large, and suggests a close relationship between the 
livestock economies of these countries and the U.S. corn shipments. The 
four quarter lagged dependent term was introduced into the equation to 
explain the seasonal variation in export shipments. Two dummy variables 
also appear to account for the large unexplained variation in exports during 
specified periods in 1978 and 1980. Earlier regression tests indicated that 
these two periods were exerting an undue influence on the estimated 
parameters of the equation. 
113 
Commercial Inventory demand Commercial inventories, or free stocks 
of corn can be usefully broken down into two categories according to 
intention of use. These are pipeline (also called working) stocks and 
speculative stocks. 
Pipeline stocks are held for convenience reasons and tend to be 
unresponsive to prices and price expectations. These stocks are used in the 
normal business of feeding, or processing, and have a "convenience yield" 
attributable to their being on hand when needed. Pipeline stocks do not 
vary much from year to year, and are primarily determined by the volume of 
grain handled, as well as the efficiency and size of the transportation 
system. 
Speculative stocks, on the other hand, can be viewed as an investment 
yielding an intertemporal flow of costs and returns. Individuals or firms 
with access to storage facilities hold such stocks hoping to profit on 
future price increases. Speculative stocks are very sensitive to current 
and expected prices and vary sometimes considerably both within and between 
crop years. Whereas pipeline stocks are often hedged and decrease risk to 
the owner, speculative stocks are normally unhedged and increase the risk of 
ownership. Because most of the variation in free stocks is the result of 
variation in speculative holdings, attention is focused on explaining this 
component when modeling the demand for free stocks. 
Original specifications of the stocks equation utilized a partial 
adjustment approach based on the flexible accelerator model described in 
Womack (1976). Such a specification when estimated, however, resulted in a 
very price inelastic relation that contributed substantially to market 
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instability in historical simulations of the model. In an effort to rectify 
the situation and restore some of the price response in the equation, the 
partial adjustment approach was dropped. The final form of the equation is 
loosely based on the Womack specification, with allowances for the 
interaction of commercial stocks with FOR stock of corn. The estimated form 
is : 
ICRN = 3932.46 - 588.20*RPCRN + 274.93*Q4*RPCRN - 285.76*Q1*RPCRN 
(4.99) (6.87) (1.69) (2.05) 
[0.49] [0.13] [0.61] 
- 266.07*Q2*RPCRN + 0.629*D4*XCRN - 0.354*F0RSTK - 20.54*D23*APCRN 
(1.77) (4.93) (3.59) (1.23) 
[1.10] [0.81] [0.09] [1.38] 
+ 105.32*DPRELS - 2146.47*Q4 + 1443.48&Q1 + 1515.63*Q2 (6.4) 
(1.12) (1.75) (1.63) (1.67) 
(S/M = 0.07, R-SQUARE = 0.99, DW = 1.03, quarterly-2SLS, 197IIV - 1982IV) 
where : 
ICRN = ending commercial stocks of corn, mil. bu. 
XCRN = total corn production, mil. bu. 
FORSTK = total ending reserve stocks of corn, mil. bu. 
APCRN = total area planted to corn, mil. acres 
D23 = 1 in calendar quarters 2 and 3, 0 otherwise 
D4 = 1 in calendar quarter 4, 0 otherwise 
DPRELS = shifter for periods in which reserve release price 
was adjusted 
A strong determinant of the quantity of corn held in storage is the 
current period price. The current price of corn constitutes an opportunity 
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cost of carrying corn forward. As price increases, the storage speculator 
would be expected to market more grain and carry less forward in 
anticipation of higher prices. Conversely, low prices encourage 
stockholding, as speculators hope for higher future prices. The 
specification employed in the equation allows the price responsiveness of 
commercial stocks to vary between quarters within the marketing year. The 
results suggest that commercial stocks of corn are relatively price elastic, 
with the elasticity increasing through the crop year. 
Total production of corn appears in the equation in the first quarter 
of the marketing year only. The coefficient of this variable reflects the 
marginal propensity to store increased supplies. The estimated relationship 
implies that a one billion bushel increase in corn production would increase 
carryout stocks for the fourth quarter by around 630 million bushels. The 
acreage planted to corn appears in the equation in the spring and summer 
quarters, and acts as a proxy for late season expected prices. An increase 
of one million acres in corn planted area in the spring is estimated to draw 
down free stocks by about twenty million bushels through the summer months. 
The two variables FORSTK and DPRELS, depict the influence of the FOR 
program and its price rules on speculative stockholdings. As demonstrated 
earlier, the extent of interaction between free and FOR stocks has critical 
implications for the performance of the FOR program in stabilizing prices. 
The coefficient of total FOR quantities embodies both the substitution 
effect and the expectation effect as outlined in Chapter IV, and was 
hypothesized to fall in the [-1,0] range. The estimated coefficient for 
reserve stocks in the relation implies that a one bushel increase in 
116 
reserves displaces 0.35 bushels of commercial stocks. Implicitly then, 
around sixty-five percent of the corn entering the program originates from 
reduced farmer marketings of the commodity. The shift variable for periods 
of release price adjustment (DPRELS) appears in the equation to capture any 
effect of a change in the program's price rules on free stocks. Aside from 
the direct tradeoffs that exist between public stock levels and private 
stockholdings, Gardner (1982) points out that a public stock program may 
influence private stockholding behavior through its price rules. For 
example, an increase in the release price (assuming the reserve is not 
currently in release status), expands the range over which the market price 
can freely move, thereby increasing the chance for speculative profits, and 
thus, the demand for free stocks. The coefficient of DPRELS measures the 
impact of a change in the reserve's price rules on free stocks, and implies 
that a one dollar increase in the release price increases free stocks by 105 
million bushels. 
Farmer-owned reserve demand In explaining carryover levels of 
farmer-owned reserves, explicit consideration is focused on modeling not 
only the demand for corn for placement into the program, but also the demand 
for redemptions from the program, once trigger prices are reached. These 
two distinct decisions facing eligible producers are considered separately 
in this section. 
FOR placement behavior For the eligible producer, the FOR 
represents a temporary marketing device that can be substituted for a direct 
sale or speculative storage. As such, the demand for corn for placement 
into the program is likely to be quite responsive to disparities between the 
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discounted flow of net returns provided by participation in the reserve 
program, and the returns to the other marketing alternatives that exist. 
A large number of factors influence the returns to FOR participation. 
Incorporating these factors into a mathematical characterization of the 
placement decision is one of the major constraints that arises in the 
analysis of FOR behavior. These factors originate from the provisions of 
the program (loan rate, interest charge, interest period, storage payment), 
the producer's situation (cost of capital, storage costs), and the 
producer's expectations (the sales price at redemption, time of redemption, 
probability of default). The value of a bushel placed in the reserve 
includes all these factors and will vary from producer to producer as 
expectations, the farm's cost of capital and cash storage costs vary. 
When evaluating a placement decision, the producer must consider the 
two possible outcomes of that decision. First, is the possibility that 
grain placed in the reserve will be released with the producer having the 
option to redeem the loan. Second is the possibility that grain in the 
reserve will be turned over to the CGC under the default option, and the 
loan is not repaid. Clearly, the expected returns to a bushel placed in the 
reserve will vary depending on the outcome of the loan. If the loan is 
redeemed prior to or at maturity, the present value (PV^) of a bushel placed 
in the reserve in year t is: 
PV^ = PL + (6.5)  
(1 + r)^ j=0 (1 + r)^ 
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where : 
k = number of years Co redemption (0 < k ^  3) 
PL = loan rate per bushel 
, = expected sales price at redemption 
(release price < P^^^ £ call price if k < 3) 
i = CCC interest rate charged on FOR loans 
n = number of years interest accrues (assumed n j< k, 
otherwise n = k) 
r = the producer's cost of capital 
SP = annual storage payment per bushel 
SC = annual storage costs per bushel. 
If release is never reached through the term of the contract or the 
producer does not choose to exercise the redemption option, the grain is 
turned over to the CCC as full loan payment at contract maturity. Under 
this outcome the present value of a bushel placed in the FOR is simply: 
PVG = PL + 
j=0 (1 + r)^ 
( 6 . 6 )  
In the model, it is assumed that the producer evaluates expected 
returns to program participation as the maximum of returns to the redemption 
option, or returns under the default option. The expected returns variable 
PV, is thus formulated as: 
PV = max(PVl, PV2) (6.7) 
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In addition to the market price, and the returns to participation, the 
amount of corn that enters the reserve in the current period also responds 
to the quantity of corn that is eligible for placement, which effectively 
forms a cap on placements. The amount of eligible corn varies from year to 
year with total production and the proportion of producers who were in 
compliance with the current acreage program, if one was in existence. 
Within the crop year, the quantity of corn available for placement is 
reduced by marketings, on-farm feeding, and reserve placements in prior 
periods. As the amount available decreases through the year, the demand for 
farmer-owned reserves shifts leftward. 
Original specifications of the placement equation employed a logistic 
functional form similar to that suggested by Meyers and Jolly (1980). This 
specification, however, proved inferior in simulations to the simple 
arithmetic form used in previous equations, and was subsequently dropped in 
favor of the linear form. The final placement equation appearing in 
equation (6.8) was estimated using data only over the period since 1979IV. 
With the beginning of the 1979 crop, farmers were allowed to bypass the nine 
month loan program and directly place corn into the reserve program. Prior 
to that period, the amount of grain maturing from the nine month program 
defined the quantity of grain eligible for placement, and formed the upper 
constraint on placements. 
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The structure by which FOR placements are determined is represented as : 
PLACE = -1318.75 - 482.68*PCRN + 992.44*PV - 0.0047*AVAIL 
(5.60) (10.28) (11.30) (0.32) 
[5.60] [12.31] [0.07] 
+ 0.027*Q4*AVAIL + 0.049*Q1*AVAIL - 0.049*Q2*AVAIL 
(2.24) (4.38) (4.09) 
[0.29] [0.47] [1.92] 
- 302.14*0823 (6.8) 
(3.60) 
(S/M = 0.17, R-SQUARE = 0.98, DW = 2.89, quarterly-2SLS, 1979IV - 1982IV) 
where: 
PLACE = total FOR program corn placements, mil. bu. 
PCRN = average price of corn received by farmers, $/bu. 
PV = summary variable of expected returns to FOR 
participation, $/bu. (see* computation, p. 255) 
AVAIL = total quantity of corn eligible for placement, mil. bu. 
D823 = lin 1982111, 0 otherwise 
Corn placements in the model were initially estimated as varying simply 
with the price of corn, the expected returns to participation, and the 
amount of eligible corn. However, in simulation testing the performance of 
this specification proved less than satisfactory. After examining the 
residuals, it was felt that placements were responding in a different manner 
to the amount of grain available as the crop year progressed. Hence, the 
specification was adjusted in order to allow the coefficient on AVAIL to 
vary seasonally. This revision yielded the above statistical relationship. 
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and produced improvements in both the fit of the equation and its simulation 
performance. 
The market price of corn appears in the equation as an opportunity cost 
of corn placed in the program. As the market price rises relative to the 
expected returns to participation the producer would be less likely to 
participate in the reserve, opting instead for the sure returns of the 
marketplace. An increase in the returns to participation, on the other 
hand, would shift the function to the right in a price-quantity space, 
increasing the demand for reserves at a given price. An increase in the 
demand for reserves would come about if the storage subsidy or the expected 
sales price at redemption were to increase, whereas increases in the 
interest charge on the FOR loan, the interest period, the producer's storage 
costs, and the discount rate would decrease the demand for reserves. 
As exemplified by the computed elasticities, program placements tend to 
be extremely sensitive to both the current market price of corn, and the 
expected returns to participation. These results are not completely 
surprising since participation in the FOR involves relatively little risk 
for farmers, and is a strong substitute with the cash market as a marketing 
alternative for their grain. In this respect, deviations in the returns to 
one option over the other would be expected to induce a large quantity 
response. The large elasticities also suggest that expectations of returns 
to the FOR option held by farmers are fairly narrowly distributed. If the 
expected returns were widely distributed across eligible farmers, then 
logically the elasticity of program placements with respect to PV would be 
much smaller. 
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The intercept shift variable D823, was included in the equation to 
account for the abnormally small placements that took place during the 
relatively low priced summer of 1982. At this time, the managers of the 
program extended the rotation period on FOR corn from 30 days before harvest 
to 60 days, resulting in heavy late season marketings. To a large extent, 
these marketings displaced new placements into the program. 
FOR redemption behavior Redemption of FOR grain is not 
possible until either the market price exceeds the release price, or the FOR 
contract matures. Once release has been announced a producer may sell or 
continue to store in hopes of higher returns. Assuming that k periods 
elapse between the time the producer places grain in the reserve and release 
occurs, the net returns from immediate sale are: 
where : 
Pj. is the current market price 
PR < < PC (call price) 
ij._j. is the interest charge per period at the time of placement 
n , is the number of periods interest accrues (assumed n^ , < k, 
t-k , , . t-k — 
otherwise n^ , = k) 
t-k 
PL^_^ is the loan rate per bushel at the time of placement. 
The same return would apply if the loan were redeemed at maturity, however, 
the sales price in this event would not be restricted to the PR, PC range. 
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If, on the other hand, the producer does not sell the grain in release, 
but rather continues to store for ra more periods anticipating higher prices, 
he receives (in discounted terms) a net return of: 
(1 + r)" j=0 (1 + r)j 
where : 
is the expected sales price 
PR < P® < PC 
— t+tn — 
r is the cost of capital per period 
SC is the cost of storage per bushel per period. 
Assuming m = 1, the representative producer (in the absence of other 
considerations) could be expected to sell the grain and redeem the loan now 
if RV^ > RV^ or, rearranging (6.9) and (6.10), if: 
P > -  SC 
(1 + r) 
or, 
Pj. > RV (6.12) 
where : 
RV is the opportunity cost of immediate cash sale 
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The RV expression consists of the discounted value of the sura of the 
expected sales price one period later plus an imputed return (negative cost) 
of deferring the loan principal and interest payment for one period, minus 
the storage cost involved. The redemption function was specified including 
the above factors, in addition to lagged reserve stocks, which logically 
constrain the amount that may be redeemed in a given period. Only data from 
periods of release were used in statistically estimating the parameters of 
the redemption function, resulting in only six observations. Although some 
redemption of grain does occur at prices below the current release price, 
due to contract maturities and grain under previous FOR contracts with lower 
release levels, this amount is relatively small. 
Equation (6.13) was used to explain corn redemptions from the FOR: 
REDEMP = 102.07 + 52.12*PCRN - 28.74*RV + 0.0114*FORSTK . 
(1.58) (2.11) (0.81) (0.47) 
[0.64] [0.33] [0.03] 
+ 332.30*DCD (6.13) 
(35.56) 
(S/M = 0.03, R-SQUARE = 0.99, quarterly-2SLS, 1979III - 1982IV: 
redemption periods) 
where : 
REDEMP = total FOR program corn redemptions, rail. bu. 
RV = opportunity cost of current marketing in release, $/bu. 
(see computation, p. 258) 
DCD = 1 in 1981II, 0 otherwise 
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Given the limited number of observations, the statistics are by no 
means robust estimates, but do provide a rough measure of the process 
generating redemptions from the program. The price variables have the 
expected signs, but do not exert the influence on FOR grain movements, as 
did those of the placement equation. A large proportion of the variation in 
the equation is explained by the shift variable, D812. An unprecedented 
amount of grain came out of the reserve in the spring of 1981, most of which 
was placed in the program during the previous quarter under the 
interest-free loan provisions that were shortly thereafter dropped. As the 
equation was not equipped to account for the unexpected redemptions during 
the period, the shift variable was included in the specification. 
Corn production 
The production of corn is predetermined and forthcoming only in the 
first quarter of the crop year, based on production decisions two quarters 
earlier. In the model, corn yields per acre are assumed exogenous, such 
that the production of corn in the first quarter is equal to the product of 
the yield per acre and the acreage planted the previous spring. 
Acreage planted to corn The planted acreage response by farmers 
reflects the demand for land as an input in the production of corn. Because 
corn and soybeans are grown in the same geographical areas and compete 
closely for land, the acreage planted to corn tends to respond to expected 
corn and soybean prices, and government policy variables reflecting current 
acreage programs for the two crops. 
The acreage response equation utilized in the model was specified as a 
partial adjustment process whereby desired plantings are determined by 
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current corn and soybean prices, diversion payments for corn, and price 
support levels for corn. The final estimated relationship is: 
APCRN = 46.27 + 11.01*[PCRNA/PSBA] + 5.53*RPSCRN - 2A.22*RDPCRN 
(5.99) (1.68) (2.40) (7.73) 
[0.05] [0.11] [0.05] 
+ 0.277*APCRN (6.14) 
(2.99) 
(S/M = 0.02, R-SQUARE = 0.96, DH = 0.31, annual-OLS, 1966 - 1982) 
where: 
APCRN = total area planted to corn, mil. acres 
PCRNA = four quarter moving average of PCRN 
PCRN = average corn price received by farmers, $/bu. 
PSBA = four quarter moving average of PSB 
PSB = average soybean price received by farmers, $/bu. 
RPSCRN = effective support rate for corn, deflated by FPI, $/bu. 
RDPCRN = effective diversion payment for corn, deflated by FPI, $/bu. 
Annual data extending from 1966 to 1982 was used in estimating the 
parameters of the equation. The data period was chosen to begin in 1966 
because of changes in farm program provisions where, from that time on, 
price supports (via nonrecourse loans) were only offered to those producers 
complying with the provisions of the current acreage program, if in 
existence. 
Initial estimations of the equation employed the spring quarter prices 
of corn and soybeans as separate regressors in the relationship. However, 
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inclusion of the variables in this form consistently yielded poor 
statistical results, and was dropped in favor of a specification using the 
ratio of current and lagged corn and soybean prices. Although not 
statistically significant at ten percent, the estimated coefficient for the 
variable is theoretically plausible. The other two explanatory variables, 
RPSCRN and RDPCRN, are policy variables included in the relationship to 
explain variations in planted acreage as a result of government backed 
incentives or disincentives to plant corn. Both variables are weighted by 
restrictions imposed on the programs' participants, using a method similar 
to that described in Houck et al. (1976). Diversion payments offered to 
eligible producers are essentially government sponsored "rental" rates to 
divert land from corn production, and were found in the relation to possess 
a great deal of explanatory power for those periods in which such a program 
was in existence. The price support, or loan level also exerts a 
noticeable, but positive effect on corn acreage response. In addition to 
the price support for corn, consideration was given to including the soybean 
suport level in the specification. However, given that the support level 
for soybeans has historically remained well below the cash price, it is 
doubtful to have exerted a systematic affect on corn plantings, and hence 
was excluded from the specification. 
Livestock and broiler production 
Unlike the discrete production and storable characteristics of crop 
commodities, meat production is continuous and perishable. Within a three 
month period, the quantity of meat can neither be increased or decreased 
significantly, leaving price to bear the burden of adjusting the quantity 
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demanded to the quantity supplied. Because production is essentially 
predetermined in the short run, the supply of livestock and poultry exhibit 
very little response to current economic variables, varying instead with 
production decisions in earlier periods. 
Modeling livestock supply response is particularly difficult not only 
because of the above factors, but also because live cattle and hogs are both 
a capital input into subsequent meat production, and an immediate source of 
output. Furthermore, certain livestock classes are hypothesized to exhibit 
negative supply responses (Reutlinger, 1966), given that an increase in 
future meat production can only come about by retaining potential slaughter 
animals for use in the breeding herd. These factors have profound impacts 
on the dynamic behavior of the system as a whole, and hence, on the 
specification of a mathematical model of the subsector. 
The equations of the livestock model explain the quarterly production 
of fed beef, pork, and broilers, and the inventories of beef cows, cattle on 
feed, and sows farrowing. 
Beef cow inventories The number of beef cows on farms and ranches 
is the fundamental barometer of the cattle inventory cycle. The size of the 
beef cow inventory largely determines the size of subsequent calf crops, and 
so exerts a major influence on subsequent beef production. 
Beef cows are maintained on farms as an investment in the production of 
feeder calves. In principle, the desired size of the beef cow herd should 
respond to the expected discounted returns from producing and selling feeder 
calves minus the revenue from the current sale of the cows for slaughter. 
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Since future feeder calf prices are not observable, logically expectations 
may be based on actual or past price data. 
In the beef cow inventory relation of the model, expected feeder prices 
are proxied by the last four quarter's prices with an arithmetic lag 
structure. While there are many eligible lag distributions, this type was 
employed because of its simplicity and because Freebairn and Rausser (1975) 
in a similar application used an arithmetic lag with satisfactory results. 
The current rate of interest appears in the equation as a proxy of the cost 
of keeping beef cows on hand. While it may be desirable to incorporate 
utility cow prices into the equation, this variable is quite collinear with 
other beef prices, and in prior studies was used with little success (e.g., 
Martin, 1983). 
The specification employed in the model utilizes a partial adjustment 
form in determining January 1 beef cows numbers: 
BFCWS = -3501.6 + 0.889*BFCWS^ + 163.77*RPFDRSA, , 
(1.37) (16.15) (11.26) 
[0.21] 
- 28.76*INTPR (6.15) 
(0.77) 
[0.01] 
(S/M = 0.01, R-SQUÂRE = 0.97, DH = 1.21, annual-OLS, 1969-1983) 
where: 
BFCWS = beef cows on farms, Jan. 1, thou, hd. 
RPFDRSA = four quarter moving average of RPFDRS 
RPFDRS = average price of Kansas City feeder steers, deflated 
by FPI, $/cwt. 
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INTPR = four quarter moving average of prime interest rates, % 
FPI = index of prices paid by farmers, all production items, 
1977 = 100 
Feeder calf price Feeder calves are an intermediate product in the 
production of beef, and an important input in the production process. A 
well-developed market exists for feeder steers and heifers, and facilitates 
the allocation of feeders between placement on feed and retention on 
pasture. 
Cattle finishers' interests in purchasing feeder calves are directly 
linked to the profitability of feeding the calves to market weight. The 
demand for feeder calves is thus assumed to respond to expected fed beef 
prices, and the price of feed. The supply of feeder calves, on the other 
hand, is primarily related to. previous calf crops, which in turn reflects 
the size of the cow herd. 
While it would seem preferable to model the demand and supply of 
feeders explicitly in a separate submodel within the system, such an 
approach in previous studies (e.g.. Reeves, 1979; Arzac and Wilkinson, 1979) 
was dropped due to estimation problems, in favor of a partially reduced form 
equation for price. The latter approach is employed here, where the partial 
reduced form for feeder steer prices appears as: 
RPFDRS = 15.025 + 0.840*RPFBF + 0.626*RPFBF - 5.460*RPCRN 
(0.99) (3.65) (2.59) (3.32) 
[0.83] [0.62] [0.25] 
- 0.00062*BFCWS « - 0.337*Q4 + 2.091*Q1 + 0.087*Q2 (6.16) 
(1.76) (0.28) (1.90) (0.07) 
[0.50] 
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(S/M = 0.08, R-SQUARE = 0.89, DW = 0.54, quarterly-2SLS, 1971IV - 1982IV) 
where: 
RPFDRS = average price of Kansas City feeder steers, deflated 
by FPI, $/cwt. 
RPFBF = price of choice slaughter steers, Omaha, deflated 
by FPI, $/cwt. 
RPCRN = average corn price received by farmers, deflated 
by FPI, $/bu. 
Expected slaughter cattle prices in the relation are proxied by current 
and lagged price, with the price of corn reflecting feeding costs. The 
results suggest that the price of feeder cattle changes $0.84 for every 
dollar movement in live cattle prices. The two quarter lagged inventory of 
beef cows arises from the supply side of the subsystem, and reflects the 
supply of feeder calves, thus exerting a negative impact on feeder prices. 
A ten percent increase in the lagged number of beef cows is expected to 
reduce the price of feeder cattle by five percent. 
Cattle on feed Slaughter steer prices and the price of feed impact 
the beef industry primarily through cattle feeding decisions. Since cattle 
may be finished on either concentrate feed rations or grass, feedlot 
placements tend to respond noticeably to variations in feeding margins. 
Because most cow-calf operators prefer calving in the early spring, feedlot 
numbers also tend to be quite seasonal, peaking sharply in the fall quarter. 
The number of cattle on feed in the model is assumed to depend on 
expected feeding margins, previous calf crops, and seasonal shift variables. 
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The structural equation depicting end of the quarter cattle on feed numbers 
is : 
COF = -963.74 + 33.084*[RPFBF - 10.68*[1.705*RPCRN + 0.0023*RPSBM]] 
(0.46) (3.00) 
[0.17] [0.14] [0.01] 
+ 0.772*COF + 0.0818*NETCLF + 1287.82*Q4 - 655.67*Q1 
(9.42) (1.50) (9.65) (4.25) 
[0.31] 
- 465.80*Q2 (6.17) 
(3.47) 
(S/M = 0.05, R-SQUARE = 0.85, DW = 2.24, quarterly-2SLS, 1971IV - 1982IV) 
where : 
COF = cattle on feed, 13 states, end of period, thou. hd. 
RPSBM = soybean meal price, 44% Decatur, deflated by FPI, $/ton 
NETCLF = number of calves on farms proxy, thou. hd. 
The bracketed term in the first line of the equation is a cattle 
finishing profitability index, defined as the net returns over feed costs of 
producing 100 pounds of beef. The index is equal to the live cattle price 
per cwt. minus a feed conversion ratio times the cost of 100 pounds of an 
eleven percent corn-soybean meal feed ration. The results suggest that a 
ten percent increase in the price of live cattle would increase the number 
of cattle on feed by 1.7 percent, whereas a ten percent increase in the 
price of corn would decrease the number of cattle on feed by 1.4 percent. 
The variable NETCLF, is a proxy for the number of calves available for 
placement on feed, and is computed as a two quarter lagged number of beef 
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cows minus total commercial slaughter of calves during the previous two 
quarters. While it would be desirable to impose calving ratios on total cow 
numbers, such data is not available on a seasonal basis. 
The lagged dependent term was included in the equation as an indicator 
of delays in adjusting feedlot numbers due to technical constraints. The 
seasonality of cattle numbers on feed can be seen by investigating the 
coefficients on the quarterly intercept shifters. At given prices, cattle 
on feed numbers for the thirteen states tend to be around 1.3 million head 
higher in the fall quarter than for the rest of the year. 
Production of fed beef The primary factor determining the amount of 
fed steer and heifer beef produced in a given quarter is cattle placement 
decisions in previous quarters. Although cattle on feed display a strong 
degree of seasonality, fed beef marketings, and hence, fed beef production 
tend to be fairly evenly distributed through the year. 
While the number of cattle marketed exhibits very little response to 
economic factors, there is some current period price response of slaughter 
weights. Typically slaughter weights are lower than normal in times of poor 
feeding margins, and heavier than normal when margins are profitable. To 
account for some of the variation in total beef production by carcass weight 
when the number of cattle slaughtered is fixed, the cattle finishing 
profitability index defined above is also included in the beef production 
equation. 
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Production of fed beef in the model is explained by the following 
equation: 
+ 0.0023*RPSBM]] - 440.34*07323 - 569.49*07534 + 46.07*Q4 
(3.58) (5.24) (1.20) 
[0.01] 
- 4.41*Q1 - 76.91*Q2 (6.18) 
(0.09) (1.96) 
(S/M = 0.03, R-SQUARE = 0.82, DW = 1.96, quarterly-2SLS, 1971IV - 1982IV) 
where: 
XFBF = fed steer and heifer beef production, carcass wt., 
mil. lbs. 
07323 = 1 in 1973II - 1973III, 0 otherwise 
07534 = 1 in 1975III - 1975IV, 0 otherwise 
The estimation results evidence the strong relationship between fed 
beef production and the lagged number of cattle on feed. The coefficient 
implies an elasticity of 0.42, which seems quite plausible, since the 
average time for cattle on feed in commercial and farm feedlots is around 
190 days, or just over two quarters (Gee et al., 1979). A significant, but 
minor response of beef production to feeding margins was also detected in 
the estimation. The shift variable 07323 was included in the specification 
to explain the displacement of the market from its equilibrium that occurred 
XFBF = 2389.43 + 0.178*COF 
(8.90) (6.24) 
[0.42] 
+ 6.078*[RPFBF - 10.68*[1.705*RPCRN 
(3.06) 
[0.07] [0 .06]  
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during the period of beef price controls from March 29, 1973 to September 
10, 1973. Another shift variable appears in the relationship to account for 
the extremely low production period in 1975. The model in previous 
simulation tests was consistently overestimating beef production during this 
period which strongly suggested the omission of a relevant explanatory 
variable from the specification. 
Sows farrowing The number of hogs slaughtered in the current time 
period is directly related to the number of sows farrowed some two to three 
quarters earlier. The decision to farrow is finalized about two quarters 
before farrowing takes place. Factors influencing the number of sows 
farrowed include the expected price of hogs at market time, expected feeding 
and carrying costs, past sow farrowings, and seasonal components. The 
following equation was used in the model to estimate quarterly farrowings: 
SOWF = -276.91 + 8.69*RPPK „ 
(0.70) (2.21) 
[0.12] 
- 61.45*RPCRN „ 
(1.08) 
[0.04] 
+ 0.496*[SOWF + SOWF ,] - 0.064*Q4*[SOWF 
(10.07) ^ (8.25) t-1 
+ SOWF 
t-2 
- 0.063*Q1*[SOWF 
(7.78) t-1 
+ SOWF. ^] + 0.155*Q2*[SOWF. , + SOWF ,] 
(16.99) 
+ 234.23*D7783*Q4 + 62.75*D7783*Q1 - 497.58*D7783*Q2 
( 3 . 6 8 )  (0.95) (7.53) 
- 28.23*INTFR + 9.87*T 
(2.04) (1.86) 
(6.19) 
(S/M = 0.04, R-SQUARE = 0.94, DH = 0.67, quarterly-OLS, 1971IV -19831) 
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where :  
SOWF = number of sows farrowing, U.S., thou. hd. 
RPPK = barrow and gilt price, 7 markets, deflated by FPI, $/cwt. 
RPCRN = average corn price received by farmers, deflated 
by FPI, $/bu. 
INTPR = four quarter moving average of prime interest rates, % 
T = time trend 
D7783 = 1 in 19771 - 19831, 0 otherwise 
It is assumed that expectations regarding future hog and corn prices 
are determined on the basis of past and present price experiences. Hence, 
corn and hog prices in period t-2, when the decision to farrow is 
culminated, are included in the specification. Sow farrowings in the 
equation respond the most however, to lagged farrowings. The coefficient on 
the one and two quarter lagged dependent terra is quite significant as are 
the slope shift coefficients on the variable, pointing out some of the 
seasonality in sow farrowings. Farrowings peak in the March - May period, 
and according to the equation, also tend to be much more responsive to past 
farrowings during this period. This result suggests that more gilts are 
retained for breeding purposes, and more sows culled from the breeding herd 
after spring farrowing than at other times of the year. 
Because of the more intensive use of central farrowing and confinement 
facilities in hog production, the seasonality in farrowings appears to be 
diminishing. Hurt and Garcia (1982), for example, note a structural change 
in farrowing seasonality, and adjust their model specifications accordingly. 
An analysis of residuals from earlier regressions of the equation in this 
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study similarly indicated a problem, and revealed a consistent 
overprediction of spring farrowings, and underprediction of fall farrowings 
in the latter part of the sample period. For this reason, intercept 
shifters were introduced, to allow the seasonality of farrowings of change 
after 1977. As expected, the results do indicate a significant decrease in 
the number of sows farrowing in the spring in latter years, and a 
corresponding increase in fall farrowings. The specification also includes 
interest rates to reflect the costs of maintaining sows in the herd, and a 
time trend. Attempts to include cattle prices in the equation, as a proxy 
of returns to alternative uses of farm resources, and pigs saved per litter 
produced inconsistent estimates, and failed to improve the performance of 
the equation. 
Barrow and gilt slaughter The magnitude of barrow and gilt 
slaughter for the entire swine industry is determined within fairly-narrow 
limits once farrowings have taken place. Since six months is the average 
time required for a pig to reach market weight, two or three quarter lagged 
pig crops (computed in the model as sow farrowings times pigs saved per 
litter) are the two primary variables in the specification. To detect any 
seasonal patterns in gilt retention for breeding purposes, the coefficient 
for lagged pig crops is allowed to vary by quarter. The final version of 
the equation is: 
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BGSLT = 2673.28 + 0.646*[0.75*PIGCRP^_„ + 0.25*PIGCRP ,] 
(1.76) (12.18) ^ 
[0.79] 
- 0.014*Q4*[0.75*PIGCRP „ + 0.25*PIGCRP „] 
(1.57) 
[0.8] 
- 0.017*Q1*[0.75*PIGCRP , + 0.25*PIGCRP._,] 
(2.09) 
[ 0 .80 ]  
+ 0.014*Q2*[0.75*PIGCRP „ + 0.25*PIGCRP _] 
(1.72) 
[0.79] 
+ 42.70*T - 128.85*RPCRN - 1647.31*07323 (6.20) 
(4.70) (0.56) (2.18) 
(S/M = 0.04, R-SQUARE = 0.91, DW = 1.65, quarterly-OLS, 1971IV -19831) 
where: 
BGSLT = slaughter of barrows and gilts under federal inspection, 
U.S., thou. hd. 
PIGCRP = pig crop, U.S., thou. hd. 
D7323 = 1 in 1973II, 1973III, 0 otherwise 
Since the impact of past pig crops was allowed in the specification to 
vary seasonally, for ease of interpretation the two and three period lagged 
terms were combined into a weighted term. From initial tests, it was 
estimated that close to 75 percent of the market hogs slaughtered in a given 
quarter were farrowed two quarters earlier, and 25 percent, three quarters 
earlier. These two proportions were subsequently imposed on lagged pig 
crops in computing the weighted terra. As expected this variable explains a 
substantial proportion of variation in the number of barrows and gilt 
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slaughtered. The elasticity of barrow and gilt slaughter with respect to 
lagged pig crops is 0.80. The slope shifters on the term, furthermore 
indicate that hog producers tend to retain more gilts for breeding purposes 
from spring and summer farrowings than other times of the year. This 
finding directly supports the empirical results reached in the sows 
farrowing equation in (6.19) above. 
The slaughter of barrows and gilts also displays a strong upward trend, 
and responds in part to lagged corn prices. A dummy variable for the price 
control period in 1973 illustrates the constrained disequilibrium situation 
that resulted as production in the major livestock markets was displaced 
from a state of equality with demand. 
Sow slaughter The number of sows marketed for slaughter is 
contingent upon past farrowings and expectations of the future profitability 
of raising hogs. As expected returns to raising market hogs increase, 
breeding herds are built up, and fewer sows are sold for slaughter. The 
following equation estimates sow slaughter: 
SOWSLT = -267.07 - 6.35*RPPK 
(0.93) (2.71) 
[0.24] 
+ 132.33*RPCRN^ , 
(4.39) 
[ 0 .26 ]  
+ 0.213*[SOWF , 
( 6 . 2 6 )  
[1 .20]  
+ SOWF^ „] + 0.007*04*[SOW? 
[1.19] 
t-1 
+ SOWF 
t-2 
- 0.017*Q1*[SOWF 
(4.04) 
[1.24] 
t-1 + SOWF „] - 0.003*Q2*[SOWF (0.55) 
[1.24] 
t-1 + SOWF t-2 
(6.21) 
(S/M = 0.09, R-SQUARE = 0.81, DW = 1.23, quarterly-OLS, 1971IV - 19831) 
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where: 
SOWSLT = slaughter of sows under federal inspection, U.S., thou. hd. 
One quarter lagged corn and hog prices indicate the desireability of either 
selling or re-breeding sows. At the means, the results indicate that a ten 
percent increase in the price of corn, or decrease in the price of market 
hogs, would increase the slaughter of sows by around 2.5 percent, reflecting 
the diminished profit potential from raising hogs. The estimation also 
suggests that a larger percentage of sows in the breeding herd are culled in 
the summer and fall months, and marketed for slaughter. 
Pork production Because of the absence of data on the number of 
hogs not slaughtered under federal inspection, the production of pork is 
stochastically represented in the model rather than calculated by identity. 
Meat from the slaughter of barrows and gilts comprises the great majority of 
that used in the production of pork. Through the sample period, the 
slaughter of barrows and gilts accounted for around 94 percent of the total 
slaughter mix, while the slaughter of sows represented five percent. In 
general, pork production exhibits very little response to current period 
prices. 
The production of pork is represented by equation (6.22): 
XPK = -95.02 + 0.186*BGSLT + 0.224*SOWSLT + 23.46*Q4 -14.02*Q1 
(1.76) (36.98) (4.87) (2.36) (1.23) 
[0.97] [0.07] 
+ 16.15*Q2 - 1.46*T 
(1.51) (2.65) 
( 6 . 2 2 )  
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(S/M = 0.01, R-SQUARE = 0.99, DW = 0.78, quarterly-2SLS, 197IIV - 19831) 
The coefficients on slaughter numbers in the equation are highly 
significant but cannot be strictly interpreted as dress weights per head, 
due to the fact that some slaughter classes were excluded from the 
specification. The elasticity on barrow and gilt slaughter is very close to 
one, as would be expected. The negative sign on the trend variable 
represents continuation of the tendency toward the marketing of leaner 
"meat-type" hogs. 
Broiler production The production of broiler meat is largely 
determined by the broiler hatch in the previous quarter, which in turn 
reflects production intentions based on future price expectations. Allowing 
current farm broiler prices and corn prices to proxy future expectations, 
and given the one quarter lag in production, the equation is specified as: 
where : 
XPK = commercial production of pork, carc. wt., mil. lbs. 
XBRL = -62.84 + 9.48*RPBRL , 
(0.27 (2.80) * 
[0.09] 
- 31.15*RPCRN , 
(1.66) 
[0.03] 
+ 2.55*LPROD 
(2.06) 
[0 .12]  
+ 0.854*XBRL - 179.19*QA + 20.29*Q1 + 182.71*Q2 
(7.08) (9.93) (1.00) (11.05) 
(6.23) 
(S/M = 0.02, R-SQUARE = 0.99, DH = 0.03, quarterly-OLS, 1971IV - 19831) 
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where : 
XBRL = total production of broiler meat, RTC wt., mil. lbs. 
RPBRL = farm price of broilers, deflated by FPI, i / V a .  
LPROD = index of labor productivity in poultry production, 
interpolated to quarterly series, 1977 = 100 
The desired production of broiler meat was found to respond closely to 
lagged prices, and an index of labor productivity in the poultry sector. 
The latter variable was included in the specification to account for the 
increasingly capital intensive processes used in poultry feeding. The 
production of broiler meat is also quite seasonal, peaking in the second 
quarter of the year. 
Retail meat demand 
The specifications used in the retail demand equations for the three 
meat commodities are based upon the neoclassical theory of utility 
maximization. Although no reference is made to a specific utility function, 
it is assumed that the function is separable between meats and other 
commodities. As such, the quantity demanded for each meat by the 
representative consumer may be characterized as a function of the prices for 
each of the three meats, a price index for other products, and disposable 
income. 
For simplicity in the aggregation of individual demand relations into a 
market demand function, identical consumer preferences are assumed. In this 
framework then, the dependent variable may be represented in a per capita 
form. Although such a specification restricts the elasticity of demand with 
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respect to population to one, it does avoid the multicollinearity problems 
that frequently exist between population and disposable income, and 
decreases the number of estimable parameters. 
Under the postulate that consumer demands are homogeneous of degree 
zero in all prices and income, the number of variables, and hence 
parameters in each demand equation may be further reduced by designating the 
price of all other goods as the numeraire, and deflating the remaining 
prices and income by this variable. 
The final versions of the retail demand equations for each of the three 
meat commodities are: 
QTBFC = 11.71 - 0.196*RPRCF + O.I28*RPRGBF + 0.022*RPRPK - 0.009*RPRBRL 
(3.81) (5.95) (3.53) (1.34) (0.21) 
[1.15] [0,45] [0.10] [0.02] 
+ 0.0054*RDPIC - 1.697*07323 - 0.095&T - 0.215*Q4 
(5.36) (3.36) (7.07) (1.75) 
[1 .10]  
- 0.118*Q1 + 0.021*Q2 (6.24) 
(0.99) (0.17) 
(S/M = 0.03, R-SQUARE = 0.87, DW = 1.41, quarterly-2SLS, 1971IV - 19831) 
QPKC = 23.95 + 0.011*RPRCBF + 0.093*RPRGBF - 0.165*RPRPK - 0.008*RPRBL 
(11.64) (0.55) (4.09) (15.39) (0.34) 
[0.06] [0.32] [0.71] [0.02] 
- 0.G003*RDPIC - 0.042*T + 0.875*Q4 - 0.016*Q1 - 0.454*Q2 (6.25) 
(0.42) (5.17) (9.75) (0.19) (5.05) 
[0 .06]  
(S/M = 0.02,  R-SQUARE = 0.97, DW = 1.26, quarterly-2SLS, 1971IV - 19831) 
144 
QBRLC = 4.679 - 0.016*RPRCBF + 0.071*RPRGBF + 0.020*RPRPK - 0.129*RPRBRL 
(2.65) (0.96) (3.54) (1.64) (4.26) 
[0.14] [0.37] [0.13] [0.41] 
+ 0.0013*RDPIC + 0.061*T - 0.619*Q4 - 0.348*Q1 + 0.471*Q2 (6.26) 
(2.05) (8.04) (7.52) (4.81) (6.15) 
[0.40] 
(S/M = 0.02, R-SQUARE = 0.96, DW = 1.32, quarterly-2SLS, 1971IV - 19831) 
where: 
QTBFC = consumption of fed beef per capita, lbs. 
QPKC = consumption of pork per capita, lbs. 
QBRLC = consumption of broiler meat per capita, lbs. 
RPRCBF = retail price of choice beef, deflated by CPI, i / Y b .  
RPRGBF = retail price of ground beef, deflated by CPI, (^/Ib. 
RPRPK = retail price of pork, deflated by CPI, j^/lb. 
RPRBRL = retail price of frying chicken, RTC, deflated by CPI, 
dVlb. 
RDPIC = disposable personal income per capita, deflated by CPI, 
thou. $ 
T = time trend 
D7323 = price control dummy, 1 in 1973II - 1973III, 0 otherwise 
The retail demand for all three meat groups exhibit very strong 
own-price responses. In the case of choice beef, this response tends to be 
quite elastic. A strong degree of substitution between consumption of the 
meat commodities and consumption of ground beef is also revealed in the 
relations. Some of the other estimated cross-price effects, however, enter 
with a negative sign, contrary to a priori expectations. Although each is 
145 
statistically insignificant, such results have been encountered in previous 
demand system studies, and were explained by Hayenga and Hacklander (1970), 
as evidence of consumers' desire for a "variety" in their diet. These 
findings only occur in the model between the consumption of broiler meat, 
and that of the other two meat groups. 
The coefficients on the time variables in the relations point out the 
strong trends developing in the consumption of red meats and poultry. Both 
choice beef and pork consumption display a strong downward trend. Per 
capita consumption of the two meats is decreasing by 0.1 lbs. and 0.04 lbs. 
per quarter, respectively. Consumption of broiler meat, on the other hand 
is increasing by 0.06 lbs, per quarter per capita. Moreover, the demands 
for choice beef and chicken are strongly, and positively related to 
disposable income, whereas retail pork demand exhibits a weak, negative 
response to income. The response of choice beef consumption to income 
variation is quite elastic, as expected. A degree of seasonality is also 
evident in the demand functions for broiler meat and pork. The freeze on 
beef prices imposed by the Nixon Administration was estimated to have 
reduced the per capita consumption of choice beef by almost 1.7 lbs. below 
desired levels. 
For comparison purposes, the retail demand elasticities of this study 
are presented in Table 6.2, with those computed from other econometric 
studies similar to this one. The elasticities of choice beef with respect 
to price and income are quite consistent with those reported in earlier 
studies. While the computed price elasticity for pork appears reasonable, 
the implied income elasticity for pork in the model is somewhat disturbing. 
146 
Table 6.2. Retail price and income elasticities for different studies 
Own-price elasticity Income elasticity 
Choice 
beef Pork Chicken 
Choice 
beef Pork Chicken 
This study -1.15 -0.71 -0.41 1.10 -0.06 0.40 
Freebairn and 
Rausser (1975) 
-0.83 -0 .84 -0.85 1.61 0.46 0.75 
Arzac and 
Wilkinson (1979) 
-1.86 -0.87 -0.98 1.02 0.65 0.52 
Martin (1983) -0.71 -0.74 -0.63 1.34 0.62 0.67 
The other studies report significant positive impacts of disposable income 
on the consumption of pork, whereas the findings here, although 
insignificant statistically, suggest pork to be an inferior good. The 
contradiction in results may partially be attributable to the specifications 
employed in the models. This study, opposed to the others, utilized a trend 
variable in the equation which explained a large proportion of variation in 
the demand for pork, decreasing quite markedly the significance of the 
income variable over time. The broiler market responses in the model are 
somewhat less elastic than those of the other studies, however, in the 
Freebalrn and Rausser, and Arzac and Wilkinson studies, the consumption of 
chicken includes all classes, not only that of broilers, and must be 
evaluated accordingly. 
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Farm-retail price margins 
Marketing margins in the model link the farm and retail prices of the 
respective meat commodities. Farm-retail margins are represented 
endogenously because of strong interdependencies that exist between price 
margins and farm commodity prices. To the extent that retail prices are a 
relatively constant percentage markup of farm prices, a margin equation 
approach is preferable to a derived-demand approach as formulated by Gardner 
(1975). 
Because of the absence of a suitable deflator, the margin equations are 
represented in nominal form. The final versions of the equations are: 
MFBF = -13.349 + 0.712*PFBF + 1.015*PFBF . + 10.039*WHMP 
(4.89) (2.78) (5.08) (12.52) 
[0.28] [0.40] [0.52] 
- 0.788ABPAB - 0.72*Q4 + 2.119*Q1 - 0.160*Q2 ( 6.27) 
(2.70) (0.63) (2.12) (0.13) 
[0.09] 
(S/M = 0.03, R-SQUARE = 0.99, DW = 1.37, quarterly-2SLS, 1971IV - 19831) 
MPK = -3.858 + 0.198*PPK + 0.842*PPK , + 7.753*WHMP 
(1.52) (1.60) (9.61) (21.33) 
[0.09] [0.40] [0.59] 
- 0.456*BPAP - 0.230*Q4 + 1.269*Q1 - 1.870*Q2 (6.28) 
(0.73) (0.28) (1.72) (2.46) 
[0.03] 
(S/M = 0.03, R-SQUARE =0.98, DW = 1.51, quarterly-2SLS, 1971IV - 19831) 
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MBRL = 8.862 + 0.522*PBRL + 0.248*PBRL , + 3.013*WHPD 
(7.43) (3.72) (1.76) (10.09) 
[0.33] [0.16] [0.28] 
+ 0.491*Q4 - 0.035*Q1 - 0.823*Q2 (6.29) 
(0.94) (0.09) (2.48) 
(S/M = 0.03, R-SQUARE = 0.95, DW = 1.99, quarterly-2SLS, 1971IV - 19831) 
where: 
MFBF = farm-retail price margin for fed beef, HVa. 
MPK = farm-retail price margin for pork, ji/lb. 
MBRL = farm-retail price margin for broilers, ii/lb. 
PFBF = choice slaughter steer price, Omaha, $/cwt. 
PPK = barrow and gilt price, 7 markets, $/cwt. 
PBRL = farm price of broilers, é/lb. 
WHMP = average hourly earnings for production workers in 
•meat packing, $ 
WHPD = average hourly earnings for production workers in 
poultry dressing, $ 
BPAB = beef by-product allowance (carcass plus farm allowance), 
i6/lb. 
BPAP = pork by-product allowance, (i/lb. 
The farm price variables in the equations reflect the proportion of 
marketing costs which may be viewed as a percentage markup. Because there 
is some evidence of delays in price adjustment between the farm and retail 
levels (Miller, 1979), lagged prices are also included in the specifications 
to allow for the possibility of "stickiness" in price adjustments. As 
indicated by the respective elasticities, the margins for choice beef and 
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pork do appear to respond slowly to changing farm level prices, whereas the 
margin for broilers is more strongly related to current prices, suggesting a 
much quicker response. 
Marketing costs in the equations are proxied by wage rates in the meat 
packing and poultry dressing industries. The cost of labor is the largest 
component of total marketing costs, accounting for 44 percent of the total 
food marketing bill in 1982 (Dunham, 1983). These variables possess a great 
deal of explanatory power in the equations, and appear to be strong 
determinants of differences between farm and retail prices. The by-products 
variables were included in the beef and pork equations because of their 
importance as a source of total packer returns. Variations in the 
by-product allowances were found to exert negative impacts on margins, 
indicating that an increase in the value of by-products, for example, would 
act to decrease the spread between the farm and retail prices of the final 
products. In the poultry dressing industry, the value of by-products is 
negligible, and hence, was excluded from the specifications. 
Market clearing identities 
The supply and demand of the meat commodities are linked through a 
series of market identities. Most are relatively straightforward, but 
involve some assumptions. 
In the .nodel, fed beef is classified as meat produced from cattle 
finished on concentrate feed rations, and excludes beef from cull cows, 
range-fed beef, and imported beef. However, high quality table cuts of meat 
at the retail level are derived from both ration-fed and range-fed beef. It 
is assumed that 77 percent of the weight of fed and nonfed beef carcasses 
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goes into the production of table quality beef. Correspondingly, 23 percent 
of the carcass weight of these two beef classifications is used in the 
production of processed beef. Cold storage stocks of beef, and beef from 
cows, bulls, and imported animals are treated as also being of processing 
quality. These assumptions follow from that suggested by Ryan (1980), and 
are consistent with the assumptions used in other studies of the U.S. 
livestock sector (e.g., Martin, 1983). 
For reference, the equations and identities of the entire structural 
model are represented together in Appendix B. 
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CHAPTER VII. VALIDATION OF THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
While simulation and multiplier techniques are valuable tools in 
applied econometric research, the outcomes generated by these approaches 
reflect only the properties of the underlying structural model. As a 
result, the justifiable use of these techniques in a policy analysis or 
forecasting exercise first requires demonstration that the stuctural model 
provides an adequate representation of the real world. 
The validation of econometric models is one of the most problematic 
aspects of econometric work. Validating a model is essentially an exercise 
in hypothesis testing. Yet unlike standard statistical testing of a 
hypothesis, there are no generally recognized methods of statistical 
inference available for use in the validation process. Accepting or 
rejecting a model therefore becomes largely a matter of good judgment. 
Silberberg (1978) points out that although the validity of a model may be 
rejected at any stage in the validation process, its validity can never be 
proved. As a result, the validation process becomes essentially that of 
subjecting the model to a series of tests designed for different purposes. 
If the model performs satisfactorily in testing, then gradually the 
confidence that can be attached to the results of a forecast or policy 
simulation of the model may be increased. 
Several validity measures are adopted in this chapter to test the 
amount of "realism" built into the corn-livestock model developed in the 
previous chapter. These measures are generated from historical simulations 
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of the model, outside the sample (i.e., ex post) model forecasts, and 
multiplier analysis. 
Historical Simulations of the Model 
An examination of the ability of the corn-livestock subsector model in 
tracking key market variables over the sample period provides a good 
indication of its ability in describing the subsector's dynamics. A. 
historical simulation of the model is conducted in this section to evaluate 
the performance of the model in replicating observed behavior in the 
relevant markets over the historical period. 
A fully dynamic simulation of the model is one of the most rigorous 
tests of the model. In a simulation exercise of this type, there is 
opportunity (through lagged endogenous variables) for single equations' 
errors to interact with each other as they pass through other equations 
within the system. Even modest errors in the model could build into 
progressively larger errors, causing the solution values to diverge more and 
more from their actual paths. Since the equations of the model are 
intertemporally dependent in a dynamic simulation it provides a primary 
means for assessing the model's stability over time. 
The model developed in this study resides on a relatively large set of 
exogenous variables. In the dynamic simulation below the actual time paths 
of these variables are taken as given, as are the values of the endogenous 
variables during the initialization procedure. With the exogenous variables 
conditioning the model, the solution is then evolutionary as lagged 
simulated values of the endogenous variables replace actual lagged values of 
these variables in the model's solution. 
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Because of nonlinear!ties in the system, the simulation of the model 
was executed using Newton's nonlinear method in the SIMNLIN procedure of 
SAS/ETS (SAS, 1980). The equations presented in the previous chapter, 
together with the identities of the model given in Appendix B, were solved 
simultaneously for each quarter of the period, 1971IV - 1982IV. The actual 
and simulated values for selected endogenous variables are plotted over time 
in Figures 7.1 - 7.16. For reference, summary error statistics generated 
from the simulation are also presented (Table 7.1). These statistics 
include the root mean squared percent error (RMSPE), Theil's U - statistic 
(U), and Theil's inequality proportions. 
The root mean squared percent error and Theil U are relative error 
measures and more meaningful in this context than the standard root mean 
squared error statistic. For each of the endogenous variables, the RMSPE 
statistic reflects the percentage deviation of the simulated values of the 
variables from their historical paths. The Theil U statistic is related to 
but not the same as the RMSPE statistic. If the predictions of a variable 
exactly coincide with the actual historical values, then the U - statistic, 
equals zero, as does RMSPE. If the model forecasts no better than a "naive" 
model of no change from the previous period, then U = 1. If U > 1, the 
predictive power of the model is inferior to a naive forecast. 
Theil's inequality proportions are composed of three components. These 
components are the bias proportion U the regression error proportion U , 
and the disturbance proportion which together sum to one. The bias 
proportion reflects any difference between the mean of the simulated values 
for a variable from the mean of the actual values of the variable. The 
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Figure 7.3. Predicted and actual corn exports 
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Figure 7.4. Predicted and actual commercial stocks of corn 
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Figure 7.5. Predicted and actual placements of corn into the Farmer-Owned Reserve 
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Figure 7.6. Predicted and actual Farmer-Owned Reserve stocks of corn 
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Figure 7.7. Predicted and actual farm price of corn deflated by FPI 
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Figure 7.8. Predicted and actual feeder steer prices deflated by FPI 
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Figure 7.9. Predicted and actual choice slaughter steer prices deflated by FPI 
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Figure 7.10. Predicted and actual cattle on feed, 13 states 
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Figure 7.11. Predicted and actual production of fed beef 
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Figure 7.12. Predicted and actual barrow and gilt prices deflated by FPI 
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Figure 7.13. Predicted and actual production of pork 
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Figure 7.14. Predicted and actual farm price of broilers deflated by FPI 
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Figure 7.15. Predicted and actual choice retail beef prices deflated by CPI 
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Figure 7.16. Predicted and actual choice beef farm-retail price margins 
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Table 7.1 Historical simulation accuracy of the model, 1971IV - 1982IV 
Variable RMSPE 
"b "R % u 
Corn QCRNFEED 6.37 0.00 0.01 0.99 * 
Market QCRNFSIC 6.33 0.00 0.08 0.92 0.09 
Block QCRNEX 14.87 0.01 0.07 0.92 * 
ICRN 16.27 0.00 0.11 0.88 * 
PLACE 40.92 0.03 0.94 0.03 0.12 
REDEMP 2.88 0.09 0.38 0.52 0.04 
FORSTK 9.18 0.08 0.00 0.92 * 
APCRN^ 1.06 • - - - -
XCRN^ 1.47 - - - -
RPCRN 12.35 0.00 0.57 0.43 0.05 
GCAU 2.89 0.01 0.16 0.83 * 
Beef BFCWS* 0.86 - _ -
Production RPFDRS 7.50 0.02 0.38 0.60 * 
Block COF 7.62 0.00 0.17 0.83 •k 
XFBF 4.48 0.01 0.00 0.99 * 
RPFBF 6.03 0.00 0.17 0.83 • * 
RCFPl 164.87 0.02 0.08 0.90 0.25 
Fork SOWF 5.59 0.00 0.10 0.90 * 
Production PIGCRP 5.59 0.00 0.08 0.92 * 
Block SOWSLT 14.37 0.00 0.23 0.77 * 
BGSLT 5.61 0.00 0.21 0.79 * 
XPK 5.89 0.00 0.19 0.81 * 
RPPK 14.93 0.01 0.39 0.60 * 
Broiler XBRL 2.86 0.01 0.09 0.90 * 
Production RPBRL 10.55 0.00 0.20 0.80 •k 
Block 
Retail QTBFC 3.94 0.00 0.09 0.91 * 
Demand and QPKC 5.86 0.00 0.28 0.72 * 
Margin QBRLC 2.98 0.01 0.11 0.88 * 
Block MFBF 2.95 0.01 0.21 0.78 * 
MPK 6.39 0.01 0.38 0.61 * 
MBRL 5.06 0.00 0.03 0.97 * 
RPRCBF 3.08 0.01 0.13 0.86 •k 
RPRPK 6.76 0.01 0.30 0.69 * 
RPRBRL 6.74 0.00 0.09 0.91 * 
^No Theil statistics were computed for annual variables. 
* U < 0.009. 
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regression proportion reflects that portion of the simulation error 
attributable to the regression coefficient of actual values on predicted 
values being different from one. The disturbance proportion measures the 
percentage of the error attributable simply to residual variation. The 
ideal distribution of these coefficients is Ug = = 0, and Up = 1• 
Error statistics for only the real price variables have been reported 
in Table 7.1, since deflation by an exogenous variable has no effect on the 
root mean squared percent error formula. For the same reason, the meat 
consumption variables are reported in per capita terms, as they were 
estimated. 
Several general observations stand out in the graphs and computed 
statistics in the table and figures. For instance, the errors are 
noticeably larger in the price variables than in the inventory and demand 
components of the model. Moreover, the model's predictions of farm level 
variables tend to be less accurate than those at the retail level. 
Reasons for the inferior performance of the price variables of the 
model relative to others rest largely with the fact that none of the 
behavioral functions (with the exception of the price of feeder cattle 
relation) were normalized on price. Heien, Matthews, and Womack (1973) for 
example, have emphasized that prices are typically forecasted with less 
certainty when the forecasting model contains no price dependent estimated 
relations. Here, as in most applications, prices were determined within the 
model by the intersection of demand and supply. Thus, variations in the 
forecasted prices of the system embody errors originating from both the 
supply and demand specifications of the model. 
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The greater predictive power of the retail demand, margin, and price 
relationships is largely the result of the structural specification of these 
equations relative to that employed in the farm production relations. 
Obviously the dynamics involved in determining levels of livestock 
inventories and production are much greater than those involved in the 
determination of the retail components of the model. Furthermore, a large 
number of the causal variables in the farm production equations are 
endogenously determined. Hence, there are fewer predetermined variables in 
the equations to reset each period's solution in the simulation exercise. 
As illustrated by the simulation statistics, the feed and FSI demand 
equations perform quite well in replicating the past. The export demand and 
commercial stock equations perform suitably, but not quite as well. This 
characteristic is typical of most modeling efforts as structural knowledge 
is strongest with respect to domestic demand relations for agricultural 
products. Generally, empirical knowledge tends to be weaker regarding stock 
demands and foreign demands, primarily because of the unobservable 
expectations influencing the demand for stocks, and the extreme random 
component present in export demand relations. 
One potentially troubling statistic in the corn market block relates to 
reserve placement behavior. The high root mean squared percent error of 
this variable, however, must be viewed in consideration of the fact that 
placements are quite variable on a quarter to quarter basis, and at times 
approach zero. Under such circumstances, a small error in prediction 
translates into a very large percentage error, in spite of the fact that the 
equation performs reasonably well. The extreme price sensitivity of this 
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variable is the cause of most of the error in the equation, and tends to 
induce an overprediction of placements when placements are low. FOR stocks 
are predicted well, although the statistics point out some bias — most of 
which is traceable to the placements equation. 
Choice steer prices and feeder cattle prices are tracked extremely well 
in the system. As evidenced by the plot of cattle on feed, this variable 
exhibits some upward bias in the latter periods, not captured in the error 
statistics. However, given the dynamic structure of the equation, and the 
accuracy of the beef model in predicting prices, the result is not 
considered troublesome. Similar to the FOR placement variable, caution 
should be exercised in the interpretation of the simulation statistics for 
the cattle feeding profitability index (RCFPI). Because the variable always 
assumes values close to zero, the poor statistics generated by the 
historical simulation are not necessarily evidence of a poor statistical 
relationship. 
The pork equations and price perform the weakest of the three livestock 
markets. A large amount of the variation in the farm price of pork compared 
to that for the price of beef is traceable to the specifications of the 
respective production equations. The production of pork in the 
specification is perfectly inelastic, whereas, beef production does exhibit 
some current period price response, thus tending to decrease instability in 
the generated beef prices of the model. 
For comparative purposes, the simulation results for major variables in 
the model are presented in Table 7.2 with those reported for the same 
forecasted variables in two prior studies. The Martin (1983), and Arzac and 
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Table 7.2 Comparison of the forecasting accuracy of the model in this 
study with previous studies 
Variable Arzac and^ 
name in Martin^ Wilkinson 
this study RMSPM variable RMSPM variable RMSPM 
Corn QCRNFEED 6.9 XDC^ 7.5 XDC^ 9.3 
Market QCRNFSIC 6.3 - - - -
Block ICRN 7.1 ICT 10.3 ICC 14.6 
APCRN 1.1 ACP 2.0 API 2.9 
XCRN 1.5 COSPRUS 3.2 XSC 3.3 
PCRN 10.1 PCORN 18.0 PGl 13.8 
Beef COP 7.5 PF'^ 10.9 IP 7.1 
Production BFCWS 0.9 BCOWS 2.4 KB 4.1 
Block PFDRS 7.9 RBSP 11.8 PF5 20.5 
XFBF 4.4 fshbs 8.7 XSl 5.6 
PFBF 6.6 STP 11.9 PFl 13.3 
Pork XPK 5.7 PKS 8.3 XS3 7.8 
Production PPK 15.1 HOP 24.1 PF3 15.2 
Block 
Broiler XBRL 2.7 CHPDN 3.9 XS4 3.2 
Production PBRL 11.1 chfp 15.8 PF4 18.1 
Block 
Retail QTBFC 4.0 xtb 6.7 XDl 5.4 
Demand and QPKC 5.6 XPK 8.0 XD3 8.0 
Margin QBRLC 2.9 XCN 4.0 XD4 4.5 
Block PRCBF 3.1 PCB 7.9 prl 10.4 
PRPK 7.2 PPK 12.9 PR3 10.9 
PRBRL 7.2 PCN 10.6 PR4 12.8 
^See Martin (1983, p. 212-213). 
See Arzac and Wilkinson (1979, p. 303). 
^Total domestic corn disappearance. 
PF denotes quarterly cattle placements not cattle on feed. 
Wilkinson (1979) studies were chosen for comparison, because both entail 
quarterly models of the corn/beef/pork/broiler markets similar in structure 
to the one developed here. Because root mean squared error as a percent of 
the mean (RMSPM) was the only reported statistic in the Arzac and Wilkinson 
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paper, the forecasting accuracies in the table are presented in terms of 
this statistic rather than RMSPE. 
Strictly on the basis of the reported statistics, the model developed 
in this study generated better forecasts over the historical sample period 
than either of the other two models, for every variable except cattle on 
feed. For many market variables, the model substantially outperforms the 
other two. This occurs with respect to the majority of variables in the 
corn market, the farm prices of fed beef and feeder cattle, and the 
variables in the retail demand block. 
There are some general qualifications to this result. For example, the 
historical periods used in the Martin, and the Arzac and Wilkinson 
simulations were both 19651 - 1975IV. Although most of this period entailed 
relatively stable and flat prices, the mean values for many variables in the 
studies were lower than the means for the same variables in the 1971 - 1982 
simulation period in this study. Thus, for the same degree of predictive 
accuracy, the RMSPM statistic computed in the other two studies would 
possess some upward bias relative to that computed for this model. 
Additionally, these two studies included the nonfed beef market in the 
model's specification. Because nonfed beef slaughter is largely a residual 
component of the total beef slaughter, both models encountered difficulty in 
accurately representing the production of this classification of beef. 
Although not likely to be large, errors in tracking nonfed beef slaughter in 
the two models, may be introducing unnecessary error in the other components 
of the beef market, and hence, the entire models. 
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Nevertheless, the corn-livestock model developed for this analysis does 
perform appreciably better for the majority of variables than either of the 
other two models used in the comparison. This result is quite encouraging, 
and lends a great deal of confidence to the estimated results. 
Ex Post Forecasts of the Model 
The most stringest examination of a model involves testing its ability 
to forecast outside the period of estimation. To investigate the ex post 
forecasting properties of the model, forecasts were generated for the 
1982/83 crop year. Root mean squared percent error statistics corresponding 
to the four quarterly forecasts, and percent errors in each quarter are 
presented in Table 7.3 for the same variables that appeared in Table 7.1 
Because the 1982/83 crop year embodied the payment-in-kind (PIK) 
program for corn producers, some initial forecasting problems occurred. 
Drought-induced high prices, and pledges for PIK payments resulted in 
substantial redemptions of corn from the FOR program in the last quarter of 
the 1982/83 crop year. Of the 2.6 billion bushels of corn in the reserve 
program in July, 1.6 billion bushels was committed as either pledges for PIK 
payments or for delivery to the CCC under the "PIK-for PIK" procurement 
program. Because the redemption equation was not equipped to quantify 
redemptions from the program for these purposes, the equation was "turned 
off" in this period, and redemptions exogenized. The results in the table 
thus represent the model's forecasts for the four quarters, with redemptions 
taken as given in the last quarter of Che crop year. 
As a whole, the model performs quite well in forecasting four quarters 
ahead. For most of the variables, the error statistics are somewhat higher 
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Table 7.3 Ex post forecasting accuracy of the model, 1982IV - 1983III 
Percent error by quarter 
Variable RMSPE IV I II III 
Corn QCRNFEED 12.8 -2.4 -5.8 -24.3 5.1 
Market QCRNFSIC 11.9 -10.8 -0.4 -10.4 -18.5 
Block QCRNEX 12.5 2.7 -7.5 7.7 -22.4 
ICRN 188.1 -1.0 2.1 26.1 375.4 
PLACE 91.5 -15.6 -0.3 153.0 -99.4  
FORSTK 4.2 -5.4 -4.2 -2.5 -4.1 
APCRN^ 2.1 -4.1 
XCRN^ 1.3 -2.6 — 
RPCRN 12.6 14.6 -4.2 13.6 15.0 
GCAU 2.3 1.2 2.6 1.1 3.4 
Beef BFCWS^ 0.1 0.1 — — — — 
Production RPFDRS 21.2 16.6 15.4 17.4 31.5 
Block COF 5.2 2.9 7.9 2.4 5.7 
XFBF 5.2 -1.6 -0.6 -2.4 -10.1 
RPFBF 16.6 18.3 6.2 13.5 23.3 
RCFPI 82.6 31.7 51.4 20.5 -152.3 
Pork SOWF 3.8 -1.9 0.5 0.7 7.2 
Production PIGCRP 3.7 -1.9 0.5 0.7 7.2  
Block SOWSLT 10.0 -2.0 -7.2 -11.4 -14.7 
BGSLT 1.9 -1.5 -0.03 -3.1 -1.7 
XPK 3.1 -3.1 -1.7 -4.4 -2.9 
RPPK 19.6 30.7 -1.9 24.2  2 .8  
Broiler XBRL 2.4  2.7 0.6 0.8 3.8  
Production RPBRL 19.1 -10.1 -11.8 -20.1 -28.5 
Block 
Retail QTBFC 5.0 -1.5 0.6 -2.3 -9.6 
Demand and QPKC 3.1 -3.0 -1.6 -4.3 -2.8 
Margin QBRLC 2.5 2.9 0.7 0.8 4.0 
Block MFBF 3.8 -0.0 4.4 2.1 5.9 
MPK 4.4  -2.5 5.4 -6.5 0.1 
MBRL 3.1 -2.5 -3.7 -4.4 -0.7 
RPRCBF 6.7 4.6 4.9 5.2 10.4 
RPRPK 4.1 7.2 3.2 1.9 0.9 
RPRBRL 9.2  -5.2 -6.7 -10.4 -12.6  
^Annual equations. 
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than those reported in Table 7,1. This is to be expected since information 
contained in the data for 1982/83 was not incorporated into the estimation 
of the model's parameter sets. For several variables, however, the RMSPE 
statistics were lower in the ex post forecast period than in the historical 
period. These variables include total exports of corn, farmer-owned 
reserves, corn production, inventories of beef cows, cattle on feed and 
grain consuming animal units, and all the variables of pork production 
block. 
The forecast results for commercial stocks of corn, and placements into 
the FOR require a close examination. Specifically, the percent error in 
commercial stocks for the last quarter of the crop year was extremely high. 
An examination of this result indicated that the model did capture the 
turning point in stocks in this period, but failed to predict the magnitude 
of the change in ending stocks from the previous quarter. Ending commercial 
stocks in the 1982 crop year were greatly influenced by the high summer 
prices and PIK entitlements, and were over two and one-half standard 
deviations below average ending stocks for that quarter over the sample 
period. With this in mind, and considering that the model was predicting 
carryover stock levels well below the average, the result was not considered 
troublesome. Based on the percent errors, corn placements in the third and 
fourth quarters of the crop year were also predicted quite poorly. However, 
the percent errors are extremely misleading in this context, because 
placements were very close to zero in the two quarters. Total placements in 
the two quarters were only 41 million bushels compared with 1392 million 
bushels in the first two quarters of the crop year. In actuality, the 
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equation predicted placements quite well as evidenced by the error 
statistics in the first two quarters, and the statistics for total FOR 
stocks through the year. The RMSPE statistic for the cattle feeding 
profitability index was similarly distorted, as it was in Table 7.1, by 
small values of the variable. 
Although some variables do exhibit a certain degree of bias in the 
forecasts, the results in this section indicate that the model performs 
appreciably well in the beyond-sample forecasts. The use of a particular 
year in the ex post forecast, is of course arbitrary and may well have 
resulted in misleading error statistics for some variables, either up or 
down. This problem is, however, inevitable in any use of simulation 
techniques for model validation. 
Multiplier Analysis 
A dynamic simulation was performed in the first section of the chapter 
to test the goodness of fit of the model, and its stability over the 
historical period when conditioned on the actual values of the exogenous 
variables. In this section, the values for selected exogenous variables are 
altered in some fashion from their historical paths. Under these imposed 
conditions, simulation passes are conducted for the purpose of examining 
whether the structure of the model tends to dampen or amplify shocks to the 
system. Specifically, attention is focused on the patterns of adjustment 
the endogenous variables follow in reconverging to a new equilibrium, and 
whether the adjustment responses are theoretically consistent. 
Dynamic multipliers for the exogenous shocks cannot be explicitly 
computed from the reduced form, because the model contains nonlinear 
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relationships. The nonlinear features of the model furthermore guarantee 
that the Impacts of external shocks to the system will vary depending on the 
conditions at the time the shock is encountered. Consequently, implicit 
multipliers calculated from the simulation exercises are presented for 
systematic demand and supply side shocks imposed on the model at two 
separate points in time. These multipliers measure the effect of the 
exogenous shocks on the values of the endogenous variables through time, and 
are computed as deviations of the paths taken by the endogenous variables 
from the time paths generated for those variables in the "base" simulation. 
The base simulation, or baseline corresponds to the dynamic solution of the 
model presented in the first section of the chapter in which the historical 
values of the exogenous variables conditioned the model. 
Impact, interim, and long term multipliers for key variables of the 
corn-livestock sector are presented in Table 7.4 for a permanent 100 
million bushel per quarter increase in corn exports to the USSR. The 
computed impact multipliers indicate the first quarter impact, whereas 
interim multipliers reflect the intermediate run effects of the export 
shocks on the endogenous variables. Because total or equilibrium 
multipliers cannot be calculated from the model, a long term multiplier is 
presented indicating the impact of the sustained shock in the last year of 
the sample period. In the true long run, the market price would adjust 
sufficiently so that any change in the quantity demanded for utilization 
would be met by an equal change in the quantity produced, with no long term 
building or drawing down of total stocks. 
Table 7.4. Multipliers £or a permanent 100 million bushel Increase In corn exports to USSR 
Initiated in 1975IV Initiated in 1979IV 
Endogenous Year& Long Year Long 
variable Units Impact 1 2 termb Impact 1 2 term 
Corn 
Domestic 
Feed mil. bu. -41 -161 -246 -76 -25 -91 -103 -95 
FSI mil. bu. -3 -20 -24 -8 -2 -12 -8 —8 
Stocks 
Commercial rail, bu. -51 -167 -143 208 -9 49 171 269 
FOR mil. bu. — — — -742 -60 -314 -633 -901 
Exports mil. bu. 95 348 264 272 96 368 320 300 
Production mil. bu. 0 0 18 26 0 0 12 27 
Price $/bu. 0.15 0.23 0.26 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.14 
Livestock and Meat 
Inventory 
Beef cows thou, hd. 0 0 -26 267 0 0 — 16 -42 
Cattle on feed thou. hd. -88 -414 -506 -112 -52 -185 -208 -195 
Sows farrowing thou, hd. 0 -20 -170 -83 0 -12 -78 -98 
Production 
Fed beef mil. lb. -16 -163 -394 -108 -10 -88 -167 -162 
Pork mil. lb. 0 1 —66 -95 0 1 -36 -93 
Broilers mil. lb. 0 -22 -80 -18 0 -13 -35 -28 
Prices 
Farm 
Choice steers $/cwt. 0.28 0.57 1 .21 0.54 0.22 0.40 0.74 0.79 
Feeder cattle $/cwt. -0.59 -0.62 0.29 -0.10 -0.49 -0.37 0.21 0.44 
Hogs $/cwt. 0.03 0.03 0.61 0.88 0.02 0.02 0.45 0.93 
Broilers /-/lb. -0.04 0.11 0.58 0.29 -0.03 0.10 0.37 0.37 
Retail 
Choice beef / V l b .  0.49 1.25 3.21 1.50 0.38 0.92 I .96 2.15 
Pork »^/lb. 0.04 0.05 1 .00 1 .85 0.03 0.03 0.77 1.86 
Broilers >5/lb. -0.05 0.18 1.10 0.51 -0.04 0.17 0.64 0.66 
^Multipliers In first and second crop years following export shock. 
Multiplier in last crop year of historical period. 
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Most of the corn market adjustments to the export shock take place in 
the first two years, with the maximum one-quarter responses occurring four 
to six quarters following initiation of the shock. After two years, the 
market adjustments taper off, suggesting that the model dampens the shock 
over time as the true market would. The sharpest price effects are noticed 
in the fourth quarter of each crop year, when available supplies are the 
tightest. The inventory responses are somewhat longer in the livestock 
sector because of technical constraints. Adjustments in the livestock 
sector begin to exert a noticeable effect on the demand for corn in the 
second year after the export increase. 
Ifhen subject to the autonomous increase in exports, the model indicates 
that the price of corn in the first quarter would rise about $0.15/bushel. 
Total exports do not rise by the full 100 million bushels, because the price 
increase chokes off a small amount sold commercially elsewhere. The shock 
when initiated in 1975, induces a 44 million bushel decrease in domestic 
utilization, and a 51 million bushel draw down in commercial stocks in the 
first quarter. Interestingly, the same shock imposed in 1979, exerts a much 
smaller impact on domestic utilization and stocks, with the heaviest burden 
falling on reserve placements which are reduced by 60 million bushels. In 
the livestock markets, the first quarter responses are relatively minor. 
Higher current corn prices reduce the expected profitability of livestock 
feeding and cause the number of cattle on feed in the first quarter to drop 
by 88 thousand head, or roughly one percent. The livestock industry effects 
of the permanently higher corn prices primarily unfold in the first and 
second years. All livestock inventories are reduced as the retention of 
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animals for breeding purposes is cut back while culling rates become 
moderately heavier. The number of sows farrowing in the second year is 
reduced by 170 thousand head, while the number of cattle on feed drops by 
506 thousand head. This translates into reductions of 5.6 percent and 6.3 
percent, respectively. Although the production of pork exhibits a 
transitory increase, as more sows are marketed for slaughter, the production 
of all meat classes decreases after the first year. 
By the end of the historical period, the impacts of the export shock 
have tempered, and are distributed in a somewhat different manner than in 
the initial periods. Based on an average of the long term multipliers for 
the two time periods, the annual 400 million bushel increase in exports to 
the USSR actually increases total exports by only 286 million bushels. The 
effects on domestic utilization are smaller in the last year with feed 
demand falling off by 86 million bushels, and FSI demand by 8 million 
bushels. Interestingly enough, the rate of accumulation of commercial 
stocks is more rapid in spite of higher prices. The slowing down of reserve 
stock accumulation has sufficiently stimulated the demand for speculative 
stockholdings that it overpowers the price effects, and causes commercial 
stocks to build. Nevertheless, total stock accumulation is smaller, 
moderating the upward price pressure brought about by the demand shock. 
In general, the price effects in the last year are also smaller than 
the adjustments in earlier periods. The long run price of corn rises about 
$0.12/bushel, while the price of choice slaughter steers increases 
$0.66/cwt. The price of feeder cattle falls slightly in certain periods 
reflecting the declining demand for cattle and calf placements on feed. At 
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the retail level, the long run changes in meat prices are minimal, with 
choice beef prices adjusting upward by $0.02/lb. 
To provide further information on the market impacts of external 
shocks, multipliers for a supply side shock to the model are presented in 
Table 7.5. Illustrated in this table are the calculated multipliers for a 
permanent corn yield increase initiated in the same two periods as before. 
The results indicate that the distributional impacts of the yield shock 
on the model are largely the same as for the export shock, but opposite in 
direction. The absolute price responses are larger because the yield 
increase adds from 50 - 75 percent more grain to the system than the export 
shock removed. The sharpest market adjustments again occur in the first two 
years, and taper off with the passage of time. Reduced corn prices 
encourage not only heavier feeding rates per animal, but with a lag increase 
the number of livestock on feed. By the end of the second year, increases 
in livestock numbers have induced a 9.6 percent increase in the demand for 
feed. In the second year following the shock in 1975IV, the demand for feed 
absorbs about two-thirds of the increase in production. In the long term, 
however, adjustments in domestic utilization are substantially smaller than 
in the initial years, with most of the production increase channelled to the 
export market, and the Farmer-Owned Reserve. With active operation of the 
FOR, the price of corn at the end of the sample period has fallen by 
$0.24/bushel compared with $0.36/bushel in the first two years. The 
response of the livestock industry also tapers off contributing to a weaker 
long term multiplier for feed demand. 
Table 7.5. Multipliers for a permanent 10 percent Increase In corn yields 
Initiated In 1975IV Initiated In 1979IV 
Endogenous Year& Long Year Long 
variable Units Impact 1 2 termb Impact 1 2 terra 
Corn 
Domestic 
Feed mil. bu. 94 326 400 180 70 230 184 205 
FSI mil. bu. 8 32 32 15 6 21 16 16 
Stocks 
Commercial rail. bu. 501 155 111 -429 508 -162 -351 -534 
FOR mil. bu. — — — 1268 174 596 1058 1571 
Exports mil. bu. 10 100 205 212 11 84 136 176 
Production rail. bu. 613 613 593 732 769 769 609 727 
Price $/bu. -0.34 -0.36 -0.36 -0.23 -0.35 -0.30 -0.21 -0.24 
Livestock and Meat 
Inventory 
Beef cows thou, hd. 0 0 58 -394 0 0 44 53 
Cattle on feed thou. hd. 200, 548 620 134 150 288 250 256 
Sows farrowing thou, hd. 0 56 268 132 0 44 152 158 
Production 
Fed beef mil. lb. 37 316 576 196 28 220 276 276 
Pork mil. lb. 0 -4 132 152 0 -4 92 160 
Broilers mil. lb. 0 52 116 32 0 40 55 41 
Prices 
Farm 
Choice steers $/cwt. -0 .65 -1.01 -1.76 -0.97 -0 .64 -0.92 -1 .21 -1.34 
Feeder cattle $/cwt. 1 .33 0.71 -0.59 0.17 1 .39 0.45 -0 .61 -0.67 
Hogs $/cwt. -0 .07 -0.05 -1.08 -1.39 -0 .07 -0.04 -1 .02 -1.54 
Broilers i / l h .  0 .08 -0.31 -0.87 -0.49 0 .08 -0.33 -0 .63 -0.60 
Retail 
Choice beef t / l h .  -1 .11 -2.40 -4.74 -2.65 -1 .10 -2.26 -3 .29 -3.65 
Pork i / l h .  -0 .08 -0.08 -1,89 -2.94 -0 .08 -0.07 -1 .83 -3.17 
Broilers <5/lb. 0 .13 -0.51 -1.52 -0.87 0 .12 -0.57 -1 .11 -1.07 
^Annual multipliers In first and second crop years following yield shock. 
Multiplier in last crop year of historical period. 
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It is interesting to note that the quarterly corn price adjustments to 
the yield shock are the smallest in the fourth quarter of "ch crop year, 
whereas for the export shock the price adjustments were the most pronounced 
in the fourth quarter. By the last quarter of the crop year, the increase 
in production has already been allocated to the consumption channels by 
price adjustments in earlier periods. Hence, the available supply in the 
fourth quarter is essentially unchanged from what it was in the baseline, 
with the price response being minimal. 
Similar to the demand shock, the influence of the FOR program is 
evidenced by the impact multipliers for corn prices. The first quarter 
price effects are the same for the shocks in 1975IV and 1979IV, although due 
to both larger yields and plantings, the production increase in 1979 was 
over 25 percent larger than in 1975. The FOR in 1979 soaked up 174 million 
bushels of the production increase in the first quarter, lessening the 
equilibrium price response to the shock. 
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CHAPTER VIII. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE FARMER-OWNED RESERVE 
PROGRAM FOR CORN 
Policy models are mathematical representation of economic systems 
formulated for the purpose of anticipating and evaluating outcomes of 
decisions that influence the functionings of the system. The econometric 
model developed in Chapter VI assumes the role of a policy model in this 
chapter for the purpose of examining the economic ramifications of 
alternative grain storage policies on the markets of the corn-livestock 
sector. Specifically, the objectives of the chapter are to assess through 
econometric simulation, the implications of the Farmer-Owned Reserve program 
on carryover stocks, production and utilization of corn, and corn and 
livestock price levels and variability through time. 
Description of Policy Alternatives 
In order to evaluate the FOR program an alternative intrayear supply 
management policy is needed. The alternative (i.e., No-FOR) policy employs 
rules governing the accumulation and release of Commodity Credit Corporation 
(GCC) stocks, designed in the analysis to replicate stock management 
strategies in place prior to the inception of the FOR in 1977. Rules 
characterizing the operation of the FOR and the alternative policy, and 
revisions in the model's structure necessary to accomodate the alternative 
policy are presented in this section. Each option implies different supply 
management responses, and hence, affects the structure and functionings of 
the markets in different manners. The policy rules implemented in the 
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analysis reflect the alternative price corridor objectives assumed for each 
storage option. 
FOR policy option 
The Farmer-Owned Reserve program formed the basis of the post-1977 
grains policy. Because the corn-livestock model was specified to explain 
market behavior over the historical period, the management and operations of 
the FOR program are already built into the model. At low prices, the FOR 
placement equation depicts the amount of corn entering the program. 
Participation in the program is voluntary and depends on current prices, the 
provisions of the program, and the amount of eligible corn. As prices rise, 
the inventives provided to participants for holding reserve grain are 
relaxed in the model at two specific levels. Prices immediately above the 
trigger or release level activate the redemption equation which quantifies 
the amount of grain voluntarily reentering market channels. If the market 
price of corn reaches the FOR call level, all corn remaining in the program 
is immediately placed on the market until the price falls, or FOR stocks are 
completely liquidated. 
Under this policy, CCC-owned stocks serve as a backup buffer stock. 
The trigger level for disposing of CGC stocks is 105 percent of the reserve 
call level prior to 1981, and 110 percent of the reserve release level after 
that time. Determination of ending government-owned stock levels is, for 
the most part, exogenous in the FOR model. 
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No-FOR policy option 
The alternative program designed invoked in the analysis assumes only 
the existence of the regular CGC loan program. With no formalized farmer or 
government-owned buffer stock, the No-FOR model assumes total reliance upon 
adjustments in CCC-ovmed stocks to moderate extreme price movements. The 
amount of corn under nine month loan is not specifically handled in the 
No-FOR model since it is reflected in the commercial stocks equation. 
However, in the simulation exercise in the next section, the quarterly 
carryover level of CGC stocks of corn is partially endogenized through a 
series of adjustment rules.^ These rules for determination of ending 
GCC-owned stocks are as follows: 
2 (1) If the seasonally adjusted annual price of corn without 
intervention lies between the regular GGG loan level, and 115 
percent of that level, then ending CGC stocks equal beginning 
GGG stocks. 
(2) If the seasonally adjusted annual price of corn without 
intervention falls below the regular loan level, then stocks 
of corn in the CGC accumulate on an even quarterly basis until 
the seasonally adjusted price is raised to the loan level. 
(3) If the market price of corn in any quarter exceeds 115 percent 
of the GGG loan level, then CGC stocks are released until 
either the price falls below that level, or CCC-owned stocks 
are completely exhausted. 
The only exception to these rules for determining CGC carryovers 
occurs in the model in 198III. GCC-owned stocks were increased by 128 
million bushels in this period, consistent with actual GGG purchases of 
corn, instituted at the time to offset the expected price depressing effects 
of the Soviet grain embargo. 
2 
The seasonally adjusted annual price of corn is computed as a weighted 
average of the quarterly corn prices with the weights corresponding to 
quarterly utilizations. 
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These stock adjustment rules are consistent with actual CCC adjustments 
during the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. Prices below the loan 
precipitate the accumulation of CCC stocks of grain via the forfeiture of 
grain under loan, while prices above the CCC release level bring these 
quantities back on the market. 
Unlike the FOR option, incorporating this policy design into the model 
required some structural revisions. Because the reserve program is not in 
operation, the reserve equations and variables of the model were removed 
from the specification. In addition, the commercial stocks relationship was 
respecified and estimated over the historical period. The motive for 
reestimating the stocks equation initially reflected the desire to allow the 
price responsiveness of private stockholding to vary if need be, before and 
after introduction of the FOR. Introduction of the program in 1977 
undoubtedly affected the structure of related markets by adding another 
price-responsive demand component. However, it was conjectured that the 
program may also have influenced the markets by causing a parametric drift 
in the structure of certain relationships. Because of its close interaction 
with the demand for grain for public stockholding, the commercial stocks 
equation was considered the most likely of the relationships in the model to 
have experienced a behavioral shift in 1977. To avoid a potential bias in 
the price stabilizing characteristics of the pre-1977 corn market structure, 
the commercial stocks equation was fitted to the period, 19691 - 1977III, 
with FOR stocks in the equation replaced by CCC stocks. Contrary to 
expectations, the estimated results yielded a relationship noticeably more 
price inelastic than the stocks equation in the FOR model. Moreover, the 
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implied rate of substitution between CCC stocks and commercial stocks was 
implausible in magnitude. Because of the poor performance of the equation, 
and in view of the objectives of the study, this approach to determining the 
structure of the commercial stock demand relationship in the No-FOR model 
was abandoned. The final form of the stocks equation appearing in the model 
is only a minor modification of the stocks equation in the FOR model. The 
same price elasticities were imposed on the No-FOR equation, and the CCC 
stock variable in the equation replaced by the sum of the CCC and FOR 
stocks, which together constitute "government-controlled" stocks. The 
equation was estimated over the entire sample period and takes the form: 
ICRN = 3932.46 - 588.20*RPCRN + 274.93*Q4*RFCRN - 285.76*Q1*RPCRN 
(4.99) (6.87) (1.69) (2.05) 
[0.49] [0.13] [0.61] 
- 266.07*Q2*RPCRN + 0.629*D4*XCRN - 0.246*[CCCSTK + FORSTK] 
(1.77) (4.93) (2.77) 
[1.10] [0.81] [0.09] 
- 20.54*D23*APCRN - 2146.47*Q4 + 1443.48*Q1 + 1515.63*Q2 (8.1) 
(1.23) (1.75) (1.63) (1.67) 
[1.38] 
(S/M = 0.07, R-SQUARE = 0.98, quarterly-OLS, 19711 - 1982III) 
where: 
ICRN = ending commercial stocks of corn, mil. bu. 
RPCRN = average corn price received by farmers, deflated 
by FPI, $/bu. 
XCRN = total corn production, mil. bu. 
CCCSTK = ending CCC-owned stocks of corn, mil. bu. 
APCRN = total area planted to corn, mil. acres 
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D23 = 1 in calendar quarters 2 and 3, 0 otherwise 
D4 = 1 in calendar quarter 4, 0 otherwise 
Qi = 1 in calendar quarter i, -1 in calendar quarter 3, 
0 otherwise (i = 1, 2, 4) 
Although the government-controlled stocks variable in the estimation 
includes FOR stocks, in the No-FOR model simulations in the next section, 
only CCC-owned stocks appear as government-controlled. 
For the remainder of the structural relationships of the model there 
was no prior evidence to suggest any behavioral change following 
introduction of the FOR, and hence, the processes determining these 
relationships are assumed to have been generated from a structurally 
homogeneous period. 
Historical Simulation of the Policy Alternatives 
With the FOR and No-FOR models representing the market structures of 
the corn-livestock sector under the FOR policy, and alternative CCC policy, 
respectively, deterministic simulations of each model are conducted to 
examine the behavior of the systems under similar sets of circumstances. 
Generated scenarios from the simulation passes for prices, carryover stocks, 
production and utilization of corn, and livestock price and productici; 
levels form the basis for evaluating the FOR program relative to the 
alternative storage policy. 
To avoid the imposition of ad hoc provisions and rules reflecting the 
many components of the FOR, the simulation process begins in 1977IV, and 
proceeds through 1982III. This time frame is well-suited for the analysis 
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because it encompasses periods of both tight and depressed markets. In the 
simulation exercise, the provisions of FOR operation remain at their 
historical settings, with the exception that direct entry is allowed in all 
periods. The CCC loan rate, an important parameter in the No-FOR model, 
also remains at its historical value. All other policies characterizing the 
1977-1982 period are taken as a given. 
The simulation process itself is quite interactive when conducted in 
the framework of the management rules for the alternative policy outlined 
above. In the No-FOR model, the price vector for each crop year is first 
solved and "checked" before continuing to the next year. If specific policy 
actions are required based on the model's solution, these actions are 
imposed on the model, and the solution recomputed for the same year. If no 
action is necessary, the process continues to the next year and so on. In 
the FOR model, the process is much simpler, since the only management rule 
imposed on the solution reflects the dumping of FOR stocks on the market at 
prices above the call level. No judgmental inputs are introduced at any 
point in the solution of either model. Although interactive, the simulation 
process is entirely mechanical with the management rules for the respective 
policy options, and the actual exogenous variables conditioning the two 
models. 
Outcomes generated from the simulation exercise for selected variables 
in the U.S. corn market are reported in Table 8.1. The levels of these 
variables under each option appear in the table, together with the 
percentage change under the FOR policy scheme. Because the structures of 
the two models differ only by the inclusion or absence of the FOR program, 
Table 8.1. Levels of selected variables In the U.S corn market under the FOR and No-FOR policy opctons, 1977IV-1982III 
Crop Year 
1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 
Variable 
Percent' Percent Percent Percent Percent 
FOR No-FOR change FOR No-FOR change FOR No-FOR change FOR No-FOR change FOR No-FOR change 
million bushels 
Total 
utilization 6480 6503 -0.3 6866 7217 -4.9 7321 7690 -4.8 6798 6580 3.3 6950 7017 -1.0 
Feed 4002 4020 -0.4 4168 4416 -5.6 4378 4587 -4.6 4007 3817 5.0 4162 4241 -1.9 
FSI 587 586 0.2 597 624 -4.3 707 724 -2.3 731 700 4.4 798 809 -1.4 
Exports 1891 1898 -0.4 2101 2177 -3.5 2236 2379 -6 ,0 2060 2063 -0.1 1990 1967 1 .2 
Total stocks 
Commercial 
CCC 
FOR 
1027 
720 
13 
294 
1004 
716 
288 
0 
2.3 
0 . 6  
1244 
547 
99 
598 
866 
866 
0 
0 
43.6 
-36.8 
1614 
469 
256 
889 
833 
833 
0 
0 
93.8 
-43.7 
1289 
761 
138 
391 
681 
68!  
0 
0 
89.3 
11.7 
2103 1437 
388 769 
202 
1513 
47.0 
-49.5 
688 
0 
vo 
-1^ -
Product ion 6 6 2 1  6 6 2 1  0.0  7083 7080 0 . 0  7691 7657 0.4 6474 6427 0.7 7764 7773 -0.1 
Farm price 
Mean 
Std. dev. 
2.05 2.06 
0.37 0.35 
-0.5 2.46 2.12 
0.33 0.30 
16.0 
dollars per bushel 
2.53 2 .28 
0.38 0.42 
11 .0 2.99 3.38 
0.35 0.18 
-11 .5 2.57 2.40 
0.16 0.19 
7.1 
^Percent change under FOR policy option, selected variables. 
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variations in the simulated outcomes for the two options directly reflect 
the implications of the program. The implications of the FOR relative to 
the alternative program are discussed categorically below. 
Corn stock effects 
Expansion of carryover stocks has been posited as one of the 
fundamental objectives of the Farmer-Owned Reserve program. Large carryover 
stocks absorb the market impacts of external shocks, thus moderating price 
responses. Table 8.1 suggests that the program has been quite successful at 
achieving an increase in total stocks of corn over the period, 1977-1982. 
Under the FOR, average ending stocks of corn were 1455 million bushels, 
whereas under the alternative storage program, ending stocks averaged only 
964 million bushels. The increase in total stocks in the FOR model occurred 
in spite of the fact that the level of commercial stocks was for the most 
part, reduced by FOR operations. Ending commercially-held stocks of corn 
under the FOR program averaged 577 million bushels, compared with 773 
million bushels in the absence of the program» Logically, free stocks 
should be smaller in the presence of the FOR program, because of the larger 
substitution of government-controlled stocks for free stocks in the FOR 
model. A one dollar decrease in the price of corn, for example, initially 
increases free stocks in both models by 588 million bushels. However, the 
price induced expansion of reserve stocks by 483 million bushels 
subsequently displaces 171 million bushels of the increase in free stocks in 
the FOR model. Slightly larger ending commercial stocks in the FOR model in 
the 1977/78 and 1980/81 years are attributable to price differences between 
the two models. 
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Most of the expansion in total stock levels under the FOR is the direct 
result of the operations of the program. However, some of the disparity 
between stock levels in the two models reflects the operational rules for 
CCC stock accumulation. Adherence to the set of rules outline above 
resulted in zero CCC carryovers for three years of the five year period in 
the No-FOR model. Strong supply relative to demand in the 1977/78 year 
implied an equilibrium price below the $2.00 loan level. To clear the 
market at the loan level in the No-FOR model required the CCC to accumulate 
288 million bushels of corn by yearend. However, because the assumed 
management rules of CCC-stock operations were to release stocks to the 
market as soon as price surpassed 115 percent of the loan, the entire 288 
million bushels was placed back on the market in the third and fourth 
quarters of the 1978/79 year. Because Che seasonally adjusted market price 
of corn in the No-FOR model remained above the CCC loan rate until 1981/82, 
the level of CCC-owned stocks remained at zero until then. By contrast, the 
release level for government held stocks in the FOR model, at 105 percent of 
Che call level, was more than $0.70 higher than the release level in the 
No-FOR model. Since Che role of CCC sCocks in the FOR model was assumed to 
be that of a backup buffer stock, these inventories were only liquidated in 
periods of very high prices so as to avoid interference with normal FOR 
operations. Under the FOR, the market price exceeded the trigger level for 
CCC stock release only in the second quarter of the 1980/81 year. 
Operationally, the Farmer-Owned Reserve program buffers sharp price 
movements by transferring the impact of market variations to stock level 
changes. Price enhancing shocks in the FOR model induce larger drawdowns in 
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total stocks while price depressing shocks result in larger accumulations. 
Variation measures reported in Table 8.2 support the supposition that FOR 
operations aimed at stabilizing prices through stock changes consequently 
destabilize total stock levels. The table also suggests, however, that as a 
result of the substitution of FOR stocks for commercial stocks, the FOR 
program reduces the variability of commercial stock levels. 
Corn price effects 
The Farmer-Owned Reserve program as mandated in 1977 was not 
specifically intended to function as a price supporting mechanism. However, 
depending on the relationship between the expected returns to participation 
and the current market price of program commodities, the program may enhance 
mean price levels directly by isolating larger quantities of grain from the 
market through stock accumulation. Intended or not, this apparently was the 
situation in U.S. corn markets over the five year period Investigated. By 
virtue of its contribution to total stock levels, the FOR raised the average 
price of corn from the S2.45/bushel level prevailing in the absence of the 
program, to $2.52/bushel. Although increasing the average price of corn 
over the entire period, the implications of the program for average corn 
prices in a particular year critically depend on the characteristics of that 
year. As illustrated in Figure 8.1, prices in relatively lean crop years 
such as existed in 1980/81, were actually lower in the presence of the FOR 
program, whereas in periods of strong supply relative to demand, reserve 
placements supported price levels. Because of the dual stabilization focus 
implicit in the operating rules of the FOR, the program reduces prices in 
high price periods, and enhances prices in low price periods. 
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Table 8.2. Variation in corn stock levels under the FOR and No-FOR policy 
options, 1977IV - 1982III 
Average quarterly variation^ 
Variable FOR No-FOR 
- - - - million bushels - - - -
Total stocks 467 368 
Commercial stocks 227 251 
^Computed as average standard deviation of stock levels per quarter 
through the sample period. 
Average corn prices in the 1977/78 year were slightly higher in the 
absence of the FOR because of stock accumulations by the CCC necessary to 
clear the market at the loan level. The accumulation of 288 million bushels 
of corn by the CCC in 1977/78 acted to raise the average price of corn by 
$0.12/bushel in the No-FOR model. However, in the 1978/79 and 1979/80 
years, FOR stock expansion significantly raised average corn prices over 
what would have existed in the absence of the program. With zero reserves 
in the No-FOR model at the outset of the 1980/81 year, the average price of 
corn climbed to $3.38/bushel. By contrast, the average corn price under the 
FOR for 1980/81 year was only $2.99/bushel. As prices under the FOR 
exceeded the $2.81 release level in the fall, and the $3.26 call level in 
the winter quarter, 498 million bushels of reserve corn reentered the 
market. To this amount was added 116 million bushels of CCC-owned corn, 
released in the winter quarter by prices temporarily above the CCC trigger 
level. In the No-FOR model, on the other hand, CCC-stocks were totally 
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-r 
1983. 1 
v£> VO 
200 
exhausted prior to the 1980/81 marketing year, leaving no reserves on hand 
to contain upward price movements. 
The short 1980/81 crop was followed by a record crop in 1981/82. 
Prices in the absence of the FOR program responded quite sharply to the 
record corn yields. CCC stocks increased to 688 million bushels by yearend 
to support the $2.40 loan level. In the FOR model, reserve placements 
absorbed a substantial amount of the new production, increasing by 1122 
million bushels during the year. The increase in reserve placements in 
1981/82 was to a large extent induced by the $2.55 loan level for the FOR 
loans, which for the first time deviated from the regular CCC loan level. 
Interestingly, the difference in average price levels under the two policies 
in the 1981/82 year closely reflected the differing loan levels between the 
two programs. 
Probably the most .important aspect of the FOR program's performance is 
its impact on the variation in corn prices over time. Together with 
increasing carryover stock levels, the primary objective of FOR operation is 
taken to be the stabilization of prices. Table 8.3 reports corn price 
variation measures for both policy scenarios on seasonal and annual bases . 
Based on the simulation results, the FOR appears to have significantly 
decreased the year-to-year variation in U.S. corn prices over the period. 
In the absence of the program, corn price variability throughout the 
1977-1982 period would have increased 59 percent. The ability of the FOR to 
moderate the severity of wide price swings is readily evident in Figure 8.1 
earlier. The increase in annual price from 1979/80 to 1980/81, for example, 
was $0.46/bushel in the FOR model compared with $1.08/bushel in the No-FOR 
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Table 8.3. Variation in corn prices under the FOR and No-FOR policy 
options, 1977IV - 1982III 
Corn price variation^ 
Periodicity FOR No-FOR 
- - - - dollars per bushel - - - -
Annual 0.34 0.54 
Seasonal 0.32 0.29 
^Annual price variation was computed as the standard deviation of the 
annual mean price levels around the period mean. Seasonal price variation 
was computed as the average within year standard deviation in price. 
model. From 1980/81 to 1981/82, FOR-influenced corn prices fell by 
$0.42/bushel, whereas the price response in the absence of the FOR was 
• $0.98/bushel. 
While decreasing the annual variation in corn prices, the results of 
the analysis suggest that the FOR exerted little impact on the seasonal, or 
within year variation in prices. In three of the five years of the period, 
the seasonal variation in corn prices was actually larger in the presence of 
the reserve program. Moreover, a degree of stability in prices in the 
No-FOR model was forfeited in the analysis because CCC stocks were zero for 
the 1978 through 1980 crop years, and as a result unavailable to curtail the 
generally rising prices of the period. 
The rather minor influence of the FOR program on seasonal price 
variation relative to the alternative CCC policy is, in part, attributable 
to the characteristics of the respective policies. By virtue of its three 
year participation period, the FOR program is essentially a long term 
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marketing aid. One might therefore assume that the operations of the 
program were geared primarily towards the reduction of prices between 
marketing years. In this context, an indicator of stability between years 
would constitute a more appropriate measure of the price stabilizing 
characteristics of the FOR program. Although not operated strictly as a 
buffer stock, the regular CCC loan program appears better suited to 
influence the marketing of grain, and thus, the variability of prices within 
a marketing year. 
Corn utilization and production effects 
The effects of the FOR program on corn utilization reflect the corn 
price responses and livestock sector adjustments induced by the program. 
Through the five year period corn prices under the FOR were increased by 3.2 
percent. Lower prices in the absence of the program facilitated a larger 
movement of corn into the feed, FSI, and export market channels. Under the 
No-FOR option, the average amount of corn consumed per year was 7.01 billion 
bushels. With the FOR in operation, average corn consumption was 6.88 
billion bushels, for a reduction of 1.7 percent. Feed, FSI, and export 
demands were reduced 1.8 percent, 2.0 percent, and 0.7 percent, respectively 
by the FOR over the first five years of its existence. 
Interestingly, the analysis suggests that the FOR program reduced the 
variation in total marketings. This result is not implicit in the 
operations of the program, since FOR activity aimed at stabilizing prices do 
not necessarily stabilize marketings. The variation in marketings between 
the two policy strategies may be demonstrated to be crucially dependent on 
the sources of instability causing price movements. For example, increased 
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placement activity following a supply increase, tends to offset some of the 
downward potential for prices thereby reducing the rate of increase in 
demand in the FOR model relative to the No-FOR scenario. On the other hand, 
price moderating reserve activity following a demand decrease causes demand 
to fall off at a faster rate, implying greater variation in utilization 
under the FOR. 
Nonetheless, the analysis indicates that the FOR did significantly 
reduce the variation in utilization over the period. On the basis of 
standard deviation, the year-to-year variation in total corn utilization was 
330 million bushels with the FOR, and 487 million bushels in its absence. 
Production of corn was affected to only a minor extent by the FOR 
program. On average the program increased the plantings, and hence, 
production of corn by less than one percent. Production in the presence of 
the FOR was only reduced below production without the program in the 1981/82 
year, when no acreage programs were in existence, and plantings in the 
No-FOR model reflected the expected continuation of the $3.40/bushel prices 
that prevailed in 1980/81. 
It should be noted that if anything, the production effects of the 
program may be biased downward in the analysis. If the reserve program 
reduced the risk, or more importantly the perceived risk of unintended price 
swings, the acreage response function may either have shifted up, or become 
more price inelastic in the post-1977 period reflecting the risk-averse 
nature of agricultural production decisions. This potential shift in the 
structure of the acreage relationship was not incorporated into the models. 
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but if present would have induced further increases in plantings in the FOR 
model relative to the No-FOR model. 
Livestock, market effects 
The livestock sector itself acts as a buffer mechanism with respect to 
the feed grain markets (Offutt, 1984). Adjustments in the livestock sector 
to corn market signals increase the long term elasticity of total corn 
demand. Thus, the sector functions in a manner that complements the 
operations of the FOR in the intermediate and long run. 
In the short run given animal numbers, sectoral responses to corn price 
movements depend on ration substitution possibilities, and production 
flexibility in terms of animal slaughter weights. Long run responses in the 
livestock sector depend on the manner in which the inventories adjust to 
expected prices. Typically cattle respond the quickest to variation in 
feeding costs and conditions, and hence policies affecting feed grain 
markets, because potential slaughter animals may bypass the feedlot and 
remain on roughage feeds. In the pork production sector, the slaughter of 
breeding animals represents the only short term response, due to the fact 
that the size of the finished animal and feeding patterns are not as 
adjustable. 
Levels of key variables in the livestock and poultry sector under the 
FOR and alternative policy regime are reported in Table 8.4 for the period, 
1978I-1982IV. Higher corn prices in the presence of the FOR for the first 
three years of the period induced reductions in the respective livestock 
inventories under the program relative to the alternative policy 
(Figure 8.2). 
Table 8.A. Levels of selected variables In the U.S. livestock-poultry sector under FOR ami No-FOR policy options, 197BI-1982IV 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Percent^ Percent Percent Percent Percent 
Variable FOR No-FOR change FOR No-FOR change FOR No-FOR change FOR No-FOR change FOR No-FOR change 
head - -
Inventory 
Beef cows 37844 37830' 0.0 38034 380 77 -0.1 39403 39487 -0.2 38955 38885 0.2 37884 37672 0 .6 
Cattle on 
feed 10544 10691 -1 .4 10802 11227 -3.8 10270 10446 -1.7 10392 10093 3.0 10913 11058 -1 .3 
Sows 
farrowing 13375 13381 -0.0 13929 13992 -0.5 13417 13610 — 1.4 12198 12289 
0
 
1 11483 11358 1 .1 
million pounds 
Production 
Fed beef 
Pork 
Broilers 
Farm prices 
Choice 
steers 
Feeder 
cattle 
Hogs 
Broilers 
16457 16501 -0.3 16898 17188 -1.7 
14026 14023 0.0 15429 15442 -0.1 
10057 10059 -0.0 10872 10930 -0.5 
16738 17032 -1.7 
15714 15846 -0.8 
11493 11556 -0.5 
16321 16136 1.1 
15194 15383 -1.2 
11910 11856 0.4 
16787 16788 -0.0 
14067 14008 0.4 
12375 12360 0.1 
dollars per cwt. 
53.72 53.51 0 .4 65 .39 64 .30 1 .7 63.53 62.40 1 .8 63 .19 63 .95 -1 .2 67 .65 67 .55 0.1 
54.76 55.13 -0 .7 72 .17 72 .51 -0 .5 67.02 65.79 1 .9 65 .06 63 .68 2 .2 70 .44 71 .80 -1 .9 
42.38 4 2.39 -0. 0 43 .77 43 .53 0 .6 43.42 42.13 3 .1 47. 23 45, .67 3 .4 60 .05 60 .85 -1.3 
25.71 25.73 -0 .0 30 .62 30 .14 1 .6 28.28 27 .55 2 .6 28 .69 29. 05 -1 .2 24 .11 24 .35 -1 .0 
r-o 
O 
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Figure 8.2. Grain consuming animal units under the FOR and No-FOR policy options 
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The livestock market impacts of the FOR policy were relatively minor in 
1978. Under FOR operation, the number of cattle on feed was reduced by 1.4 
percent resulting in a 44.7 million pound reduction in the production of 
high quality beef for the year. The production of broiler meat similarly 
responded to higher corn prices under the FOR, while pork production was 
initially larger reflecting the increased culling of sows from breeding 
herds and the decreased retention of gilts. Although broiler and cattle 
prices were enhanced by the FOR in 1978, livestock and poultry prices as a 
whole were largely unchanged (Figure 8.3), due to transitory decreases in 
pork pricesIn 1979, placement of corn under FOR loan tightened the 
markets, raising the price of corn by $0.34/bushel. Poor feeding margins 
prompted reductions in all livestock inventory categories under FOR 
operation, resulting in a 1.7 percent decrease in the number of grain 
consuming animal units. The farm prices of choice steers, and broilers were 
increased 1.7 and 1.6 percent, respectively by the FOR in 1979, and the 
price of barrow and gilts by 0.5 percent. Because of technical constraints, 
the livestock production and price impacts of the higher FOR corn prices in 
1979 became more evident in 1980. Total production of meat was reduced 1.1 
percent by the FOR, which in turn, enhanced the farm prices of slaughter 
steers, hogs, and broilers by 1.8 percent, 2.9 percent, and 2.6 percent, 
respectively. 
The index of livestock prices in the figure was computed as a weighted 
average of steer, hog, and broiler prices with 2.386, 1.406, and 0.656 
constituting the weights on the prices, respectively. These weights were 
arrived at by deflating the prices of the commodities to 1957-1959 levels, 
and then weighting each group by its relative contribution to farm 
production receipts over the sample period. 
Index 
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Figure 8.3. Livestock prices under the FOR and No-FOR policy options 
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In 1981 and 1982, livestock market conditions under the two policies 
partially reversed. Corn prices under the alternative policy in 1981 soared 
to $3.12/bushel, exceeding prices under FOR operation by $0.30/bushel. High 
corn prices in both models encouraged a scaling back of feeding activities, 
however, the liquidation of inventory animals in the absence of the FOR 
program proceeded at a much more rapid rate. Larger production of fed beef 
and broilers under the FOR decreased the farm level prices of the two 
commodities by 1.2 and 1.3 percent respectively. Production of pork, on the 
other hand, was reduced by the FOR in 1981, reflecting the limited current 
period response of the pork sector to changing market conditions. Although 
corn prices were enhanced by heavy reserve activity in 1982, larger 
production of pork and broilers occurred under the program, reflecting the 
lower FOR corn prices in 1981. Livestock prices were slightly lower in 1982 
under FOR operation, with the exception of slaughter cattle prices which 
were virtually unchanged. 
In total, the FOR program increased the mean price level of all 
livestock commodities, but by relatively modest amounts (Table 8.5). The 
price of barrows and gilts was impacted the most, increasing by $0.51/cwt, 
or just over one percent. The influence of the program on livestock prices 
during the five year period primarily reflected higher corn prices under the 
FOR. By contrast, the FOR program had mixed implications for livestock 
price stabilization. Presumably the price bands in place for the feed grain 
reserve programs were established so as to impart acceptable levels of 
instability on the livestock sector. Stable feed grain prices implying 
stable feeding margins, reduce the risk of production commitments and 
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Table 8.5. Livestock and broiler mean price levels and variation under 
FOR and No-FOR policy options, 1978I-1982IV 
Variation in prices 
Mean prices Seasonal Annual 
Commodity FOR No-FOR FOR No-FOR FOR No-FOR 
dollars per cwt. 
Choice steers 61.74 61.41 5.39 5.59 5.32 5.28 
Feeder cattle 64.76 64.64 4.76 4.81 6.82 7.07 
Barrows and gilts 46.01 45.50 5.45 5.52 7.32 7.92 
Broilers 27.05 26.93 1.23 1.09 2.57 2.36 
^Computed as the average within year standard deviation in price. 
Computed as the standard deviation of the annual mean price levels. 
promote economic efficiency for reasons advanced earlier. Interestingly 
enough, the analysis suggests that on an annual basis, choice steer and 
broiler prices were actually more unstable under the FOR over the period. 
However, in the case of choice steer prices, the difference was less than 
one percent. On a seasonal basis, the program reduced the variability in 
the farm prices of feeder and slaughter cattle, and barrows and gilts. 
Conclusions 
The analysis in this chapter suggests that the Farmer-Owned Reserve 
program has profound implications for the markets of the corn-livestock 
sector. Introduction of the program in 1977 induced a fundamental shift in 
the structure, and hence, behavior of U.S. corn markets by creating another 
price responsive component of total demand. Because corn is a crucial input 
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in the production of livestock and poultry, the program has important 
ramifications for these markets as well. 
Over the period 1977IV-1982III, the analysis indicated that the FOR 
program exerted appreciable effects on both the mean price of corn, and the 
year-to-year variation in corn prices. The average annual price of corn for 
the period was $2.52/bushel in the presence of the FOR compared with an 
estimated $2.45/bushel in its absence. On the basis of standard deviation 
of annual prices about the period mean, the FOR was discovered to have 
decreased the variability of corn prices by $0.21/bushel. Specifically, the 
dual focus on price stabilization implicit in the reserve program's 
provisions enabled the FOR to significantly moderate the potential magnitude 
of price swings during the first five years of its existence. Relative to 
the alternative policy, the FOR program enhanced prices in surplus years, 
while curtailing prices in tight years. 
The FOR directly influenced the structure of U.S. corn markets through 
its impact on stockholding behavior. On average, total ending stocks of 
corn were increased almost 500 million bushels by reserve operations over 
the period. Free stocks, on the other hand, were reduced by the FOR but the 
reduction was more than offset by larger reserve levels. Higher corn prices 
under the FOR induced small increases in the area planted to corn, with the 
production of corn averaging 18 million bushels more per year under the FOR 
than the alternative policy assumed in the analysis. 
The corn price supporting characteristics of the FOR in its first three 
years brought about a contraction in livestock and poultry numbers and 
production relative to what would have prevailed in the absence of the 
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program. The analysis indicated a one-half to one percent reduction in the 
production of red meat and poultry under the FOR in 1978-1980, with roughly 
a two percent corresponding increase in the farm prices of the commodities 
during the period. In 1981 and 1982, however, livestock and poultry prices 
were decreased by the FOR program. Livestock numbers in the absence of the 
program would have been sharply cut back, in response to estimated corn 
prices as high as $3.49/bushel in 1981. With the FOR in operation, the 
release of reserve grain during the period held prices to less than 
$3.25/bushel. As a result, the number of animals on feed at the end of 1981 
was 553 thousand higher under FOR operation. Although livestock and poultry 
prices were decreased by FOR operations in the last two years of the period, 
as a whole the operations of the program enhanced the farm prices of the 
commodities from 1978-1982. 
For the most part, the results of the analysis are consistent with the 
findings reported in other evaluations of the Farmer-Owned Reserve program. 
The $0.07/bushel estimated increase in corn prices attributed to the FOR was 
exactly the conclusion reached in an evaluation of the program over the same 
period by Salathe, Price, and Banker (1984), hereafter SPB. Meyers and Ryan 
(1981), investigating the program's performance through 1980/81 detected 
only a $0.01/bushel increase in corn prices under the FOR. The $0.21/bushel 
reduction in corn price variability reported in this study compares 
favorably with the $0.15/bushel reduction found by Meyers and Ryan. By 
contrast, SPB concluded that the FOR brought about only a $0.01/bushel 
reduction in corn price variability. The minor influence of the FOR on the 
instability in prices in the SPB article was attributed to a narrower price 
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band under the alternative CGC policy assumed in their analysis. Because 
SPB didn't report actual stock levels under the two policies, however, it is 
difficult to ascertain stockholding behavior in their model, and the extent 
to which government-owned stocks were used to enforce the price band of the 
alternative policy. This behavior might indicate why in the short 1980/81 
crop year, for example, their analysis revealed corn prices to be 
$0.04/bushel lower in the absence of the FOR program, while this study and 
the Meyers and Ryan work suggests prices were $0.38/bushel, and $0.21/bushel 
higher, respectively, in the absence of the FOR. With regard to the 
stockholding impacts of the program, the analysis in this chapter concluded 
that the FOR added an average 491 million bushels to total ending stocks of 
corn over the five year period. This estimate is much larger than the 221 
and 233 million bushel stock increases reported by SPB, and Meyers and Ryan, 
respectively. Most of the discrepancy in the estimates is explained by zero 
CGC carryovers for three years under the alternative policy assumed in this 
study. All three studies detected positive, but small effects of the 
reserve on corn production. In no case was total production of corn 
enhanced by more than one percent. The largest impact of the program on 
livestock prices in both the SPB analysis and this study, occurred with 
respect to market hog prices, reflecting the sensitivity of sow farrowing 
decisions to expected feeding conditions. In the SPB study, the price of 
steers was 0.26 percent higher under FOR operation, hogs were 1.6 percent 
higher, and broilers 1.0 percent higher over the 1978-1982 period. Steer, 
hog, and broiler prices in this study were determined to be 0.5, 1.1, and 
0.4 percent higher, respectively in the presence of the FOR for the period. 
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Although the overall period livestock price effects are similar, the prices 
of hogs and broilers were found by SPB to be higher in each year of the 
period, whereas the prices of the two commodities in this study were lower 
under the FOR 1981 and 1982, reflecting lower corn prices in the FOR model. 
The desired scope of the problem undertaken in this study prevented a 
comprehensive evaluation of the Farmer-Owned Reserve program. Specifically, 
the objective of the study was to quantify the immediate and direct effects 
of the FOR and alternative storage policy on the markets of the 
corn-livestock sector. As a result, several relevant issues regarding the 
performance and feasibility of the program, as well as the prospects for its 
future were not addressed. Among the more important of these is the degree 
of budget exposure implicit in the respective programs. Although the model 
was not equipped to measure the costs of the two program options implemented 
in the analysis, some general observations regarding the costs of the 
programs do stand out. More than likely the costs of the FOR program would 
exceed, and perhaps significantly, the costs of the alternative CCC-based 
policy. Throughout the analysis the amount of corn under FOR loan was 
substantially greater than the amount under the price support loan of the 
alternative policy. Thus, direct government outlays for producer loans 
would be noticeably larger under the FOR, although for the most part, these 
program costs are potentially recoverable since the loan must be repaid or 
the grain forfeited to the CGC. In the event grain is forfeited to the CGC, 
the recovery of expenditures for storing, handling, and transporting this 
grain would occur in a shorter period of time under the alternative policy, 
in view of the release levels for CCG stocks for the two policies. 
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Nonrecoverable costs of the FOR program include primarily the interest 
subsidies on FOR loans, and the storage payments to FOR participants. These 
costs are offset to a small extent, however, by lower deficiency payments 
necessary under the FOR program. 
The model employed in the analysis was also incapable of empirically 
measuring the effects of the two programs on net farm income. Salathe et 
al. (1984) demonstrated that the FOR program directly enhanced net farm 
income. The small reduction in livestock receipts under the FOR was 
determined to be more than offset by increased crop income in their work. 
Because the model in this study was not formulated to explain production 
expenses under the two policies, one cannot discriminate between the two 
policies on the basis of income effects. Nonetheless, the results do 
suggest that the program improved crop income. Specifically, total 
marketing receipts for corn were enhanced by the FOR for the five year 
•period, to which is added the rather sizable 26.56/bushel storage payments 
to FOR participants for corn under loan. Under the alternative policy, 
smaller plantings imply some reduction in production costs, however, in all 
probability the cost savings would be more than offset by the loss of the 
storage subsidies available under the FOR alternative. 
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CHAPTER IX. SUMMARY 
The Farmer-Owned Reserve program was created in 1977 as an outgrowth of 
widespread concern over the volatility in commodity markets of the 
mid-1970s. Instability in the U.S. grain economy had become particularly 
acute at the time, reflecting the increased level and variability of U.S. 
exports, the insulation of important foreign markets from world price 
fluctuations, and the reluctance of the United States to erect trade 
barriers to protect domestic markets. 
Since its inception, the Farmer-Owned Reserve has become a primary 
grains policy instrument in the United States. Among the major agricultural 
policy instruments in operation, only the FOR influences the marketing of 
grain between crop years, and offers some protection against future 
shortages. However, because the reserve program is passively operated from 
the standpoint of central authority, it is also the most difficult to 
control of the policy programs, and likely the least understood» In its 
seven year history, stocks of grain under the program have become quite 
massive and variable. Carryover reserve stocks of corn, for example, 
fluctuated from less than five percent of total utilization to around forty 
percent of total utilization. These stocks became so large in 1982/83 that 
drastic measures were implemented to control the size and costs of the 
program. 
A variety of objectives have been articulated for the Farmer-Owned 
Reserve. They include establishing and maintaining a system of price 
corridors for major agricultural commodities, enhancing farm commodity 
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prices and incomes, expanding the level of carryover stocks for program 
commodities, and reducing farm commodity price and income variability. 
Among these it is generally agreed, at the program's outset at least, that 
the primary management objective of the reserve program was the reduction of 
price variability. To improve the stability of prices, the program offers 
incentives to eligible farm producers to either place grain in the reserve 
or remove grain from the reserve, depending upon the relationship of the 
market price to the price parameters of the program. For example, to 
encourage producers to isolate stocks from the market in periods of low or 
falling prices, the FOR offers up-front money in the form of a price support 
loan, and advance storage subsidies. When prices are high, incentives are 
activated to encourage the liquidation of FOR contracts, such that the 
producer may freely market his reserve grain taking advantage of the high 
prices. In this manner, the program maintains a dual focus on the 
stabilization of prices. Low prices trigger incentives to lock-up grain, 
while high prices trigger incentives to bring these quantities back on the 
market. 
The desired degree of price stability is implicit in the program's 
provisions. The loan level, or price for acquiring stocks constitutes an 
effective price floor for participants. Given adequate reserve stocks, the 
release and call levels, at which penalties for continued storage of reserve 
grain are selectively imposed, loosely form price ceilings. The settings 
for these parameters, which comprise the price band, are particularly 
slippery issues. Concessions to certain groups at the expense of others 
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will obviously bring about dissatisfaction with the program, as well as move 
the market price to the boundaries of the price band. 
Implementation of the Farmer-Owned Reserve in 1977 represented a major 
intervention into the speculative grain stockholding activity of the private 
sector. The fundamental structure of commodity markets, and market behavior 
was altered with the introduction of the program. By virtue of its size and 
operations, the FOR has obvious and important implications, not only for the 
eligible crops, but for related crops and the livestock industry as well. 
This study sought to examine the economic effects of the Farmer-Owned 
Reserve program on the markets of the U.S. corn-livestock sector. A 
comprehensive econometric approach was used to investigate the impacts of 
the reserve program on the sector for the period 1977-1982, relative to 
continuation of the pre-1977 storage policies. A quarterly modeling 
approach was employed because it increases the number of observations on FOR 
behavior, and permits an examination of the within year as well as between 
year effects of the program. 
Over the first five years of the program, the analysis indicated that 
the FOR program exerted appreciable effects on both the mean price of corn, 
and the year-to-year variation in corn prices. Average annual corn prices 
in the presence of the FOR for the period were $0.07/bushel higher than 
those that would have prevailed in the absence of the program. On the basis 
of standard deviation of annual prices around the five year mean, the 
results suggested that the program decreased the variability of corn prices 
by $0.21/bushel. Relative to the alternative storage policy, the reserve 
program enhanced prices in surplus years, while moderating the upward 
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pressure on prices in tight years. The program also made a substantial 
contribution towards the objective of expansion of carryover stock levels. 
In spite of the fact that commercial stocks were reduced by FOR operation, 
the program induced over a 490 million bushel increase in carryover corn 
stocks over the period. 
The Farmer-Owned Reserve exerted noticeable, although not large 
effects on the U.S. livestock industry over the five year period. Livestock 
markets are directly affected by corn market policies through the market for 
feed. Reserve-induced higher corn prices resulted in small reductions in 
livestock herds, and hence, production under the FOR relative to 
continuation of the pre-1977 policies. Correspondingly, livestock prices 
were increased by around one percent by the operations of the program. 
Stability in year-to-year corn prices also imparted some stability in 
livestock prices under the reserve program. 
The empirical approach employed in the analysis was structured for the 
expressed purpose of assessing the economic ramifications of the FOR program 
on the corn-livestock sector. Limitations in the scope of the analysis, and 
model size prevented a full investigation of the performance and feasibility 
of the reserve program. Specifically, the model was incapable of 
quantifying the implications of the program for net farm income and 
government outlays. While no conclusive remarks can be made regarding these 
effects, in all probability it was felt that the program enhanced net farm 
income, but with greater budgetary exposure than would have prevailed in the 
absence of the program. Expanded analyses would undoubtedly want to 
consider in an explicit manner the consequences of the program in these 
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areas. Moreover, expanded analyses may want to consider several alternative 
program specifications. If price stabilization is truly an objective for an 
agricultural policy, such studies may feel the need to evaluate a variety of 
program designs that could potentially be used to attain a reduction in 
commodity price variation. In addition to the policies investigated above, 
this might include a simple storage subsidy to encourage stockholding, or 
perhaps even government ownership of a buffer stock. As opposed to a 
passively operated farmer-held stock program, central ownership enables the 
program authorities to precisely control the flow of grain in and out of the 
buffer stock, however, it may be that the costs or complexities of such 
programs severely limit their practicality. 
The FOR offers eligible producers a viable marketing alternative. It 
can potentially enhance farm prices while simultaneously decreasing the 
variability in prices. However, the program must be managed with close 
discretion and foresight. Strict use of the provisions of the program for 
the enhancement of prices threatens to revive the well-known problems 
associated with supporting prices above market clearing levels and the 
resulting imbalance of program stocks, such as occurred in 1982-83. If 
successfully managed, the program would not generate uncertainty in the 
marketplace, but rather guide production and consumption decisions, 
facilitating the efficient flow of resources. To do so, a strict and well 
communicated set of rules must be articulated that allow for the orderly 
accumulation and marketing of grain. Knowledge of key parameters 
determining farmer response to the program's provisions, and resulting 
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market behavior given expected participation, will continue to be a major 
constraint in eliciting the desired outcomes to the program. 
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APPENDIX A. PROVISIONS OF THE RESERVE PROGRAM FOR CORN 
August 29, 1977 
December 6, 1977 
February 8, 1978 
March 29, 178 
April 30, 1978 
May 31, 1978 
July 29, 1978 
August 7, 1978 
October 5, 1978 
November 24, 1978 
June 19, 1979 
August 1, 1979 
August 3, 1979 
Announced creation of feed grain reserve (Reserve I) 
a. three year contracts 
b. storage payments of $.20/bushel 
c. target of 17-19 million tons. 
Announced that reserve was expanded to include the 1976 
and 1977 crops. 
Increased reserve storage payments to $.25/bushel. 
Interest rate on FOR loans waived after first year. 
Announced early entry of corn starting May 1. 
Deadline for transferring 1976 crop into the reserve. 
Deadline for obtaining a price support loan on 1977 
crop. 
Announced a 30 day extension in loan maturity dates. 
Also corn loan program was reopened for two months (to 
run through Sept. 29), but only for producers who wish 
to put their grain immediately into the reserve. 
Announcement that 1978 crop under price support loan 
will be permitted to go direct into the reserve if it 
appears that the reserve goals will not be met from 1977 
crops by October 1. 
Announced that 1978 crop eligible for immediate entry 
into reserve. 
1978 crop will not be accepted for immediate entry into 
the reserve after November 30. 
Corn enters release status. 
Release discontinued. Also, producers give option to 
extend loans for six months. 
Reserve grain that has been called but not redeemed is 
eligible to reenter reserve if national average price 
falls below the release level. 
October 3, 1979 Corn released for second time. 
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October 22, 1979 
November 30, 1979 
January 7, 1980 
January 23, 1980 
April 15, 1980 
May 13, 1980 
July 11, 1980 
July 28, 1980 
August 25, 1980 
August 29, 1980 
September 8, 1980 
October 31, 1980 
December 3, 1980 
December 30, 1980 
February 6, 1981 
April 16, 1981 
All 1979 grain and outstanding 1978 loan grain eligible 
for immediate entry into reserve. 
Release discontinued. 
Reserve II opened. Loan, release, and call levels 
increased. Producers given 90 days for settlement of 
called grain. Storage payments increased to 
$26.5/bushel. First year interest costs waived for 
first 512 million bushels. 
Corn placed in reserve between October 22 and January 7 
will be eligible for interest waiver after January 7. 
Non-participant corn producers may place grain in 
reserve. 
Corn non-participants given 30 more days to put grain in 
reserve. 
Corn released for third time. 
Reserve III opened. Loan, release, and call levels 
increased. 
No further entries into Reserve II. 
Corn in Reserve III released. 
Conversion to Reserve III must be done before a reserve 
is called. Reserve I call period extended to 90 days. 
Corn in Reserve I called. 
Loan rates increased. Release and call unchanged. 
Interest charge waived. 
Corn in Reserve II and III called. Producers may 
continue to place eligible corn into Reserve III through 
January 15, 1981, 
Authorized 30 day extension on reserve and regular loan 
maturity with 15-1/4% interest to be charged after 
maturity date. Also settlement date on Reserve II and 
III extended to May 15, 1981. 
Settlement date cancelled. Farmers no longer have to 
settle by May 15, but 15-1/4% interest charged after 
April 15. 
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July 23, 1981 
October 6, 1981 
January 29, 1982 
July 1, 1982 
July 28, 1982 
October 8, 1982 
March 28, 1983 
July 15, 1983 
July 26, 1983 
September 1, 1983 
November 2, 1983 
Interest waiver repealed. 
Reserve IV opened. Immediate entry of 1981 crop 
allowed. Call price terminated. Trigger levels raised. 
No ceiling on placements. 
Corn under CCC loan eligible for immediate entry. 
Corn permitted immediate entry into Reserve V. 
Rotation period extended from 30 to 60 days. 
Farm-stored reserve corn can be removed if it was in 
danger of going out of condition or it is replaced in 15 
days. 
Notice that PIK grain can be rotated through normal 
rotation provisions. 
Reserve VI triggered for release. 
Reserve V triggered for release. 
Storage payments stopped. Interest started. 
Reserve V will remain in release status for at least 
November and December. Reserve holders to earn storage 
for this period. 
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APPENDIX B. STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL AND 
DATA DEFINITIONS 
The stochastic equations of the model were presented and discussed in 
detail in Chapter VI. The structural model used in the simulation exercises 
and analysis in Chapters VII and VIII, however, contained a number of 
identities not reported in Chapter VI. To illustrate the relationships of 
the model, and for ease of reference, the equations of the complete model 
are presented in Table B.l below. The variables appearing in the model are 
defined in Table B.2, together with the references for data obtained 
directly from published sources. Because some of the variables in the model 
were derived rather than obtained directly, a description of the derivation 
process is discussed in the final section of the appendix. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the data sources are identified by the 
following abbreviations: 
AGP - Agricultural Prices (USDA) 
AGS - Agricultural Statistics (USDA) 
CPR - Current Population Reports (U.S. Department of Commerce) 
EE - Employment and Earnings (U.S. Department of Labor) 
FAC - Foreign Agriculture Circular (USDA) 
FOO - Fats and Oils Outlook, and Situation Report (USDA) 
FOS - Feed Outlook and Situation Report (USDA) 
FRB - Federal Reserve Bulletin (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System) 
GLA - Monthly Grain Loan Activity Report (USDA) 
IFS - International Financial Statistics (International Monetary Fund) 
LMS - Livestock and Meat Statistics Annual Summary (USDA) 
LPOS - Livestock and Poultry Outlook and Situation Report (USDA) 
LS - Livestock Slaughter Annual Summary (USDA) 
MLR - Monthly Labor Review (U.S. Department of Labor) 
PPI - Producer Prices and Price Indexes (U.S. Department of Labor) 
SCB - Survey of Current Business (U.S. Department of Commerce) 
WOS - Wheat Outlook and Situation (USDA) 
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Table B.l. The equations of the complete model 
Corn demand equations 
Feed demand 
1. QCRNFEED = 244.03 - 188.12*RPCRN - 47.80*Q4*RPCRN - 54.23*Q1*RPCRN 
(0.53) (2.64) (1.39) (1.16) 
[0.42] [0.37] [0.49] 
- 29.34*Q2*RPCRN + 0.0194*GCAU + 96.55*RPWHT + 450.82*Q4 
(0.64) (2.40) (2.96) (5.61) 
[0.53] [0.86] [0.30] 
+ 272.36*Q1 + 19.18*Q2 
(2.54) (0.18) 
(S/M = 0.08, R-SQUARE = 0.96, DW = 2.05, 2SLS, 1971IV - 1982IV) 
FSI demand 
2. QCRNFSIC = 1.387 - 0.177*RCPCRN - 0.00029*RDPIC + 0.064*RCPWHT 
(4.36) (4.02) (3.27) (2.96) 
[0.34] [1.44] [0.17] 
+ 0.0094*T - 0.036*Q4 - 0.036*Q1 + 0.093*Q2 
(14.11) (2.97) (3.03) (7.77) 
- 0.071*D79*Q4 - 0.131*D79*Q1 - 0.045*D79*Q2 
(3.39) (5.86) (2.08) 
(S/M = 0.05, R-SQUARE = 0.96, DW = 1.20, 2SLS, 1971IV - 1982IV) 
Export demand 
3. QCEXNURS = -1580.93 - 108.19*RXPCRN3 - 0.654*EXPCOMP + 18.74*AUEC9J 
(1.76) (3.11) (1.27) (2.14) 
[0.56] [0.17] [5.48] 
+ 0.609*QCEXNURS , - 136.37*0781 + 132.66*08034 
(3.74) (2.81) (2.62) 
+ 1.38*Q4 - 21.12*Q1 + 39.64*Q2 
(0.08) (0.79) (1 .48) 
(S/M = 0.16, R-SQUARE = 0.76, DW = 1.59, 2SLS, 1971IV -  1982IV) 
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Table B.l .  (continued) 
Commercial inventory demand 
4. ICRN = 3932.46 - 588.20*RPCRN + 274.93*Q4*RPCRN - 285.76*Q1*RPCRN 
(4.99) (6.87) (1.69) (2.05) 
[0.49] [0.13] [0.61] 
- 266.07*Q2*RPCRN + 0.629*D4*XCRN - 0.354*FORSTK - 20.54*D23*APCRN 
(1.77) (4.93) (3.59) (1.23) 
[1.10] [0.81] [0.09] [1.38] 
+ 105.32*DPRELS - 2146.47*Q4 + 1443.48*Q1 + 1515.63*Q2 
(1.12) (1.75) (1.63) (1.67) 
(S/M = 0.07, R-SQUARE = 0.99, DW = 1.03, 2SLS, 1971IV - 1982IV) 
Farmer-Owned Reserve placements 
5. PLACE = -1318.75 - 482.68*PCRN + 992.44*PV - 0.0047*AVAIL 
(5.60) (10.28) (11.30) (0.32) 
[5.60] [12.31] [0.07] 
+ 0.027*Q4*AVAIL + 0.049*Q1*AVAIL - 0.049*Q2*AVAIL 
(2.24) (4.38) (4.09) 
[0.29] [0.47] [1.92] 
- 302.14*0823 
(3.60) 
(S/M = 0.17, R-SQUARE = 0.98, DW = 2.89, 2SLS, 1979IV - 1982IV) 
Farmer-Owned Reserve redemptions 
6. REDEMP = 102.07 + 52.12*PCRN - 28.74*RV + 0.0114*F0RSTK _ 
(1.58) (2.11) (0.81) (0.47) ^ 
[0.64] [0.33] [0.03] 
+ 332.30*DCD 
(35.56) 
(S/M = 0.03, R-SQUARE = 0.99, 2SLS, 1979III - 1982IV: 
redemption periods) 
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Table B.l .  (continued) 
Corn production equation 
7. APCRN = 46.27 + 11.01*[PCRNA/PSBA] + 5.53*RPSCRN - 24.22*RDPCRN 
(5.99) (1.68) (2.40) (7.73) 
[0.05] [0.11] [0.05] 
+ 0.277*apcrn , 
(2.99) 
(S/M = 0.02, R-SQUARE = 0.96, DH = 0.31, OLS, 1966 - 1982) 
Corn market identities 
8. QCRNFSIC = QCRNFSI/USPOP 
9. FORSTK = FORSTK^_^ + PLACE - REDEMP 
10. AVAIL = PART*(D4*XCRN + ICRN^_^) 
11. PCRNA = 0.25*(PCRN + PCRN^_^ + PCRN^_2 + PCRN^_g) 
12. QCRNEX = QCEXNURS + QCEXURS 
13. XCRN = 0.865*APCRN. _*YLDHA t-2 
14. ICRN = D4*XCRN + ICRN^_^ + FORSTKj._^ + CCCSTK|._^ - QCRNFEED 
- QCRNFSI - QCRNEX - FORSTK - CCCSTK 
15. RPCRN = (PCRN/FPI)*100 
16. RCPCRN = (PCRN/CBPI)*100 
17. RXPCRN3 = 0.333*[PCRN/DSDR + (PCRN/DSDR)+ (PCRN/DSDR)^_2] 
18. GCAU = 1.665*COF + 0.23*(PIGCRP + PIGCRP+ SOWF + SOWF^_^) 
+ 2.29*XBRL + 1.05*DYCWS 
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Table B.l .  (continued) 
Livestock and broiler production equations 
Beef cow inventories 
19. BFCWS = -3501.6 + 0.889*BFCWS + 163.77*RPFDRSA , 
(1.37) (16.15) (11.26) 
[0 .21]  
- 28.76*INTPR 
(0.77) 
[0.01] 
(S/M = 0.01, R-SQUARE = 0.97, DH = 1.21, OLS, 1969-1983) 
Feeder calf price 
20. RPFDRS = 15.025 + 0.840*RPFBF + 0.626*RPFBF - 5.A60*RPCRN 
(0.99) (3.65) (2.59) (3.32) 
[0.83] [0.62] [0.25] 
- 0.00062*BFCWS „ - 0.337*Q4 + 2.091*Q1 + 0.087*Q2 
(1.76) (0.28) (1.90) (0.07) 
[0.50] 
(S/M = 0.08, R-SQUARE = 0.89, DW = 0.54, 2SLS, 1971IV - 1982IV) 
Cattle on feed 
21. COF = -963.74 + 33.084*[RPFBF - 10.68*[1.705*RPCRN 
(0.46) (3.00) 
[0.17] [0.14] 
+ 0.0023*RPSBM]] + 0.772*COF + 0.0818*NETCLF + 1287.82*Q4 
(9.42) (1 .50) (9.65) 
[0.01] [0,31] 
- 655.67*Q1 - 465.80*Q2 
(4.25) (3.47) 
(S/M = 0.05, R-SQUARE =0.85, DW = 2.24, 2SLS, 1971IV -  1982IV) 
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Table B.l .  (continued) 
Production of fed beef 
22. XFBF = 2389.43 + 0.178*C0F , + 6.078*[RPFBF - 10.68*[1.705*RPCRN 
(8.90) (6.24) (3.06) 
[0.42] [0.07] [0.06] 
+ 0.0023*RPSBM]] - 440.34*07323 - 569.49*07534 + 46.07*Q4 
(3.58) (5.24) (1.20) 
[0.01] 
- 4.41*Q1 - 76.91*Q2 
(0.09) (1.96) 
(S/M = 0.03, R-SQUARE = 0.82, OW = 1.96, 2SLS, 1971IV - 1982IV) 
Sows farrowing 
23. SOWF = -276.91 + 8.69*RPPK - 61.45*RPCRN^ , 
(0.70) (2.21) (1.08) 
[0.12] [0.04] 
+ 0.496*[SOWF + SOWF „] - 0.064*Q4*[SOWF , + SOWF ,] 
(10.07) ^ ^ ^ (8.25) 
- 0.063*Q1*[S0WF^ , + S0WF._„] + 0.155*Q2*[SOWF. , + SOWF. ,1 
(7.78) ^ (16.99) 
+ 234.23*D7783*Q4 + 62.75*B7783*Q1 - 497.58*D7783*Q2 
(3.68) (0.95) (7.53) 
- 28.23*INTPR + 9.87*T 
(2.04) (1.86) 
(S/M = 0.04, R-SQUARE = 0.94, DH = 0.67, OLS, 1971IV -19831) 
Barrow and gilt slaughter 
24. BGSLT = 2673.28 + 0.646*[0.75*PIGCRP . + 0.25*PIGCRP .] 
(1.76) (12.18) "-2 C-3 
[0.79] 
- 0.014*Q4*[0.75*PIGCRP^ „ + 0.25*PIGCRP, ,] 
(1.57) 
[0.8] 
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Table B.l .  (continued) 
- 0.017*Q1*[0.75*PIGCRP + 0.25*PIGCRP. .] 
(2.09) 
[0 .80 ]  
+ 0.014*Q2*[0.75*PIGCRP + 0.25*PIGCRP. ,] 
(1.72) 
[0.79] 
+ 42.70*T - 128.85*RPCRN - 1647.31*07323 
(4.70) (0.56) (2.18) 
(S/M = 0.04, R-SQUARE = 0.91, DW = 1.65, OLS, 1971IV -19831) 
Sow slaughter 
25. SOWSLT = -267.07 - 6.35*RPPK + 132.33*RPCRN , 
(0.93) (2.71) (4.39) 
[0.24] [0.26] 
+ 0.213*[SOWF^ , + SOWF._„] + 0.007*Q4*[SOWF + SGWF 
(6.26) ^ ^ (1.46) ^ ^ 
[1.20] [1.19] 
- 0.017*Q1*[SOWF. + SOWF._,] - 0.003*Q2*[SGWF , + SOWF „] 
(4.04) (0.55) 
[1.24] [1.24] 
(S/M = 0.09, R-SQUARE = 0.81, DW = 1.23, OLS, 1971IV - 19831) 
Pork, production 
2 6 .  XPK = -95.02 + 0.186*BGSLT + 0.224*S0WSLT + 23.46*Q4 - 14.02*Q1 
(1.76) (36.98) (4.87) (2.36) (1.23) 
[0.97] [0.07] 
+ 16.15*Q2 - 1.46*T 
(1.51) (2.65) 
(S/M = 0.01, R-SQUARE = 0.99, DW = 0.78, 2SLS, 19711V -  19831) 
240 
Table B.l .  (continued) 
Broiler production 
27. XBRL = -62.84 + 9.48*RPBRL - 31.15*RPCRN , + 2.55*LPROD 
(0.27 (2.80) (1.66) (2.06) 
[0.09] [0.03] [0.12] 
+ 0.854*XBRL - 179.19*Q4 + 20.29*Q1 + 182.71*Q2 
(7.08) (9.93) (1.00) (11.05) 
(S/M = 0.02, R-SQUARE = 0.99, DH = 0.03, OLS, 1971IV - 19831) 
Livestock, and broiler production identities 
28. NETFDR = BFCWS „ - SCTOT 
t-z 
29. PIGCRP = SOWF*PIGSLITR 
30. RPFDRS = (PFDRS/FPI)*100 
31. RPFDRSA = 0.25*(RPFDRS + RPFDRS^ , + RPFDRS. » + RPFDRS. _) 
t-1 t-/ t-j 
32. RPFBF = (PFBF/FPI)*100 
33. RPPK = (PPK/FPI)*100 
34. RPBRL = (PBRL/FPI)*100 
Retail meat demand equations 
Retail choice beef demand 
35. QTBFC = 11.71 - 0.196*RPRCF + 0.128*RPRGBF + 0.022*RPRPK 
(3.81) (5.95) (3.53) (1.34) 
[1.15] [0.45] [0.10] 
- 0.009*RPRBRL + 0.0054*RDPIC - 1.697*07323 - 0.095*T - 0.215*Q4 
(0.21) (5.36) (3.36) (7.07) (1.75) 
[0 .02]  [1.10]  
- 0.118*Q1 + 0.021*Q2 
(0.99) (0.17) 
(S/M = 0.03, R-SQUARE = 0.87, DW = 1.41, 2SLS, 1971IV -  19831) 
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Table B.l .  (continued) 
Retail pork demand 
36. QPKC = 23.95 + 0.011*RPRCBF + 0.093*RPRGBF - 0.165*RPRPK 
(11.64) (0.53) (4.09) (15.39) 
[0.06] [0.32] [0.71] 
- 0.008*RPRBL - 0.0003*RDFIC - 0.042*T + 0.875*Q4 - 0.016*Q1 
(0.34) (0.42) (5.17) (9.75) (0.19) 
[0.02] [0.06] 
- 0.454*Q2 
(5.05) 
(S/M = 0.02, R-SQUARE = 0.97, DW = 1.26, 2SLS, 1971IV - 19831) 
Retail broiler demand 
37. QBRLC = 4.679 - 0.016*RPRCBF + 0.071*RPRGBF + 0.020*RPRPK 
(2.65) (0.96) (3.54) (1.64) 
[0.14] [0.37] [0.13] 
- 0.129*RPRBRL + 0.0013*RDFIC + 0.061*T - 0.619*Q4 - 0.348*Q1 
(4.26) (2.05) (8.04) (7.52) (4.81) 
[0.41] [0.40] 
+ 0.471*Q2 
(6.15) 
(S/M = 0.02, R-SQUARE = 0.96, DW = 1.32, 2SLS, 19711V - 19831) 
Retail meat demand identities 
38. QTBFC = [0.77*(XFBF + XNBF) - BFEX]/USPOP 
39. QPKC = [XPK. - (PKSTK - PKSTK^_^) + PKM - PKEX]/USPOP 
40. QBRLC = [XBRL - (BRLSTK - BRLSTK^_^) - BRLEX]/USPOP 
41. RPRCBF = (PRCBF/CPI)*100 
42. RPRPK = (PRPK/CPI)*100 
43. RPRBRL = (PRBRL/CPI)*100 
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Table B.l .  (continued) 
Farm-retail price margin equations 
Fed beef margin 
44. MFBF = -13.349 + 0.712*PFBF + 1.015*PFBF + 10.039*WHMP 
(4.89) (2.78) (5.08) (12.52) 
[0.28] [0.40] [0.52] 
- 0.788*BPAB - 0.72*Q4 + 2.119*Q1 - 0.160*Q2 
(2.70) (0.63) (2.12) (0.13) 
[0.09] 
(S/M = 0.03, R-SQUARE = 0.99, DW = 1.37, 2SLS, 1971IV - 19831) 
Pork margin 
45. MPK = -3.858 + 0.198*PPK + 0.842*PPK + 7.753*WHMP 
(1.52) (1.60) (9.61) (21.33) 
[0.09] [0.40] [0.59] 
- 0.456*BPAP - 0.230*Q4 + 1.269*Q1 - 1.870*Q2 
(0.73) (0.28) (1.72) (2.46) 
[0.03] 
(S/M = 0.03, R-SQUARE = 0.98, DW = 1.51, 2SLS, 1971IV - 19831) 
Broiler margin 
46. MBRL = 8.862 + 0.522*PBRL + 0.248*PBRL + 3.013*WHPD 
(7.43) (3.72) (1.76) (10.09) 
[0.33] [0.16] [0.28] 
+ 0.491*Q4 - 0.035*Q1 - 0.823*Q2 
(0.94) (0.09) (2.48) 
(S/M = 0.03, R-SQUARE = 0.95, DW = 1.99, 2SLS, 19711V - 19831) 
Farm-retail margin identities 
47. MFBF = PRCBF - PFBF 
48. MPK = PRPK - PPK 
49. MBRL = PRBRL - PBRL 
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Table B.2. Definitions and sources of data appearing in the model 
Variable Definition Units Source 
Endogenous variables 
APCRN area planted to corn, U.S. 
AVAIL total quantity of corn eligible for 
placement into Farmer-Owned Reserve 
Program 
BFCWS inventory of beef cows and heifers that 
have calved, end of period, annual series 
BGSLT barrow and gilt slaughter under federal 
inspection 
COF cattle on feed, 13 states 
FORSTK Farmer-Owned Reserve stocks of corn, end 
of period 
GCAU grain consuming animal units, end of 
period 
ICRN commercial stocks of corn, end of period, 
adjusted to calendar quantities 
mil. acres FOS 
mil. bu. derived 
thou. hd. LMS 
thou. hd. LMS 
thou. hd. LPOS 
mil. bu. GLA 
MBRL farm-retail price margin for broilers 
MFBF farm-retail price margin for choice beef 
MPK farm-retail price margin for pork 
NETFDR number of calves on farms proxy 
PBRL farm price of young chickens, liveweight 
PCRN average corn price received by farmers, 
calendar quarters 
PCRNA four quarter moving average of corn 
prices (PCRN) 
PFBF Omaha price of choice slaughter steers, 
900-1100 lbs. 
thou. 
mil. bu. 
6/lb. 
é/lb. 
â / l h .  
thou. hd. 
6 / l b .  
$/bu. 
$/bu. 
$/cwt. 
derived 
derived 
derived 
derived 
derived 
derived 
LPOS 
FOS 
derived 
LPOS 
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Table B.2.  (continued) 
Variable Definition Units Source 
PFDRS 
PIGCRP 
PLACE 
PPK 
PRBRL 
PRCBF 
PRPK 
QBRLC 
QCEXNURS 
QCRNEX 
QCRNFEED 
QCRNFSI 
QCRNFSIC 
QPKC 
QTBFC 
RCPCRN 
feeder steer price, Kansas City, all 
weights and grades 
pig crop, U.S. Dec .-Feb., Mar.-May, 
Jun.-Aug., Sept.-Nov. quarters 
total placements of corn into Farmer-
Owned Reserve program 
barrow and gilt price, 7 markets 
retail price of young chickens, RTC, 
4 region average 
retail price of choice beef 
retail price of pork 
per capita consumption of young chicken, 
U.S., RTC weight 
U.S. corn exports, all destinations 
except USSR 
total U.S. exports of corn, adjusted to 
calendar quarters 
domestic corn feed use, adjusted to 
calendar quarters 
domestic corn food, seed, and industrial 
use, adjusted to calendar quarters 
per capita domestic corn food, seed, and 
industrial use 
per capita consumption of commercially 
produced pork, U.S. 
per capita consumption of table quality 
beef, U.S. 
average corn price received by farmers 
deflated by CBPI 
$/cwt. LMS 
thou, hd. LMS 
mil. bu. GLA 
$/cwt• 
^Vlb. 
i / l h ,  
i / V a .  
lbs. 
mil. bu. 
mil. bu. 
mil. bu. 
bu. 
lbs. 
lbs . 
$/bu. 
LPOS 
LPOS 
LPOS 
LPOS 
derived 
mil. bu. FAC 
derived 
derived 
derived 
derived 
derived 
derived 
derived 
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Table B.2. (continued) 
Variable Definition Units Source 
REDEMP total redemptions of corn from Farmer-
Owned Reserve program 
RPBRL farm price of young chickens (PBRL) 
deflated by FPI 
RPCRN average corn price received by farmers 
(PCRN) deflated by FPI 
RPFBF Omaha choice slaughter steer price (PFBF) 
deflated by FPI 
RPFDS Kansas City feeder steer price (PFDRS) 
deflated by FPI 
RPFDRSA four quarter moving average of deflated 
feeder steer prices (RPFDRS) 
RPPK barrow and gilt price, 7 markets (PPK) 
deflated by FPI 
RPRBRL retail price of young chickens(PRBRL) 
deflated by CPI 
RPRCBF retail price of choice beef (PRCBF) 
deflated by CPI 
RPRPK retail price of pork (PRPK) deflated by 
CP I 
RXPCRN3 three quarter moving average of corn 
prices deflated by DSDR 
SOWF sows farrowed, U.S., Dec.-Feb., Mar.-May, 
Jun.-Aug., Sept.-Nov. quarters 
SOWSLT sow slaughter under federal inspection 
XBRL total production of broiler meat, RTC 
weight 
mil. bu. GLA 
i H h .  
$/bu. 
$/cwt. 
$/cwt. 
$/cwt. 
$/cwt. 
H V o .  
é/lb. 
6/lb. 
$/bu. 
derived 
derived 
derived 
derived 
derived 
derived 
derived 
derived 
derived 
derived 
thou. hd. LMS 
thou. hd. 
mil. lbs. 
LMS 
LPOS 
XCRN total annual production of corn LI. bu. FOS 
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Table B.2.  (continued) 
Variable Definition Units Source 
xfbf total production of fed steer and heifer mil. lbs. derived 
beef, carcass weight 
XPK commercial production of pork, carcass 
weight 
mil. lbs. LPOS 
Exogenous variables 
AUEC9J three quarter moving average of animal thou. derived 
units in EC-9 countries and Japan 
BFEX exports and shipments of beef, carcass mil. lbs. LPOS 
weight 
BPAB beef by-product allowance (carcass plus i^/lb. LPOS 
farm) 
BPAP pork by-product allowance tHh. LPOS 
BRLEX exports and shipments of young chickens mil. Ibis. LPOS 
BRLSTK young chicken ending stocks mil. lbs. LPOS 
CBPI producer price index, cereal and bakery index PPI 
products, 1967=100 
CCCSTK CCC-owned stocks of corn, end of period, mil. bu. derived 
adjusted to calendar quarters 
CPI consumer price index, all items, 1967=100 index SCB 
DSDR U.S. dollars per SDR, average per period $ IFS 
DYCWS inventory of dairy cows and heifers that thou. hd. LMS 
have calved, end of period, annual series 
interpolated to quarterly 
EXPCOMP total corn exports of major competitors, mil. bu. derived 
interpolated to quarterly series 
FPI index of prices paid by farmers, all index AGP 
production items, 1977=100 
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Table B.2.  (continued) 
Variable Definition Units Source 
INTPR four quarter moving average of interest 
rates charged by banks on short term 
loans 
percent FRB 
LPROD index of labor productivity in poultry index AGS 
production, interpolated to quarterly 
series, 1977=100 
PART proportion of farmers in compliance decimal FOS 
with current acreage program provisions 
PIGSLITR pigs saved per litter, U.S. average ^/litter derived 
PKEX exports and shipments of pork, carcass mil. lbs. LPOS 
weight 
PKM imports of pork, carcass weight mil. lbs. LPOS 
PKSTK cold storage stocks of pork, end of mil. lbs. LPOS 
period 
PSBA four quarter moving average of soybean $/bu. derived 
prices received by farmers 
PV summary variable of expected returns to $/bu. derived 
participation in Farmer-Owned Reserve 
program 
QCEXNURS U.S. exports of corn to USSR mil. bu. FAC 
RCP!fflT average wheat price received by farmers $/bu. derived 
deflated by CBPI 
RDPGRN effective diversion payment for corn $/bu. derived 
deflated by FPI 
RDPIC per capita disposable personal income thou. $ derived 
deflated by CPI 
RPRGBF retail price of ground beef deflated by iHh, derived 
CP I 
RPSBM soybean meal price, Decatur, 44 percent, $/ton derived 
deflated by FPI 
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Table B.2.  (continued) 
Variable Definition Units Source 
RPSCRN effective support rate for corn deflated 
by FPI 
RPWHT average wheat price received deflated by 
FPI 
RV opportunity cost of current marketing of 
corn released from the Farmer-Owned 
Reserve program 
SCTOT total commercial calf slaughter, current 
and previous quarter 
T time trend variable 
USPOP total U.S. population 
WHMP average earnings for production workers 
in meat packing 
WHPD average earnings for production workers 
in poultry dressing 
XNBF total production of nonfed steer and 
heifer beef 
$/bu. 
$ /bu. 
$/bu. 
integer 
rail. 
$/hr. 
$/hr. 
derived 
derived 
derived 
thou. hd. LPOS 
derived 
CPR 
EE 
EE 
mil. lbs. derived 
YLDHA average U.S. corn yield per harvested 
acre 
bu. FOS 
Dummy variables 
CCD 
DPRELS 
dummy variable for redemption period 0,1 
following FOR interest waiver, equals 1 
in 1981II, 0 otherwise 
dummy variable for periods of reserve 0,1 
release price adjustment, equals 1 in 
19801, 1980III, 1981IV, 1982IV, 0 
otherwise 
D4 1 in fourth calendar quarter, 0 otherwise 0,1 
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Table B.2.  (continued) 
Variable Definition Units Source 
D23 
D79 
D781 
D823 
D7323 
D7534 
D7783 
D8034 
Q1 
Q2 
Q4 
1 in second and third calendar quarter, 0 0,1 
otherwise 
1 after 1979IV, 0 otherwise 0,1 
1 in 1977IV and 19781, 0 otherwise 0,1 
1 in 1982X11, 0 otherwise 0,1 
1 in 1973II, 1973III, 0 otherwise 0,1 
1 in 1975III, 1975IV, 0 otherwise 0,1 
1 after 19771, 0 otherwise 0,1 
1 in 1980III, 198GIV, 0 otherwise 0,1 
dummy variable for quarter 1, equals 1 -1,0,1 
in calendar quarter 1, -1 in calendar 
quarter 3, 0 otherwise 
dummy variable for quarter 2, equals 1 -1,0,1 
in calendar quarter 2, -1 in calendar 
quarter 3, 0 otherwise 
dummy variable for quarter 4, equals 1 -1,0,1 
in calendar quarter 4, -1 in calendar 
quarter 3, 0 otherwise 
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Generation of the Derived Variables of the Model 
Endogenous variables 
AVAIL 
Only those producers in compliance with the terms of the current year's 
acreage programs were eligible to place grain in the Farmer-Owned Reserve. 
If no such programs were in existence, PART = 1.0. The amount of eligible 
grain is thus estimated as: 
AVAIL = PART*(D4*XCRN + ICRN^_^) 
GCAU 
According to Van Meir (1984) and Allen and Devers (1975), grain 
consuming animal units is equal to 1.5 times the number of cattle on feed 
plus 1.05 times the number of dairy cows on farms plus 0.23 times hogs held 
for market plus 0.00653 times broilers on feed. From the historical data, 
the number of cattle on feed in the U.S. was estimated at 111 percent of the 
number of cattle on feed in the thirteen quarterly reporting states. 
Similarly the historical data indicated that the average RTC weight per 
broiler was 2.85 pounds. Assuming then that broilers are on feed for a 
period of one quarter, and hogs two quarters, and converting broiler 
production to one thousand units for consistency, GCAU becomes: 
GCAU = 1.11*(1.5)*C0F + 0.23*(PIGCRP + PIGCRP^ , + SOWF + SOWF, ,) 
t - i  t - i  
+ (1000/2.85)*XBRL + 1.05*DYCWS 
or 
GCAU = 1.665*C0F + 0.23(PIGCRP + PIGCRP^_^ + SOWF + SOWF^.^) 
+ 2.29*XBRL + 1.05*DYCWS 
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QCRNFEED, QCRNFSI, QCRNEX, ICRN, CCCSTK 
USDA's crop year quarters for reporting data are October-December, 
January-March, April-May and June-September. Because the third and fourth 
quarters of the crop year are of unequal duration, the data in the study 
reported on this basis was adjusted to three month quarters for consistency. 
Although this approach may introduce some bias, it was felt preferable to 
retaining quarters of unequal duration. 
The adjustments in corn utilization were: 
If calendar quarter = 2 then 
QCRNFEED = 1.5*QCRNFEED ' 
QCRNFSI = 1.5*QCRNFSI' 
QCRNEX = 1.5*QCRNEX' 
If calendar quarter = 3 then 
QCRNFEED = QCRNFEED' - 0.5*QCRNFEED' 
QCRNFSI = QCRNFSI' - 0.5*QCRNFSI'^_^ 
QCRNEX = QCRNEX' - 0.5*QCRNEX't-1 
If calendar quarter = 1 or 4 then 
QCRNFEED = QCRNFEED' 
QCRNFSI = QCRNFSI' 
QCRNEX = QCRNEX' 
where ; 
QCRNFEED', QCRNFSI', QCRNEX' denote original USDA reported data 
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For stock variables the adjustments were: 
If calendar quarter = 2 then 
CCCSTK = CCCSTK' + 0.5(CCCSTK' - CCCSTiC'^_p 
ICRN = ICRN^_^ + CCCSTK^_j, + FORSTK^_^ - QCRNFEED 
- QCRNFSI - QCRNEX - CCCSTK - FORSTK 
If calendar quarter = 1 or 3 or 4 then 
CCCSTK = CCCSTK' 
ICRN = ICRN' 
where : 
ICRN', CCCSTK' denote original data 
METFDR 
The number of calves on farms is proxied in the model as the lagged 
number of beef cows minus calf slaughter in the current and previous 
quarters: 
NETFDR = BFCWS „ - SCTOT 
t-Z 
XFBF 
XFBF = [FCM39ST*FCDRWT]/1000 
where: 
FCM39ST = fed cattle marketed, 39 states, thou. hd. 
(source: LMS) 
FCDRWT = weighted average dress weight, steers and heifers 
under federal inspection; wts. = 2/3 for steers, 
1/3 for heifers (source: LS) 
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Exogenous variables 
AUEC9J 
The number of animal units in the EC-9 countries and Japan was computed 
CTEC9 = total cattle numbers in the EC-9, thou, hd., 
interpolated from annual data to quarterly series 
(source: FAC) 
CTJP = total cattle numbers in Japan, thou, hd., interpolated 
from annual data to quarterly series (source; FAC) 
HGEC9 = total number of hogs in EC-9 countries, thou, hd., 
interpolated from annual data to quarterly series 
(source: FAC) 
HGJP = total number of hogs in Japan, thou, hd., interpolated 
from annual data to quarterly series (source; FAC) 
Major competing exporters of corn in the world market include 
Argentina, Thailand, and South Africa. Only annual export data are 
available for these countries, reported on the basis of their respective 
marketing year. These marketing years run as: 
as a three quarter moving average of: 
AUEC9J = 1.1*(CTEC9 + CTJP) + 0.23*(HGEC9 + HGJP) 
where: 
EXPCOMP • 
Country Marketing year 
Argentina 
South Africa 
Thailand 
March/February 
May/April 
July/June 
To align these periods with the quarterly model, it was assumed that the 
marketing years for Argentina and South Africa began with the second 
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calendar quarter, and for Thailand, the third calendar quarter. According 
to USDA (1972), 65 percent of all competitor exports take place in the first 
six months of their marketing year, and 35 percent in the last half of the 
year. These proportions were assumed in the study to be equally spread over 
the quarters in the first, and second half of the year respectively. Thus, 
the proportion of annual competitor exports by calendar quarter were 
established as: 
Calendar quarter 
Exporter 1^ 
Argentina 0.175 0.325 0.325 0.175 
South Africa 0.175 0.325 0.325 0.175 
Thailand 0.175 0.175 0.325 0.325 
Hence, quarterly exports of corn by the major competitors were calculated 
as : 
EXCOMP = 0.039368*(W1*EXPARG + W2*EXPSA + W3*EXPTHAI) 
where ; 
W1, W2, W3 = quarterly proportion of annual corn exports for 
Argentina, South Africa, and Thailand, 
respectively 
EXPARC = annual corn exports of Argentina, Mar.-Feb. year, 
thou, metric tons (source: FAC) 
EXPSA = annual corn exports of South Africa, May-Apr. 
year, thou, metric tons (source: FAC) 
EXPTHAI = annual corn exports of Thailand, July-June year, 
thou, metric tons (source: FAC) 
The factor 0.039368 converts thousand metric tons to million bushels. 
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PIGSLITR 
PIGSLITR = PIGCRP/SOWF 
PSBA 
PSBA = 0.25*(PSB + PSB^ , + PSB^ » + PSB» , C—1 t-Z [-j 
where : 
PSB = average soybean price received by farmers, $/bu. 
(source; FOO) 
PV 
The expected returns to participation in the Farmer-Owned Reserve 
program was defined in accordance with Equations 6.5 - 6.7. The formula is: 
PV = max(PVl, PV2) 
where : 
0.97*PEXP - (1 + CCCINT*YRINT)*PLOAN 
PVl = PLOAN + % 
(1 + TBILL) 
. SPMT - SCOSX . 
PV2 - PIOAS + SPMT - SCOST 4 + SPMJLlJCOST 
1 + TBILL + TBILL)^ 
PLOAN = FOR loan level, $/bu. 
PEXP = expected redemption price (calculated as average of PRELS 
and PCALL) $/bu. 
PRELS = FOR release, or trigger level, $/bu. 
PCALL = FOR call level, $/bu. 
CCCINT = interest charge per annum on FOR loans 
YRINT = number of years interest accrues on FOR loans 
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SPMT = FOR storage subsidy, é/bu./year 
SCOST = on-farm cash storage costs (assumed 15 ni/bu./year) 
TBILL = rate of return on government-issued Treasury bills 
(source: FRB) 
Unless otherwise specified, the above data are reported in Burnstein and 
Langley (1985). 
RCPWHT 
RCPWHT = (PWHT/CBPI)*100 
where : 
PWHT = average wheat price received by farmers, $/bu. 
(source: WOS) 
rdpcrn 
RDPCRN = (DPCRN/FPI)*100 
where : 
DPCRN = effective diversion payment for corn (source: 
University of Missouri Agricultural Modeling 
Group - Data Bank) 
RDPIC 
RDPIC = ((DPI/USPOP)*100000)/CPI 
where: 
DPI = U.S. disposable personal income, bil. $ (source: SCB) 
257 
RPRGBF 
RPRGBF = (PRGBF/CPI)*100 
where : 
PRGBF = estimated retail price of ground beef, iHh. 
Because the USDA's series on retail ground beef prices was discontinued 
in 1980, retail prices were estimated from the price index, CPUBVHA. The 
formula used to calculate PRGBF converts the index with base 100 in 1967 
into a series with an average price of 52.256 in 1967. The formula is: 
PRGBF = 0.5225*CPUBVHA 
where: 
CPUBVHA = retail price index for "ground beef other than 
canned" (source: MLR) 
RJSBM 
RPSBM = (PSBM/FPI)*100 
where : 
PSBM = soybean meal price, 44 percent, Decatur, $/ton 
(source: MLR) 
rpscrn 
RPSCRN = (PSCRN/FPI)*100 
where : 
PSCRN = effective support rate for corn, $/bu. (source: 
University of Missouri Agricultural Modeling 
Group - Data Bank) 
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RPWHT 
RPWHT = (PWHT/FPI)*100 
where ; 
FWHT = average wheat price received by farmers $/bu. 
(source: WOS) 
RV 
The opportunity cost of a current cash sale after release was defined 
in accordance with Equation 6.11. The formula is: 
1.10*PRELS + (1 + CCCINT^ *YRINT^ ,)*PLOAN^ ,*TBILL RV = t-4 t^^ t-4 
(1 + TBILL) 
The variables are defined in the PV formula above. 
I 
The trend variable begins in 1971, and is defined as 1 in 1971IV, 2 in 
19721, etc. 
XNBF 
XNBF = XBF - XFBF - XCWS - XBULLS 
where : 
XCWS = (CWKCNUS*CWKGAUS)/1000 
XBULLS = (BLKCNS*BLKGAUS)/1000 
XBF = commercial production of beef, mil. lbs. (source: LMS) 
CWKCWS = commercial cow slaughter, thou. hd. (source: LS) 
CWK.GAUS = dress weight, cows under federal inspection, lbs. 
(source: LS) 
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BLKCNUS = commercial bull and stag slaughter, thou. hd. 
(source: LS) 
BLKGAUS = dress weight, bulls under federal inspection, lbs. 
(source: LS) 
